Semua Kabar

Donald Trump’s No-Strategy Strategy on Iran

Last week, Israel began an extensive bombing campaign on Iran, in what the Israeli Prime Minister,Benjamin Netanyahu, has claimed is an attempt to wipe out the country’s nuclear program. Iran has fired back missiles in response, but Israel’s military superiority has been clear: it has damaged nuclear sites and energy facilities across the country, and has assassinated key figures in Iran’s military leadership. PresidentDonald Trump, who has for months been saying that he would like to sign a nuclear deal with Iran—and who, in 2018, pulled out of the agreement that Barack Obama’s Administration had negotiated—has nevertheless offered significant military and rhetorical support to Israel’s current campaign. Despite what seemed like some initial reluctance to support an Israeli attack, he has now repeatedly threatened Iran, and its Supreme Leader, and called for an evacuation of Tehran. He has indicated that the United States may formally enter the conflict, perhaps in an effort to destroy Iran’s Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, which is considered reachable only with American weaponry.

To weigh this possibility, and to reflect on the United States’ role in the conflict, I recently spoke by phone with Aaron David Miller, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He previously worked at the State Department, and played a role in Middle East peace negotiations for decades, most notably at the end of the Clinton Administration. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed why Trump decided to support Israel’s war against Iran, what the Iran conflict reveals about the U.S.-Israeli relationship, and why people continue to misunderstand Trump’s approach to foreign policy.

What is your understanding, as of now, of how the Trump Administration became embroiled in the conflict between Israel and Iran?

I think it reflects a President who basically does not want a major conflict, and who didn’t want to involve the United States in a major conflict, but has not tried or figured out a way to get out of the conflict or to make American intervention less likely. That is his dilemma. We’ve got F-35s out there. We’ve got Aegis missile systems. We’ve got Patriots. He’s given the Israelis a tremendous political margin for support. He’s beaten back many of theMAGAenthusiasts who think that supporting Israel is throwing good money after bad. And he has now even provided rhetorical support.

So, if he didn’t want to get the United States involved, why is he doing these things?

To Donald Trump, it’s always a question of, How do I look? Am I being played? Am I being perceived as weak? Did I overcommit or overpromise the possibility of a deal with Iran? I think he’s trying to make a virtue out of necessity. But, whenever Trump was briefed that the Israelis were about to strike, he had the capacity and the personality and the power to tell Netanyahu to wait and, at a minimum, to get time.

TheTimesreported, on Tuesday, that the Administration felt boxed in, essentially, and that Netanyahu was going to conduct a military assault on Iran regardless. And so, to some degree, they had to go along because they couldn’t stop it. You seem to be saying that, in fact, they did have a certain amount of power.

Let me tell you why I think that. It’s not a popular view, and it’s not a view that many people hold. Donald Trump, in the last six weeks, has done things in and around and to Israel that no Republican President and no Democratic President I ever worked for, from Jimmy Carter to George W. Bush, has ever done. He has blown through two of the three basic political laws of gravity that have governed the U.S.-Israeli relationship. One is no daylight. In March, he, without Israel’s permission, authorized his hostage negotiator to open a dialogue with Hamas, a group that had already killed American citizens and had been responsible for the deaths of Israeli-American dual nationals. He cut a deal with the Houthis without the knowledge of the Israeli Prime Minister, which implicitly said that, as long as you don’t attack our naval assets, we have a ceasefire. He didn’t say anything about drones and ballistic missiles against Israel. Then, over the objections of Netanyahu, he removed sanctions on the new President of Syria. And he summoned Netanyahu to Washington from Budapest in April. Presumably, the Prime Minister thought he was coming to negotiate down tariffs. And then Trump announces, with the Prime Minister of Israel standing next to him, that he’s now opened direct negotiations with Iran. No other American President would have done something in this way. So that’s the no-daylight policy being discarded.

Second is the imperviousness to political costs or consequences. Had a Democratic President done the things that I just identified, somebody would have called for their impeachment. Trump’s margin for dealing more independently and more critically with the current Prime Minister of Israel is much larger than any American President has ever had. And this posture dates back to the first Trump term, when he believed that Netanyahu was using him. He doesn’t have the same emotional commitment to the idea of Israel, the people of Israel, the security of Israel that Joe Biden had. Israel to him is a means to an end.

The third political law of gravity that’s governed the relationship is aversion to serious and sustained pressure. Despite violating the first two, he wouldn’t or couldn’t get to No. 3. On an issue of extreme importance to Israel, which involved American equities and interests and potentially American lives, he couldn’t bring himself to say, “Look, you know, I know you have got to do what you have got to do, but I can’t be there for you. I need more time.” He may not have said “Attaboy” and green-lighted this thing, but he clearly didn’t say no.

When I read theTimespiece, I thought, O.K., this is something that we’ve seen before: an American Administration leaking that they were backed into a corner by the Israelis, that they had no choice. And what you seem to be saying is that Trump and his Administration actually had the political leeway that other American Administrations felt like they did not have, and he just didn’t take it. So we’ve ended up in the same situation that we’ve ended up in before, even though this could have been avoided without the same political cost.

Yeah, I’m suggesting to you a counterfactual. And others may say, “Oh, don’t be ridiculous, Aaron. Trump understood that Iran is a bad actor. There was no doubt in his mind.” I don’t buy that because I don’t think he’s committed to Netanyahu. Certainly he doesn’t care about the humanitarian situation for Iranians or Palestinians.

Let me put it this way. Trump is now managing three U.S.-mediated conflicts: Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Hamas, Israel-Iran. He has no effective strategy for how to deploy or to even try to deploy U.S. influence or leverage on any of them. He is situational. He is transactional. In the end, he has no strategy. Netanyahu came to him with a plan, and he may have had doubts but he didn’t say no. And once the plan was executed he responded with no broader concerns or worries about what the day after is going to look like. I think he’s moved away from being a guy who had serious doubts, worried that he was backed into a corner, and now he is, I think, reluctantly committed to, well—

He doesn’t seem reluctant in his public comments.

Right, the reluctance is gone, because what’s happened is, I think, he respects success and power. The Israelis have demonstrated success and power against a very bad actor. So, having passed up the opportunity to basically say, “No, give me more time,” he’s now contemplating the use of American military force in conjunction with the Israelis. Not to simply add on to what the Israelis are doing but to bring American power to bear, to do the one thing the Israelis cannot do that Americans can: long-range refuelling and massive-ordnance penetrators delivered by B-2 bombers that can be used to go after Iran’s Fordow reactor. And I would bet in his mind he’s not giving up the idea that getting involved could actually somehow translate itself into leverage.

He could go to Netanyahu and say, “Look, you see what I just did? We have to think about the day after and you have to stop.” But this is where I think it breaks down. I think the Iranians are going to respond. They have thousands of short-range ballistic missiles. Geography is destiny. They’ve already demonstrated in September, 2019, that they could orchestrate an attack on Saudi oil facilities with cruise missiles and drones. I’m not sure what the Iranians will do given the asymmetry of power, but there’s a very real possibility that they will strike U.S. assets in Iraq, in Syria, and in the Gulf. So that’s the day after.

And I should add that, unless Trump is prepared to move toward regime change, the Americans and Israelis cannot destroy the Iranian nuclear program. There are three models for regime change in the region. No. 1 is Egypt, or Tunisia—millions of Egyptians and Tunisians out in the streets, and security forces refuse to fire. No 2.: You have an organized, cohesive military force that has credibility—in the Syrian case, it was an Al Qaeda affiliate backed by the Turks. They didn’t even know how quickly they could get to Damascus. The hollowness of the regime facilitated this. The third option is Iraq and Afghanistan. None of these regime-change scenarios are appropriate or relevant to the situation that exists in Iran. So the question becomes: even if they destroy Fordow, can they permanently destroy an Iranian nuclear program? What is to stop reconstitution?

Do you think Israel’s goal is really to wipe out the nuclear program or is it broader?

I think Netanyahu has a problem. Can they really cease and desist knowing that they didn’t hit the main nuclear site? If you don’t hit Fordow, you can’t even make a credible claim that you demolished the program or constrained it for more than six months, maybe. No, Netanyahu needs Trump, and Trump may figure he needs to do this in order to get the Israelis to stand down. But he would have to show resolve.

In that case, it is not going to work because Trump does not have the resolve to see something complex through.

Right, so then it’s a military campaign, and what is the end result? What’s the day after an American strike going to look like? What happens? The Americans can maybe set the nuclear program back a year or two. Is the plan to do more strikes every three months? I don’t think that’s sustainable.

In terms of the broader relationships here, the U.S. always claims to have been put into a box by the Israelis. You and I talked about this during the Biden Administration. What does it say about our relationship to Israel that we keep finding ourselves in this place, or at least claiming to?

We are infantilizing the American Presidency. Look, I understand Biden and I am sympathetic to him.

You are the last person in America.

From the moment I saw his speech, after October 7th, about a black hole of loss, there was no way Biden could borrow from the three baskets that were available to him: restrict U.S. military assistance or make it conditional, introduce U.N. Security Council resolutions or vote for someone else’s, or unilaterally recognize Palestinian statehood and basically go on a campaign to question the value and the integrity of his Israeli partner.

Trump boxed himself in. He boxed himself in, in my judgment, by setting unrealistic deadlines for negotiations. He boxed himself in because he didn’t focus at all on the looming possibility that this Israeli government was seriously thinking of striking Iran. I also don’t think he drew the lesson from watching Netanyahu for six months in Gaza. Netanyahu wanted “total victory,” not negotiation. Had Trump not proposed these incremental hostage releases, there would have been no negotiation. There would have been no humanitarian assistance into Gaza. He also misread the Iranians in negotiations. And he misread the Israelis in terms of Netanyahu’s capacity to be flexible and to default to the military option. He refused to acknowledge that Netanyahu is no longer the risk-averse Prime Minister he was when I worked on this issue. He is now risk-ready and willing to go beyond his predecessors. Trump boxed himself in, because he’s not paying attention. He’s not focussed. He made the same mistake with Volodymyr Zelensky and Vladimir Putin. The conventional narrative that this is all a result of a crafty, clever Israeli Prime Minister who played Donald Trump? I’m sorry, no. He wasn’t willing to stand up and say no.

I agree with you about this infantilizing narrative that the Israelis play the Americans—there’s something silly about it. I would just say, though, that there’s also something tragic about the fact that, even if Trump is willing to go against the Israelis or to irritate Netanyahu in a way previous American Presidents were not, it still seems like Netanyahu’s managed to get to a place where, on the two issues that he probably cares about most, Iran and the Palestinians, he’s going to get what he wants, even from Trump. And so Trump may butt heads with him or have annoying news conferences with him, but fundamentally he’s going to get close to what he wants from Trump on both those issues.

I think that’s right. And Netanyahu has another ally, which is Hamas, the bad actor. And he’s got the mullahs. And the fact that those two actors helped plead his case—I think that also factors into Trump’s thinking. In terms of Netanyahu, I could argue one con man understands another. But Trump also understands that Netanyahu is dealing with bad actors and, by implication, so is Trump. As bad as Netanyahu may be, Hamas and Iran are worse.

It’s getting tougher to say that as the war in Gaza drags on.

Was the Obama nuclear deal working and did Netanyahu want a new one from Trump, one that I imagine would have looked relatively similar to the first?

The answer to the first question is that the nuclear deal was flawed but functional, because there are no good deals with Iran. There are only transactions. There are no transformations.

And Netanyahu does not believe in negotiations with Iran. He has certain principles. And, more importantly, Netanyahu’s aspiration, ultimately, is the end of this regime. He thinks that, if you want an end to the Iranian nuclear program, you have to change the regime. You don’t moderate their behavior. You change them. He knows that. And that means any negotiation, however credible, however long it delays things—he is not interested. He will only accept it if he has to. ♦

The Dangerous Consequences of Donald Trump’s Strikes in Iran

On Saturday, PresidentDonald Trumpbrought the United States into Israel’s war against Iran. American planes and submarinesstruck three sitesin Iran, including two nuclear enrichment facilities—at Natanz and Fordow—and a complex near Isfahan that was believed to contain stores of uranium. The Israeli government had been pushing for Trump to strike, in part because the Fordow site was believed to be reachable only with American aircraft and weaponry. Prior toIsrael’s attack on Iran, which began a little more than a week ago, Trump had repeatedly stated that he wanted to make a nuclear deal with Iran, despite, in his first term, having pulled the U.S. out of Barack Obama’s nuclear deal with the country.

On Saturday night, in a televised address, Trump claimed that the three sites were “completely and totally obliterated,” and said that Iran must now “make peace,” warning of more attacks if they did not. The actual extent of the damage is not yet known, nor is it clear if and how Iran will retaliate. (Trump had announced on Thursday that the decision on whether to strike would be made “within two weeks” and that there remained a possibility of negotiation.)

Late on Saturday, I spoke by phone with James M. Acton, the chair and co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed why even a successful strike might do less damage to the Iranian nuclear program than the Trump Administration hopes it will, whether the action could lead to a larger conflict with Iran, and why Trump’s decision to pull out of Obama’s nuclear deal wrecked the best chance to curtail Iran’s nuclear program.

What are your first impressions of what happened tonight?

I’m kind of appalled, to be honest, as an American citizen—appalled that the President would start military action without congressional authorization. That’s my immediate reaction. But, as a nuclear-policy analyst, I’m very worried that this is the beginning of a prolonged conflict, not the end of one.

In a lot of the coverage I have been seeing, and in a lot of the advocacy for what President Trump ended up doing tonight, there has been the impression that this would be a one-and-done thing—the President would authorize a strike, Fordow would be destroyed, the Iranian nuclear program would be ended, and it would be a very quick, completely decisive military intervention. There’s two reasons why I think that’s wrong. The first one is immediate Iranian retaliation. Iran has many short-range ballistic missiles that can reach American bases and American assets in the region. Israel has not particularly targeted that infrastructure. It’s been primarily focussed on Iran’s longer-range missiles that can reach Israel. So I’m expecting to see some pretty dramatic attempted retaliation by Iran, and I think that puts enormous pressure on the President to respond again. That is the first pathway to immediate escalation in the short term.

In the slightly longer term, I believe it’s very likely that Iran’s going to reconstitute its nuclear program. I think Iran is likely to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (N.P.T.) and thus kick out inspectors. The N.P.T. prohibits non-nuclear-weapon states, such as Iran, from acquiring nuclear weapons, and requires them to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.) safeguards, such as inspections, to verify that commitment. That puts us in the position where an American President or Israel might start striking Iran again and again.

I don’t want to speculate about exactly how successful these strikes were, but, if the strikes did what Trump has claimed, how much of a blow would that be to the Iranian nuclear program?

My answer may be a slightly unsatisfactory one, but it depends on how much else is destroyed. There are two key things that worry me. The issue is not just destroying fixed sites. Iran also had a bunch of highly enriched uranium that was once believed to be stored in tunnels underneath Isfahan. And the Iranians have claimed that they’ve removed that material. And then, secondly, there’s a whole bunch of components for building centrifuges that were being monitored when the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (J.C.P.O.A.) was enforced and are now no longer being monitored.

The J.C.P.O.A. is the 2015 nuclear deal, which was negotiated by the Obama Administration, and which exchanged a lessening of sanctions on Iran for nuclear inspections and limits on enrichment, and which Trump pulled out of in 2018.

Exactly. If the highly enriched uranium and the centrifuge components are small, that means that they’re portable. They can be moved around the country; they can be hidden. So, if what the U.S. has done is destroy the big sites that we know about, the enrichment facilities, but hasn’t destroyed the highly enriched uranium and the centrifuge components, I think Iran can probably reconstitute relatively quickly, perhaps within one or two years. It’s very hard to put an exact time on this. If the operations have managed to destroy some of the highly enriched uranium, or all of the highly enriched uranium, and the centrifuge components, then the reconstitution timeline is likely to be longer. What I would point out is that under any scenario the reconstitution timeline is going to be much shorter than the ten to fifteen years of the J.C.P.O.A. That’s how long the deal was supposed to last for. It is also worth pointing out that people argue that the J.C.P.O.A. was a bad deal because itonlylasted that long. Even that was a bit misleading.

Because some parts of the J.C.P.O.A. lasted twenty years, some lasted twenty-five years, some actually were indefinite. It was actually quite a complicated arrangement, the way the J.C.P.O.A. phased out over time. Limits on enrichment and uranium-stockpile sizes lasted ten or fifteen years. The I.A.E.A.’s right to monitor centrifuge components lasted twenty years. The prohibition against weaponization activities had no time limits. But, even under the ten to fifteen years that was often quoted, we’re now likely dealing with a reconstitution timeline under any scenario that’s substantially shorter than that.

A central point you have made, which I have seen you make in the past, is that the alternative to this strike and the Israeli action was not nothing but was in fact the deal that Trump exited in 2018. Was that deal succeeding?

I think the J.C.P.O.A. was working very well. The U.S. intelligence community assessed that Iran was complying with the deal. Iran’s program was heavily limited, and it was heavily inspected. To my mind, it was working very well when Trump pulled out. And I do think there was a slim but real opportunity for diplomacy over the past few days. Obviously, there was no possibility of reconstituting the J.C.P.O.A. But you had this interesting situation where Israel had started an attack; it couldn’t destroy everything in Iran, including but not limited to Fordow, and the American threats gave Trump some leverage. And Trump at times appeared interested in trying to use that leverage to negotiate. I do feel there was some kind of window for diplomacy there. I’m just very sad that that window was never taken, and there wasn’t a good-faith attempt to try and take advantage of it.

The lack of good faith was from Trump, or from the Iranians, too?

We don’t know. But what I would point out is that a serious negotiation can’t be done in forty-eight hours or however long it was since Trump announced that he was going to give the opportunity for diplomacy. He said this week that he would make a decision withintwo weeks. So my feeling is that there was never any real attempt on the part of the U.S. to follow up on that and actually try to negotiate some kind of diplomatic settlement here.

Do you think any negotiated deal would have been similar to the J.C.P.O.A.? Or do you think that the Trump Administration wanted to negotiate a different deal, given that Trump claimed the Obama deal was such a disaster?

It is a tough question to answer, although we had some leaks about negotiations earlier this year. Some of the ideas that were coming out about that really were starting to sound a bit like some of the ideas in the J.C.P.O.A. If I had been advising the Administration over what to do, given the imminence of escalation, given the time urgency once Israel had started to attack, I would have urged them to go for something incredibly simple, something that could be negotiated very quickly but that would give you a high degree of short-term assurance—something like a cap on enrichment levels, which would have been something that could easily be verified. It would be a very clear signal that the Iranians wanted to de-escalate. It really would reduce their proliferation potential, and then you would try and build upon that in time. That’s the kind of diplomatic approach that over the last few days I think would have been feasible. But the J.C.P.O.A. was more than a hundred pages long. You could never negotiate even a modified version of that in two weeks. But you could have done something simple.

One point that opponents of the Obama deal have made is that Iran could have been using hidden sites to enrich uranium beyond what was allowed. But you have argued that that isn’t actually a case for military action. Why?

One of the big challenges with all I.A.E.A. inspections everywhere is, Does the I.A.E.A. know where everything is? And there was always some risk with the J.C.P.O.A. that Iran would have a secret facility or more than one secret facility in which it might be violating the deal. The existence of a secret facility in and of itself would be a violation of its I.A.E.A. obligations, and the J.C.P.O.A. contained a whole bunch of provisions designed to make it easier for inspectors to try to locate a clandestine facility.

One of the big criticisms of the J.C.P.O.A. was that these provisions were inadequate. But my argument is that there’s actually a bigger problem with military action, because if Iran has secret facilities that we don’t know about, then we can’t try to bomb and destroy them. And the effect of bombing and destroying will probably harden Iran’s resolve to make the political decision to build a nuclear weapon, potentially using those clandestine facilities that we don’t know about. Moreover, if Iran kicks out inspectors, as I think is pretty likely now, then one of the key ways we had to try to find clandestine facilities has evaporated. So, if you’re worried about clandestine facilities, my view is that bombing actually has made the problem worse than it would have been under a diplomatic arrangement.

You talked about the “political decision” to make a nuclear weapon. Iran has said that its nuclear program is peaceful. Both the United States and Israel under different governments have seemed very skeptical of that. Are you implying, when you talk about a political decision being made in the future, that that decision hasn’t been made?

I would distinguish between two things here. The first is Iran wanting the ability to build a nuclear weapon on short notice, and the second is Iran having made the political decision to actually go ahead and build the bomb.

So you are saying that you think they want the first one? It’s not simply a peaceful nuclear program, but that doesn’t mean that they were on the verge of taking the final step?

I think they’ve always wanted the capability to build a bomb on short notice. They’ve dialed up and down that program over the years. To build a nuclear bomb, you really need to do two things. Firstly, you need sufficient fissile material, meaning highly enriched uranium or plutonium. And, secondly, you need to know how to turn that material into an actual, usable, deliverable nuclear device. That is called weaponization. And they stopped their weaponization activities, according to U.S. intelligence, in 2003. That’s something the U.S. has said publicly and repeatedly. Tulsi Gabbard said that in testimony back in March. But I do believe that one of the reasons why they were continuing with enrichment was to maintain this capability to build a nuclear weapon on short notice. In that sense, even though they stopped weaponization activities in 2003, I don’t think the Iranian program has ever been purely peaceful.

Now, one of the things that [Benjamin] Netanyahu came out and implied in justifying the Israeli attack just over a week ago now was that Iran had actually started to build a nuclear weapon. But we have had a lot of intelligence leaks from the U.S. that disagree with that conclusion. And part of my concern now is that if the U.S. was right, if Iran hadn’t actually made the political decision to build a bomb, these attacks are going to lead it to make that decision.

Earlier this year, the I.A.E.A. found that Iran had failed to comply with its non-proliferation obligations. What was that I.A.E.A. decision about and what did it suggest to you?

The I.A.E.A. had found evidence of Iranian nuclear activities. It had found traces of uranium at three different sites that had never been declared to the I.A.E.A. And under the rules—under the I.A.E.A.’s agreements with states—states are allowed to do more or less anything short of actually assembling a nuclear weapon, but they have to declare it to the I.A.E.A., and they have to allow it to be inspected. Iran never really explained what had gone on at those sites. It was obfuscating the activities of inspectors. It was probably lying to them. You know, as I’ve tried to make clear throughout this interview, I don’t think the Iranian program was peaceful. The question for me was: Is military action the best way of actually stopping it from getting the bomb?

When did these violations happen?

The undeclared activities all predated the J.C.P.O.A. In fact, they appear to have ended by around 2003, when Iran is believed to have stopped its weaponization program. And material and equipment was stored at a site that Iran tried to sanitize in 2018, after Trump pulled out of the deal. But the I.A.E.A. still detected nuclear material. So the key activities both predate and postdate the J.C.P.O.A., although Iran was technically in non-compliance the entire time for failing to declare the materials.

There has been a lot of speculation that what the Israelis are hoping for in the medium term or just short term is regime change. That makes a certain amount of intuitive sense, given your answers today, because what you seem to be saying is that you don’t think the Israeli strikes or the American strikes are an even medium-term solutions to the Iranian nuclear program.

I think that’s right. One of the things that surprised me about the Israeli strikes was the extent to which they were going after regime-related targets in a way that suggested their goals were broader than merely destruction of the nuclear program. And Netanyahu has openly said that he believes the death of the Supreme Leader would end the war more rapidly. So I think the Israelis, or at least Netanyahu, genuinely seem to hope that the strikes will precipitate regime change. The question that I would have is: Why do we necessarily think that a new regime would renounce the nuclear program and would give up on a nuclear weapon? One possibility is the current regime gets replaced by something that’s even harder-line, perhaps some kind of military junta of some description. That kind of regime seems pretty unlikely to give up the nuclear program. But even a more pro-Western democratic regime, which I think is quite unlikely to emerge, would not necessarily give up the program just because of how wrapped up it is in Iranian self-image these days. So it’s just not clear to me that even regime change would actually lead to what the Israelis hope it would do on the nuclear front. ♦

What Have the U.S. and Israel Accomplished in Iran?

On Monday night, forty-eight hours after PresidentDonald Trumpordered a series of strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, he announced a ceasefire between Israel and Iran. Earlier that day, Iran had fired missiles at an American airbase in Qatar, an attack that came with advance warning and resulted in no casualties. The Trump Administration had initially signalled a reluctance to formally get involved in Israel’s campaign to destroy the Iranian nuclear program, but, sincethe strikes on Saturday, Trump had publicly mused about the possibility of regime change. Even after his Monday announcement that he’d helped broker a pause in hostilities, Iran and Israel continued to exchange missile attacks, each side accusing the other of breaking the terms of the ceasefire. On Tuesday morning, Trump told reporters at the White House, “We basically have two countries that have been fighting so long and so hard that they don’t know what the fuck they’re doing.”

Nicole Grajewski is a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Nuclear Policy Program, and the author of the book “Russia and Iran.” (On Monday, the Iranian foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, met in Moscow with his country’s most powerful ally, Vladimir Putin, who had criticized the American strike.) Grajewski and I spoke just prior to the ceasefire announcement, and followed up after Trump’s declaration. Our conversation, edited for length and clarity, is below. In it, we discuss why a ceasefire may be difficult to sustain, what Russia’s relationships with both Iran and Israel may portend for the region, and why a war meant to end Iran’s nuclear program may instead have delivered prolonged uncertainty.

What are your concerns about a ceasefire holding in the short, medium, and long term?

In the short term, I think my primary concern is accidental escalation. Whether that’s Iranian proxy groups in Iraq launching something against Israel and Israel responding, or because of a response to statements from Israel or Iran. In the medium to long term, my concern has to do with the acrimonious relationship between Iran and Israel which would likely continue. This ceasefire is not going to eradicate years of shadow war that Iran and Israel are locked into. And the nuclear issue continues to loom.

On Monday, the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee of the Iranian parliament approved an outline of a bill that would suspend Iran’s coöperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency. That would curtail efforts at identifying, or at least accounting for, Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium and access to these nuclear sites. So there may be momentum within Iran that seems to be pushing against international oversight on its nuclear program.

Netanyahu has also been very aggressive lately—could you see him giving Trump a victory on a short-term ceasefire, as he did with Gaza, and then wanting to re-start the war?

It’s very foreseeable that Israel takes the opportunity again to go in and eliminate certain facilities or leadership. I think a lot of the escalatory dynamics probably hinge on what is left of the Iranian nuclear program and how close they are to reconstituting. Some of the uranium metal facilities have been destroyed, so that’s actually a pretty good stopgap for some of the weaponization work. But we don’t know where the highly enriched uranium that Iran had is. And then Iran has a lot of components of centrifuges, and these haven’t been under I.A.E.A. inspection since 2021. So, on the long-term side of it, you could see Iran developing a covert program. Moreover, because you did see Israel assassinating Iranian scientists in the past, Iran created a pretty robust community of nuclear scientists, nuclear engineers, nuclear physicists, so that continuity of knowledge would be maintained. So it’s not like the knowledge is eradicated either. And I think one thing that’s going to happen as a result of the mass intelligence penetration that really curtailed Iran’s military response and led to this destruction of their Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (I.R.G.C.) leadership, is that there’s going to be a higher-surveillance state, a higher clampdown at a societal level, and, I think, a far more secretive program.

What internal and external dynamics do you see within Iran right now?

There is a domestic audience to whom the Iranian leadership wants to convey a semblance of stability and a semblance of strength. But this is also about signalling to the United States that Iran is not weak and that, despite these massive hits when it comes to their military facilities, when it comes to their conventional power they still reserve a right to respond. But it seems that there was some warning or signalling to America and/or Qatar before this Qatar military-base attack. Iran likely doesn’t want to get involved in a war of attrition with the United States, even if they are preparing for one.

So the signalling is just to make clear that a prolonged war is not what Iran wants?

Yeah, and there’s obviously now this concern about regime change and internal stability. And so that’s going to be something, I think, that Iranian strategists are thinking about as well, because the continuation of this war for them also increases their vulnerability when it comes to the kind of control that they have at home. Israel on Monday targeted some of the organs of repression within Iran, such as the so-called Basij force, for example, and other parts of their internal security services.

Can you talk a little bit about how the regime is structured and operates?

The regime functions on repression, and terror to an extent. That’s how it was formed in this revolutionary context and then after the Iran-Iraq War. But it’s heavily bureaucratized and also institutionalized. And the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is one aspect of this. And one part of that is the Basij, which is their internal clamp on power. But they also have major conglomerates of economic interests that are really predicated on corruption. And it is factionalized. There are certain factions where you have the clergy and that emphasis in just certain parts of the country. So in Qom, for example, that’s a pretty large concentration of power when it comes to the clergy. And so you see that in discussions of the Guardian Council, which oversees elections and approves legislation, or even with succession talk. But then there’s also these hard-liners who are very much entrenched in this ideology of confrontation with the United States and Israel. And this also includes a very strong emphasis on maintaining at least this kind of threshold nuclear status and also projecting its power throughout the region.

So Iran functions as somewhat of a kleptocracy, but also a heavily ideological one. And, of course, this is all driven by an acute sense of vulnerability to any kind of internal or external upheaval that might threaten the very existence of the regime. And, of course, there’s a Supreme Leader, and he is the ultimate arbitrator within Iran, but there’s a cadre of élites around him.

I have seen you warn about the consequences of regime change. What about this regime’s structure that you have just broadly defined makes you concerned specifically?

One problem with the discussion of Iranian regime change in the United States is that it’s a goal within itself, but there is nothing with what happens after. The experience of Iraq is a good example of this. But with Iran, I think what’s worrisome is that there are such strong and also militarized factions that could potentially mount somewhat of a countercoup. The Iranian people mostly don’t support the current regime, and many Iranian people don’t support a revolutionary theocracy. But there are also the people who are actually in charge of this massive repression apparatus. And so one of my concerns is also that we pursue a policy of regime change, and what actually happens domestically in Iran is far greater repression and far more insecurity to the extent that the civilians are the ones who suffer the most. Regime change is ultimately up to the Iranian people. One would hope that this regime does fall at some point and some democratic government rises. But, you know, that’s not always how international relations play out.

How do you think the weakening or removal of Iran’s allies, whether Hezbollah after the Israeli campaign against it, or Syria after Assad’s fall, has changed Iran’s calculations?

The changing regional dynamics and the loss of Iran’s forward-defense doctrine, which is what they called it, which had provided them with strategic depth, will probably influence the response a lot. For instance, this is why Iran has so far been reliant on its missile force to serve as a deterrent or at least its retaliatory capability toward Israel. But it also, I think, ultimately shows, if you look at the debates within Iran, a failure of what they thought their defense strategy was over the years. They invested so much money in these groups that in some cases eventually turned out to succumb to almost overnight collapse. And then, of course, Assad in Syria as well. Among the so-called reformists, you would hear criticism of all this spending, especially around the time of the Syrian war. You had parliamentarians questioning why Iran is investing so much in these wars abroad when there’s endemic problems at home. But I think Iran’s retaliation shows the failure of that strategy. But if Hezbollah was stronger and Assad was there, they probably would have been able to mount a much more devastating response or a much more damaging response than they were able to.

How did the regime adjust its behavior after the nuclear deal, before Trump pulled out of it?

The nuclear issue was really about Iran’s fissile material, about its work with advanced centrifuges and the ability for Iran to potentially break out with a nuclear weapon. So I wouldn’t say the deal fundamentally changed the regime’s behavior. You saw Iran quite active in Syria at the time. That’s really when they increased a lot of their support for the Assad regime, after the nuclear agreement, and you saw Iranians supporting non-state actors throughout the region with targeted assassinations. So I wouldn’t say that the nuclear deal transformed the regime or even really prompted that much of a shift. Perhaps it pushed things underground. I think there was actually somewhat of an effort by the leadership to portray themselves as behaving on the international stage. But it didn’t shift their calculus about their security and it didn’t really shift the internal dynamics because you saw the same level of repression, you saw the same level of support for these groups. And it didn’t eradicate the discourse about Iran being a perpetual enemy to Israel and a perpetual enemy to the United States. It was really about the nuclear program. Maybe we had illusions about whether that would change the calculus of the regime. But, in reality, I think that the nuclear deal was helpful because at least we had greater transparency about what they were doing. And now this is going to be all shrouded in secrecy.

I want to turn to Iran and Russia now, but, before we do, how would you describe their relationship over the past several decades?

The relationship has never really been an easy one. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russians came into Iran to secure some arms agreements and civilian nuclear-energy coöperation. But they faced quite a bit of pressure from the United States to cancel some of these agreements. And you’d see the Russians really preferring to coöperate with the United States over Iran. And this also happened during the height of the Iran nuclear issue, prior to the 2015 nuclear deal that Obama made, when there were rounds of sanctions on Iran. Russia supported this. Around 2010 was when the Russia-Iran relationship was at its lowest, though, with Russia voting for probably the most stringent and damaging sanctions on Iran when it came to its economy and also a conventional arms embargo. And this even prompted former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to call Russia an enemy of the Iranian people and accuse them of caving to Satan. So their relationship wasn’t this close, tight-knit relationship at the time, though they still coöperated.

It was really the Syrian civil war that transformed this relationship. Both had ties to the Assad regime, but they also saw the spectre of what they viewed as Western-led regime change, akin to Libya. And it prompted them both to bolster Assad and keep him afloat. And eventually this culminated in the Russian intervention in 2015. And that transformed the Russia-Iran relationship because for the first time they had to operate in the same military campaign. They had to create structures and institutions and different channels for coöperation. And there were tensions in Syria. Russia and Iran had competing interests. They would sometimes vie over certain contracts. But what happens as a result of Syria is you see a deepening in the institutionalization of this relationship. And it goes beyond that. There is more coöperation when it comes to their intelligence services, when it comes to their interior ministries, and even on issues like sanction evasion.

What role has Iran played in the war in Ukraine?

When Russia seemed to be faltering in the war in Ukraine, they reached out to the Iranians for drones. And Iran provided drones initially. And, eventually, Russia shifted to local production of these drones. And a lot of the individuals who were involved in the Syrian campaign actually were behind the deals with the Russians. And so you see this relationship transforming into something much deeper, where Russia now was dependent on Iran. That’s changed a bit because of the localization. And Russia doesn’t necessarily need Iran for drone components anymore. But Iran was really crucial in that regard, of establishing these factories and providing Russia with munitions to terrorize Ukrainians every night.

How have the Russians responded to the Israeli attack on Iran and to Trump’s strikes?

Russia has come out with strongly worded statements supporting Iran and calling the aggression illegal. Russia has attempted to mediate and tried to use this as a way of de-escalating, though Russia doesn’t really have much legitimacy as a mediator at the moment because of the downturn in Russian-Israeli relations. At the same time, Russia does have a quite large ethnic-Russian population in Israel. So this hasn’t been a blanket endorsement of Iranian actions. And Russia doesn’t seem to be coming in to provide any formal military assistance to Iran. But Russia is trying to lean a little bit closer to Iran.

I imagine they don’t want to get too involved, in part because they are already stretched thin in Ukraine, no?

Yeah, the question is, what can Russia do? There was a bunch of analysis saying that Russia abandoned Iran, but in reality the question should have been, like, what could Russia have done? Russia’s defense industry is already strapped. It’s not clear if the Iranians have asked the Russians for help. There’s probably some coöperation when it comes to intelligence. At the meeting on Monday in Moscow, the head of Russia’s military intelligence was there. And I think that was an effort to signal that Russia may be helping Iran in terms of intelligence coöperation, but also to maybe assuage some Iranian concerns that Russia is not doing enough.

What about in terms of Russia’s relationship with Israel? Ideologically, it makes a certain amount of sense, and Netanyahu’s closest ally in Europe might be Hungary, which is close to Russia. Why didn’t this relationship develop more?

Putin and Netanyahu had a pretty good personal relationship, and that was even evident during Putin’s second Presidency in the two-thousands. So they’ve had a pretty strong relationship. Obviously, the Soviet Union didn’t have great relations with Israel, but, actually, on a personal level, Putin and Netanyahu had pretty close ties.

It’s nice to see two guys like that come together.

Yeah. In the Syrian civil war, the Russians and the Israelis had a pretty strong relationship. They had a deconfliction hotline. Russia would actually sometimes acquiesce to Israeli strikes on Iranian assets. And so they had a pretty strong working relationship. However, after the invasion of Ukraine and the closer coöperation with Iran, the Israelis mounted their concerns, and the Russians weren’t really open to that. And then, after October 7th, it became far worse because Russia barely even condemned the attack, but hosted Hamas delegations in Russia. And then, all the while, there were actually more aggressive moves in Syria, such as electronic jamming against Israel, that really led this relationship to sour. And I think what was surprising was, when Iran launched strikes in October of 2024 against Israel, Putin didn’t even bother calling Netanyahu. The Kremlin said that it had no intention to speak to the Israelis. However, with this round of strikes, almost immediately Putin tried to de-escalate and called both Netanyahu and the Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to try to serve as a mediator. So it perhaps reflects how Russia thinks the situation might be quite grave.

Yeah, it is interesting that it soured, because I remember Netanyahu being basically non-aligned on Ukraine and praising Putin.

Yeah, and there is also the Jewish Russian diaspora, and the Jewish population within Russia. Putin kept the lid on antisemitism in Russia for a while. But, after October 7th, it changed.

Going forward, if this conflict is going to be contained, what are you looking at in terms of alliances and regional dynamics?

It is really an issue between the U.S. and Iran and Israel right now. However, that could widen, and you could see Russia trying to exploit the situation as a form of horizontal escalation with the United States. The question is what form would that be? But Russia could be there as a spoiler. At the moment, they seem to be less willing to do that, because I do think that the Russians are concerned about the survival of the Iranian regime, but that could change. The Russians have shown quite a bit of flexibility when it comes to certain policies.

At the same time, I think that the regional dynamics are quite dire. There are still non-state actors that are aligned with Iran in Iraq, which could be activated and open up another front targeting U.S. bases, and there are the Houthis in Yemen. And then, of course, there’s always the Gulf countries that are in the middle of this, and Iran has thus far been clear in signalling to them and keeping communications open, but that could also deteriorate. One thing that I am also quite concerned about is Iran’s thinking on the nuclear issue. We now know that Iran has moved or diverted some of its highly enriched uranium or perhaps some of its centrifuge components from the Fordow site that was bombed by America. It is all quite murky, but the situation doesn’t look incredible at the moment. ♦

Inside the Mind of a Never Trump War Hawk

Eliot Cohen, a contributing writer atThe Atlantic, is a military historian and the founder of the strategic-studies program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Cohen has written numerous books on military history and strategy, but is perhaps best known for his passionate support of the American invasion of Iraq, which he argued in favor of extensively, both in the late nineteen-nineties, when he was a member of the Project for the New American Century think tank, along with Bill Kristol, John Bolton, and Paul Wolfowitz, and after the 9/11 attacks. In the later years of the George W. Bush Administration, Cohen served in the State Department under Condoleezza Rice. Since then, he has become a so-called Never Trump conservative, regularly attacking the President while continuing to argue for a hawkish foreign policy.

Before President Donald Trump’s order to strike Iran last weekend, Cohen published apieceinThe Atlanticpushing for American involvement, and applauding the fact that Trump seemed to be moving toward a military attack. “Much as it may pain his critics to admit it, in this matter he is acting, if not conventionally, then like a statesman of a distinctively Trumpian stamp,” Cohen wrote. Cohen followed this piece with another article, which ran inThe Atlanticon Sunday, after the strike, titled “Trump Got This One Right.” He explained, “Trump got this one right, doing what his predecessors lacked the intestinal fortitude (or, to be fair, the promising opportunity) to do. He spoke with the brutal clarity needed in dealing with a cruel and dangerous regime.”

I recently spoke by phone with Cohen about his case for American military action, and his history of support for a proactive American role in the Middle East. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we also discussed his skepticism about an American intelligence assessment saying that Trump’s strike only set the Iranian nuclear program back by a matter of months, his post-October 7th trip to the Gaza Strip, and the lessons he did and didn’t take from the war in Iraq.

What have you made of how Trump has handled Iran over the past week, from the strike to the push for a ceasefire?

I was in favor of the strike, and I give him credit. As you know, I’ve been about as ferocious a critic of him as one can be. I think I may have been the original Never Trumper, but I think on this one he did the right thing, because this has been a problem brewing for a very long time, and no Administration, including the one I was part of, was really able to deal with it. He seized an opportunity. In terms of damage assessments, my feeling about that, for a whole bunch of reasons, is that it is way too early to tell. But the strike was actually done remarkably well. Trump being Trump, he immediately claimed credit for obliterating the nuclear program. We don’t know that. And he has claimed credit for bringing peace, which I very much doubt. But many of us, including close friends, loathe the guy, and it’s made it impossible for them to recognize a good decision and a desirable outcome.

You said that other Administrations hadn’t been able to “deal with” this problem. Do you feel like Trump has dealt with the problem?

I think he’s done much more than other Administrations. We don’t know how much damage has been done by the American strikes, but there was damage done by the Israelis in their covert action, their air strikes, and the American strikes. What I think people have missed is that he has really set a precedent for the use of American military power to go after the Iranian nuclear program. It’s really important. We have tried sanctions and negotiations, and they may have, to some extent, slowed the program, but I think it’s very clear that the Iranians were pressing on.

What did you make ofTulsi Gabbard, the director of National Intelligence, saying in March that the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, had not authorized going forward with producing a bomb, and that American spy agencies agreed with that conclusion?

What I make of it is the same thing that I made of her statements that Bashar al-Assad was not such a bad guy. She’s a nut case who has no particular grasp on the realities of the situation. She is one of a number of people who never should have been appointed to that position. If [C.I.A. director] John Ratcliffe had said that, I would have taken it more seriously, because he’s not a nut case.

We don’t have any reason to believe that she was lying about what the American intelligence community broadly believed, correct?

We don’t have any reason to believe that she was [telling the truth]. And, by the way, the American intelligence community has a pretty mixed track record on this. Intelligence is always difficult. Secondly, on this one, they have an uneven record. Thirdly, the Israelis have had a much better record than we have and they’re motivated because the Iranians want to exterminate them. So between the weirdness and unreliability of Tulsi Gabbard on the one hand and our intelligence community’s record on the other, I don’t take anything she says seriously.

I was only saying that we don’t have any reason to think that the intelligence community had reached a different conclusion.

We don’t know whether she was accurately rendering what people were saying. We don’t know that it was actually a consensus position. [On June 19th, the Timesreportedthat it remains the consensus position of the intelligence community that Iran has not yet decided whether to pursue the manufacture of nuclear bombs; senior officials also told the newspaper that Iran was likely to move toward it if the United States attacked.] It would be a big mistake to think that the top-level judgments are not made with an eye to what you think the political leadership may do that you like or dislike. That was the experience I had in government. So, you know, the intelligence world is murky. It’s a murky world. There’s some outstanding people there and there are other people who have political views and act on them.

You just said that you weren’t sure how much damage was done by the American strikes on Saturday. Youalso wrote, on Sunday, “For some period—five years, maybe 10—Iran will not have a nuclear option.” Did you have a reason to use those numbers, or were you just speculating? TheTimesand other outlets recentlyreported, based on a preliminary Defense Intelligence Agency report, that the strike seems to have only set the program back by a “few months.”

That was a preliminary D.I.A. assessment which is not shared by the Israelis. If you look at the Israeli press, you’ll see that is not the Israeli view. [After Trump began an extraordinary attack on the media for reporting on the D.I.A. assessment, and defended his claim that the Iranian nuclear sites had been “obliterated,” Ratcliffe released an assessment saying that the American strikes had “severely damaged” Iran’s nuclear program. The Times also reported, on Wednesday, that, according to U.S. government officials, “should Iran decide to move quickly to get a bomb, it is unlikely to use the facilities struck in the American attack but probably has much of the raw materials and know-how needed to continue.”]

I ran the Air Force’s study of the first Gulf War. And even like six months or a year later, we were still arguing about the bomb-damage assessments. It’s a very difficult task. So it is too soon to know exactly what the result of the Fordo strikes in particular were.

That’s why I was surprised by the “five years, maybe 10” thing.

My judgment on that is based on the fact that the issue is not the American strikes; it’s the Israeliandthe American strikes.

I wasn’t sure if the five or ten years was from an intelligence assessment or—

It’s good to have the best-informed speculation.

You recentlywrote, “[Trump] understands that a different kind of Iran—if not a democratic one, then a tamed dictatorship—would be open for deals, and he would gladly make them. He has engaged more with the Persian Gulf in recent years than with any other part of the world, and sees opportunities there. He believes that the price would be low, and although the Israelis have done the heavy lifting, he will get the credit from them and others for the finishing touches.” What did you mean?

He clearly likes going to the Middle East. He likes the Persian Gulf. I think it’s partly because he likes the deference, the vast quantities of things like gold all over the place, huge business deals, jetliners. Parts of it are grotesque. But, in any case, I think he does feel comfortable doing business with those people.

He’s a businessman of a certain type and a certain rather unsavory type. But, yeah, he is a businessman. He also probably sees this as his opportunity to get a Nobel Peace Prize, which he clearly thinks he deserves and desperately wants. But also, he has a feral instinct for weakness. And I think he understood much better than a lot of the commentators have understood that this is a weak state and it’s a weak regime. And he proved to be right. All this stuff about how these guys are going to unleash terror against Americans all over the Middle East and elsewhere—no, they shot one salvo of missiles at an empty base, after they forewarned us.

Yes, you recentlywrote, “The bottom line is that Iran’s leaders do not relish the idea of tackling the United States directly, and that is because they are not fools.” You alsowrote, “Israel’s current campaign is built around two realities often missed by so-called realists: first, that the Iranian government is determined to acquire nuclear weapons and cannot be deterred, bought off, or persuaded to do otherwise, and second, that Israel reasonably believes itself to be facing an existential threat.” Is there a contradiction here? At one level, you seem to say that the Iranians are scared and acting rationally, but also that they would risk extinction and death by trying to destroy Israel.

I wouldn’t accept your characterization of it. I think there are two things at play. One, as former Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani said, Israel’s a one-bomb country, which is very different from the United States. They could reasonably believe that with a couple of nuclear weapons they could basically destroy the state of Israel.

I have been over to Israel several times since October 7th, including getting a tour of the Gaza Strip.

Just Rafah and the Philadelphi Corridor. [The corridor is a strip of land near the Egyptian border.] One of the things that really struck me was some of the Hamas hardware that they picked up, a lot of it Iranian. One of the things the Israelis say is, “This isn’t just about us and the Palestinians. This is us and Iran.” The Iranians have talked about destroying the state of Israel. So I think the Israelis have every reason in the world to think it’s existential. And the Iranians could reasonably believe if they have nuclear weapons that that would give them some kind of umbrella under which they could do a lot of things, particularly to their neighbors.

Iran has done a lot of terrible things in the neighborhood. And having nuclear weapons might unleash their ability to do much more. I was focussed on whether they are a rational regime or one that is willing to risk extinction of their entire leadership just to destroy Israel. That was the tension.

I don’t think until this point they thought that they would be risking the extermination of their entire senior leadership.

Well, Israel does have nuclear weapons.

Hezbollah was able to fire loads and loads of rockets at Israel without getting a nuke in response. But I think we've got to remember the Iranians talk about Israel as the lesser Satan. We are the greater Satan and they are much more afraid of us.

You are someone who warned about Trump’s lawbreaking and his disrespect for the law. Is there no concern about someone like Trump just deciding that he can use the military whenever he wants, even without congressional authorization?

I’ve been saying he’s a terrible guy for a long time. But I am somebody who very much believes that you don’t let those kinds of sentiments, which I absolutely have and I still have, get in the way of your analytic judgments. The “evil” George W. Bush regime, of which I was part, actually twice got authorizations for the use of military force. They didn’t get a whole lot of credit for it, I might say.

And the sainted Barack Obama Administration, which launched an extended bombing campaign in Libya, did not get congressional authorization. And I don’t remember any of the columnists or journalists, let’s say, from the center to the left part of the spectrum, complaining about that. So I think that’s really an important point that people might want to think about to get to Trump. I think he genuinely does not like war, and I don’t know what, exactly, the reason is for that. I think he’s willing to use force up to a point. He really doesn’t like war. I don’t know if it’s because he’s a builder and he hates to see buildings get blown up.

You wrote apiecea couple of years ago called “Beware the False Prophets of War.” In it, you say, “Prognosticating about war is always a chancy business . . . But making all allowances for that, it is striking just how bad Western governments, commentators, and leaders have been over the past few decades at gauging not only what course wars might take but how they have gone as they have unfolded.” In the context of our conversation today, what did you mean here?

I will say what’s striking to me is how wrong journalists, pundits, experts have been here. And, you know, a complete lack of humility. If I were to look at the misjudgments that people have made about Iran, it has been about the nature of the regime that you’re dealing with and about its objectives and about what it’s trying to achieve. Those have been the biggest misjudgments.

In late 2001, less than two months after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, you praised what you called “the Afghan achievement” as “remarkable . . . to have radically altered the balance of power there, to have effectively destroyed the Taliban state.” You were also a famous supporter of the Iraq War, which didn’t turn out so well, but which you predicted would be easy to win. What do you think you got wrong, and what lessons have you learned in thinking about Iran today?

So, a couple of things. One is, if you read my book, “The Big Stick,” I have a whole chapter on that.

I read that chapter. I didn’t read the whole book, but after finishing the chapter I still wasn’t sure what the answer to my question was.

So the answer is this: I think in both cases the part I was right about was that the conventional campaign would be quite straightforward, as it was. I think where we failed in both parts, where I failed in both parts, was in overestimating what our institutions would be capable of in terms of actually waging those wars. The biggest issue was the Iraqi and Afghan National Security Forces. And there was the way we rotated forces in and out of Iraq and Afghanistan, rotating entire divisions, which meant that basically you had no consistency in kind of the overall conduct of the campaign. If you look in Afghanistan, say, the divided chain of command, again, made no sense.

But, more broadly, these failures didn’t change your very hawkish outlook on foreign policy in the Middle East and just the whole way America conducts foreign policy, right?

I don’t know that it’s particularly hawkish.

The AfghanistanpieceI just quoted from was titled “World War IV.”

Honestly, do I still think that there is a huge problem with radical Islam? Yeah. They still do want to kill us. I mean, it’s—I don’t know if you follow the stuff that’s going on in Africa, for example, right now. You can’t tell me that that conflict is over. You have Islamic extremist groups in the Horn of Africa. And actually in Pakistan and Afghanistan and other places as well, and sometimes even within Europe and even the United States. What I try to do is describe the realities as they are. People don’t particularly like to hear them, but those are the realities. Part of the problem that you have here is everybody wants to scratch at the scab that is the Iraq War.

And, O.K., you can say Cohen’s a complete idiot.

I remember last year you wrote apiececalled “The Awfulness of War Can’t Be Avoided.” It does seem like one thing that you have tried to point out in your writing and just pointed out now is that, broadly speaking, people think that we can avoid these entanglements and we actually can’t.

That piece was about Israel continuing its war in Gaza, to be specific. But you were talking more broadly, too.

Unfortunately, that’s the world that we’re in, and people do want to avoid that.

You said earlier that you went to Gaza. What was your sense of the humanitarian situation there? It seems quite terrible.

So, honestly, the parts that I was in were just along the Philadelphi Corridor. The main impression is that the level of destruction is enormous. Actually, we saw columns of aid trucks going in. And you understand the problem. As long as you have Hamas gunmen around, they’re going to take charge of the food distribution and use it to control the population, but also to support their efforts.

I guess the Israelis have stopped that by cutting off the aid going in.

Well, the Israelis have not cut off all the food and aid. I mean, that’s not true.

If somebody has a good solution, I would love to hear it. I don’t know what a good solution is.

Well, you also have people in the Israeli government essentially implying that Palestinians deserve to starve and so on.

That’s appalling. My sentiments are more closely with those who think that you probably should have brought this thing to a conclusion a lot quicker. But having said that, I think what I would also recognize is there are no good solutions to this one. What the Israelis have tried to do, and you might say it’s a terrible solution, is create a new organization to distribute food. Is that a good idea or not? I honestly don’t know. [In the past month, since Israel helped set up anentitycalled the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, more than four hundred Palestinians have beenkilledat or near food and aid distribution sites.] I simply just don’t have enough information to be able to tell.

Yeah, you probably don’t want to just speculate on it.

I don’t want to speculate on it. ♦

The Supreme Court Sides with Trump Against the Judiciary

Its ruling lets the President temporarily revoke birthright citizenship—and enforce other unconstitutional executive orders without fear of being blocked by “rogue judges.”

The courts cannot protect us from PresidentDonald Trump’s unconstitutional overreach. That is the terrifying lesson of Friday’s 6–3 Supreme Court ruling limiting the power of federal judges to issue broad orders blocking Trump’s policies from taking effect while the lawsuits challenging them make their way through the courts. The case,Trump v.CASA, involved one of the most blatantly unconstitutional of Trump’s orders: his bid to revoke, by executive fiat, the constitutional guarantee of birthright citizenship. But the implications of the ruling extend far beyond that single issue. Friday’s decision means that courts are now hobbled from stopping any of the Administration’s actions, no matter how unconstitutional they may be, nor how much damage they will inflict. Once again, the Court’s conservative super-majority abandoned its constitutionally assigned role and dangerously empowered the President. As Justice Sonia Sotomayor put it in her dissent, “its decision is nothing less than an open invitation for the Government to bypass the Constitution.”

The LedeReporting and commentary on what you need to know today.

This outcome was as unnecessary as it was unwise. Witness the victory lap that President Trump and Attorney General Pam Bondi took in the White House briefing room after the ruling was released. Trump crowed that the Court had defused a “grave threat to democracy,” in which “a handful of radical left judges effectively try to overrule the rightful powers of the president.” Bondi, for her part, decried “rogue judges striking down President Trump’s policies” through “lawless injunctions” that let district-court judges act as “emperors.”

It remains unlikely that the Court, when it finally gets around to deciding the merits of the dispute, will uphold Trump’s effort to undo birthright citizenship. Birthright citizenship was the rule before it was written into the Fourteenth Amendment. (The departure that necessitated constitutional protection was the Court’s infamous 1857 holding inDred Scott v. Sandford, which held that people of African descent “are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word ‘citizens’ in the Constitution.”) And the language of the Amendment is clear: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States.” (The caveat—“subject to the jurisdiction”—is a carve out for the children of diplomats and other minor exceptions.) That guarantee has been codified in federal law; it was affirmed in an 1898 ruling in the case ofWong Kim Ark, the U.S.-born son of Chinese immigrants. “The Amendment, in clear words and in manifest intent, includes the children born within the territory of the United States of all other persons, of whatever race or color, domiciled within the United States,” the Court said in that case, and subsequent rulings have repeated that conclusion. No surprise, then, that three district-court judges reviewing the executive order had little trouble finding that the edict was probably unconstitutional, and that three appeals courts that reviewed their work left intact their rulings blocking the order from taking effect. Equally telling, the Supreme Court majority said not a word about the legality of the order itself.

But imagine the harms that can ensue in the meantime: parents unable to obtain Social Security numbers for their children; infants denied health coverage or nutrition assistance. Sotomayor’s dissent, joined by Justices Elena Kagan andKetanji Brown Jackson, raised the prospect that Trump’s order “may even wrench newborns from the arms of parents lawfully in the United States, for it purports to strip citizenship from the children of parents legally present on a temporary basis.” If this warning sounds overblown, let me introduce you to the White House deputy chief of staff, Stephen Miller. And this gets to why the consequences of Trump v.CASAreverberate beyond birthright citizenship. “No right is safe in the new legal regime the Court creates,” Sotomayor warned. “Today, the threat is to birthright citizenship. Tomorrow, a different administration may try to seize firearms from law-abiding citizens or prevent people of certain faiths from gathering to worship.” Sotomayor had more hypotheticals in her arsenal. “Suppose an executive order barred women from receiving unemployment benefits or black citizens from voting. Is the Government irreparably harmed, and entitled to emergency relief, by a district court order universally enjoining such policies?” she asked. “The majority, apparently, would say yes.” Those unlikely scenarios underscore the scary implications of the Court’s approach, but the real-world consequences of Friday’s decision are undeniable. They span the landscape ofTrump’s executive ordersand other actions, including efforts to impose more stringent voter-identification requirements, relocate transgender women prisoners to male facilities, and freeze foreign aid.

The majority got the balance dangerously wrong, but there is a legitimate debate over the proper reach of what are called “universal” or “nationwide” injunctions. Democratic and Republican Presidents have chafed at orders from district-court judges, often cherry-picked by plaintiffs for their demonstrated sympathies, that prevent policies from being implemented across the country, sometimes for years. “Look, there are all kinds of abuses of nationwide injunctions,” Kagan said at the oral argument in the birthright case last month, and the dissent acknowledged that “there may be good reasons not to issue universal injunctions in the typical case.” But the birthright citizenship order was particularly ill-suited to serve as a vehicle for curbing such injunctions. The order itself is likely doomed. The government’s argument that the injunctions were causing it irreparable harm is unconvincing; leaving in place what has been the rule for centuries is no hardship. And the government’s proposed alternative—that the injunctions keeping birthright-citizenship protections in place apply only to the individual plaintiffs, not to a broader group of those affected—makes little sense in the context of citizenship, which should be decided on a national basis, not relegated to a haphazard patchwork dictated by circumstances of geography or the capacity to secure a lawyer. As the dissenters put it, “This is not a scenario where granting universal relief will encourage forum shopping or give plaintiffs the upper hand. Quite the opposite: By awarding universal relief below, the District Courts just ordered the Government to do everywhere what any reasonable jurist would order the Government to do anywhere.”

Justice Amy Coney Barrett, writing for the majority, ruled that courts must limit themselves to orders that deal with the disputes immediately before them; they may not rove beyond the case at hand to resolve issues for those who aren’t parties to it. At oral argument, Barrett had seemed to express some exasperation with the government’s position, so it was disappointing to see her in the majority. But Barrett left open the possibility that the states challenging the birthright order could prove they needed the broader relief of a blanket ban, leaving that question to lower courts to determine. She also suggested that those challenging Administration orders had another option: they could file their suits as class actions. This would be more comforting if the Court in recent years had not made it more difficult for plaintiffs to obtain class-action status and if the Solicitor General, D. John Sauer, had not said that the government would probably oppose granting class status, at least in the context of birthright citizenship. Then there is the concurring opinion in Friday’s case by Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas; they warned that “district courts should not view today’s decision as an invitation to certify nationwide classes without scrupulous adherence to the rigors” of its requirements. In other words, don’t count on class actions to rein in Administrations bent on abusing the law.

Given Congress’s abdication of its constitutional role, the courts remain the best immediate vehicle for combatting Trump’s excesses. (Elections are a better solution, but they remain far off.) With Friday’s ruling, though, they are unnecessarily handcuffed. If there is one thing we have learned during the five long months of the second Trump Administration, it is how easy it is to inflict damage on programs and institutions, and how hard that damage is to repair. This is an example of the Court stripping its own branch of power, and at the worst possible moment. ♦

ICE Detains a Respected Immigrant Journalist

Mario Guevara became a target of the law-enforcement and immigration agencies he covered. Others may be next.

“LaBoca del Lobo,” a 2019Timesshort documentary, follows the work of Mario Guevara, a reporter based in the outskirts of Atlanta who has a large audience among Latino immigrants in the area. In one scene, a woman tells Guevara that her husband, who had just been detained byICEagents, had walked into “la boca del lobo” (“into the wolf’s mouth,” an expression meaning “into the lion’s den”). The immigration-enforcement agency had more than quadrupled noncriminal arrests in Atlanta in the 2017 fiscal year and was causing havoc in Spanish-speaking communities. Guevara, a forty-seven-year-old Salvadoran immigrant, is the only reporter in Atlanta (and possibly in the United States) who has been covering these raids every day for years. “Mr. Guevara’s job, and his obsession, is to stalk the wolf,” Jesse Moss, the director of the video,wrotein an accompanying piece for theTimes.

The LedeReporting and commentary on what you need to know today.

Now Guevara himself has been detained byICEagents. On June 14th, he was arrested while live-streaming a No Kings protest near Atlanta, and he is currently being held in an immigration-detention center. His case highlights the particularly vulnerable position of immigrant journalists who report on immigration for immigrant communities. As attacks on press freedom mount, including theintimidation of journalists covering protests, reporters are becoming targets of the law-enforcement and immigration agencies that they cover.

Guevara’s career as a journalist in El Salvador was brief but deeply consequential. When he was in his early twenties, he joined the photojournalism desk atLa Prensa Gráfica, one of the country’s main newspapers. “He was very young and very enthusiastic,” Francisco Campos, a renowned photojournalist who was then his editor, told me. Guevara lived in Apopa, a district north of San Salvador, the capital city, which was by then falling under the control of themaras—gangs that originated in Los Angeles and whose members were deported en masse to El Salvador in the nineteen-nineties—who routinely threatened those who didn’t pay them arenta(protection money). Guevara confided to Campos that he was afraid of them.

In 2003, Campos sent him to cover a mass protest in front of the national-government complex in San Salvador. The organizer was the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (F.M.L.N.), a left-wing guerrilla organization during the civil war that had become a legitimate political party following the 1992 peace accords. Just over a decade had passed since the end of the brutal twelve-year-long conflict, and street protests often ended in violence. As a journalist withLa Prensa Gráfica, Guevara was a target: F.M.L.N. sympathizers saw the paper as a political enemy, because it had supported the military through the war. A group of protesters attacked Guevara, who sought refuge at the nearby Ministry of Justice. He was then driven to a police station, where Campos picked him up later that day. Guevara latertold CNNthat he had received death threats during this period; in the documentary, he reiterates that he had “made some enemies” and was promised “two bullets in the chest.” In early 2004, Guevara, with his wife and young daughter, left El Salvador for the United States, reportedly arriving on a tourist visa. He settled in Atlanta and eventually requested asylum.

Guevara managed to get a job at a local, now defunct newspaper,Atlanta Latino. In 2007, he moved toMundo Hispánico, an outlet owned at the time by Cox Enterprises, which also owns the AtlantaJournal-Constitution.Mundo Hispánicobecame the leading Spanish-language news outlet in Georgia, with numbers rivalling those of English-language outlets: by 2020, it had 4.9 million followers on Facebook, while theJournal-Constitutionhad just 837,000. This growth coincided with a rapid rise in the state’s Latino population; according to the Atlanta Regional Commission, there was a more than thirty per cent increase in the Atlanta metro area between 2010 and 2020.

During the Obama Administration, a federal program that allowsICEto partner with state and local law enforcement expanded across the region, and the number of detentions ballooned. Guevara began covering them as they occurred, to document their personal and communal toll. Shortly before the start of the first Trump Administration, Guevara began noticing abandoned vans on the sides of roads, often with ladders attached to the roof and coffee thermoses left inside, and realized thatICEwas targeting vans carrying migrant construction workers. He began driving around the Atlanta region at dawn, whenICEoperations were most frequent, to catch and live-stream those raids.

Guevara built a huge immigrant audience on social media; he now has more than 1.4 million followers across all platforms, including almost nine hundred thousand on Facebook. He forged a direct relationship with them by answering their messages and by speaking to them, or by driving around their neighborhoods and introducing himself. They often sent him tips, which he pursued and turned into stories. “He had eyes and ears everywhere,” Lautaro Grinspan, a bilingual immigration reporter with the AtlantaJournal-Constitution, told me. When they had “trouble getting an official tally of immigration arrests in the area, the second-best source was Mario.” Grinspan, whoprofiled Guevarain May, just a few weeks before his arrest, added that it is “hard to overstate” his influence in the Spanish-language community. “He was a singular presence in our media ecosystem.” Now “he finds himself in the bowels of the immigration-detention system, experiencing firsthand something he used to write about.”

In “La Boca del Lobo,” Guevara recalls receiving a tip:ICEhad surrounded a building and was knocking on the door. When Guevara arrived at the scene, officers had already cordoned off the area. He began live-streaming and, at one point, realized that the migrant they were after was watching the operation live on his Facebook page. The man contacted Guevara and asked him to mediate with theICEagents so that they wouldn’t shoot him when he left the building. Guevara informed the officers that the man inside was afraid to come out, and they communicated with him—through Guevara—until he surrendered. In the same video, Guevara states that, as a reporter, he doesn’t take sides—he often interviewsICEagents and police officers for their perspective—but he notes that the raids create “a lot of fear and terror. A lot of panic. There are people who won’t go to work nor send their kids to school after a raid in their neighborhood. That fear is not letting them continue with their normal life.” He adds, “I understand that fear. Sometimes I think I’ll be next.”

By then, Guevara’s asylum request had been denied. In June, 2012, a judge had ordered him to leave the country within sixty days, but his lawyers obtained administrative closure, a procedure by which an immigration judge can temporarily pause removal proceedings. Guevara and his wife have two sons born in the U.S., and Guevara applied for a green card as an immediate relative of a citizen. According to one of his lawyers, Giovanni Díaz, he was granted a temporary work permit. His green-card request is still pending. In a recent press conference, Guevara’s daughter mentioned that one of her brothers, who is now twenty-one and is sponsoring his father’s request, had to undergo two surgeries to remove a brain tumor and depends on his father financially and emotionally.

Guevara continued reporting despite his legal vulnerability. He leftMundo Hispánicolast year to launch his own operation, MGNews. On June 14th, wearing a red shirt, a helmet, and a black vest that read “PRESS” in large white letters on the front and back, he went to cover the No Kings protest. A group of local police officers closed in on him, and, while he loudly identified himself as “a member of the media,” they arrested him. He “is very, very well known in the community, even with these jurisdictions and these police officers . . . It’s hard to believe they didn’t know who he was,” Díaz, his lawyer, said during the press conference.

Guevara was taken to the DeKalb County Jail and charged with three misdemeanors: obstruction of law-enforcement officers, unlawful assembly, and pedestrian improperly entering roadway. A few days later, three additional misdemeanor charges were filed in Gwinnett County—for ignoring traffic signs, using a communication device while driving, and reckless driving—which stemmed from an incident in May, in which, according to Díaz, Guevara was recording law-enforcement operations. (Dekalb County dropped the charges on June 25th, but the ones filed in Gwinnett County are still pending. Guevara’s lawyers said in a press release that “it is very uncommon for traffic warrants to be sought out after the alleged illegal activity. Nevertheless, we are working to obtain more information about these warrants and find out the reason why they were not brought earlier. Mr. Guevara is innocent until proven guilty.”) On June 18th, the police turned Guevara over toICE, and he was transferred to the FolkstonICEProcessing Center in southeastern Georgia. On Friday, June 20th,ICEannounced that it had initiated deportation proceedings.

Francisco Campos, the photojournalist in El Salvador who was Guevara’s editor, and who has remained in touch with him, saw the news of the arrest on Guevara’s social-media accounts. “In these twenty-some years since he left, Mario has helped several people here,” he told me. About ten years ago, he said, Guevara came to the aid of a campesino in Sensuntepeque, a remote area near the border with Honduras. The man had been forced to mortgage his land after gang members had extorted him, and the bank was about to foreclose. Guevara raised the money, Campos said, which was deposited directly in the bank to cancel the man’s debt and to insure that he maintained the property title. Sending Guevara back to El Salvador “would be a very unfortunate situation,” Campos said. “Newsrooms have laid off about sixty per cent of their staff. Many journalists are unemployed. This is not a country where you can come and launch a successful news channel like the one he has there. For him, it would be personally devastating.”

The Committee to Protect Journalists (where I serve as a board member), along with a coalition of civil-society and media organizations, expressed “alarm” at Guevara’s detention in alettertoKristi Noem, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and demanded his release. “If Guevara’s case proceeds, it would represent a grim erosion of both freedom of the press and the rule of law. Journalists who are not U.S. citizens could be at risk of deportation solely because local law enforcement filed misdemeanor charges against them in retaliation for reporting without those charges ever being tried in court,” the letter reads. (The Press Freedom Tracker has documented the arrest of eleven journalists since Trump’s Inauguration, including Guevara’s, all at anti-ICEprotests, and is working to verify the arrest of four more.) In an X post from June 20th, the Department of Homeland Security denied that Guevara had been detained because of his work and said that he was inICEcustody because he had entered the country illegally in 2004. (Díaz reiterated to NPR that Guevara had entered the U.S. legally on a tourist visa.)

Maritza Félix, the founder and director of the Spanish-language news outletConecta Arizona, based in Phoenix, has known Guevara for years. She told me that news of his arrest compounded what has been a “traumatizing” few months for reporters, especially those who came to the U.S. seeking the freedom that they lacked in their home countries. “Today, it was Mario, but tomorrow it could be any one of us. We used to believe we were in a country where the law and the Constitution were respected.” She said that her team has seen an uptick in hate messages in e-mails and on social media—“Go back to your country,” “Speak English”—and have been forced to adopt safety measures she never imagined would be necessary here.

Paola Jaramillo, the co-founder and executive director ofEnlace Latino NC, a nonprofit Spanish-language digital news outlet covering North Carolina, painted a similar picture. “The xenophobic messages began in the middle of last year, after we posted a video of a state legislative session with Spanish closed captions. They intensified with our coverage of protests and immigration issues—‘Deport them,’ ‘Learn English,’ ” she said. Jaramillo, who knows Guevara and has been following his work for years, noted that his case is “a warning” of what others might face. “Many journalists covering the Latino community have, at some point, found themselves in immigration limbo—and still we go out and report. But we used to be more respected. What we did was valued a little more. The circumstances have changed.”

When Félix watched the video of Guevara’s arrest, she realized that he was doing everything she has been trained to do in preparation for the possibility of being arrested while covering a protest—a type of training more and more journalists are now receiving from news organizations, professional associations, and some journalism schools (including the Craig Newmark Graduate School of Journalism, where I serve as the dean). “He de-escalates the situation, stays calm, walks, doesn’t resist—and, still, they take him.” When journalists who are U.S. citizens are arrested, Félix continued, they generally are taken to jail, bail is set, and they are released. But for a reporter without solid immigration status the outcome can be deportation. “Even if you’re here with legal permission, being allowed to do the work is considered not a right but a privilege,” she said. Community reporters are often the most (if not the only) trusted source of information for the most vulnerable, and the stakes for both those reporters and the people they serve couldn’t be higher. ♦

Trump, Congress, and the War Powers Resolution

Two interrelated fears that have caused mounting public alarm with respect to the Trump Administration involve unchecked executive power and the erosion of the rule of law. These worries have intensified in debates about the legality of President Trump’s decision to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities more than a week into Israel’s war against Iran. Members of both houses of Congress had introduced resolutions to try to prevent Trump from taking such military action without its authorization. But the energy that some lawmakers had mustered for a rare attempt to assert Congress’s constitutional power against Trump seemed to dissipate, at least while they expected a ceasefire between Israel and Iran to hold.

One would normally look to Supreme Court precedents to determine the constitutionality of a Presidential action. But no cases provide legal answers about the permissibility of attacks like the one on Iran. The only relevant case from the Court dates to the Civil War. It states that Congress has the sole power to “declare war,” but that, in the event that a foreign nation invades the U.S., congressional authorization is unnecessary and the President’s constitutional power as the Commander-in-Chief is sufficient to take action. The Court noted that the President cannot “initiate the war,” but it has never provided an authoritative definition of “war,” as opposed to armed conflict.

Congress has not formally declared war since the Second World War, but it has sometimes authorized Presidents to use military force in conflicts colloquially known as wars—for example, in Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq. But, when Congress has given no such authorization, Presidents have often turned to the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel. O.L.C. issues opinions that are not binding law, but which attempt to present legally correct boundaries that the President should respect. Presidents have regularly acted unilaterally to enter significant hostilities on the basis of those opinions, including in the Korean War, in Kosovo, and in Libya.

Congress, in the War Powers Resolution of 1973 (enacted over the veto of President Nixon, who thought it unconstitutional), aimed to check the unilateral Presidential use of force, requiring, among other things, that the President consult Congress before sending armed forces into hostilities and obtain congressional approval to deploy troops in conflicts for more than sixty days. But both Democratic and Republican Presidents have not fully complied, and Congress hasn’t done much about it. In recent weeks, some lawmakers proposed new War Powers Resolutions to prevent Trump from attacking Iran again unless Congress authorizes it, but the House Speaker, Mike Johnson, resisted the idea and declared that the existing War Powers Resolution was an unconstitutional infringement of the President’s power as Commander-in-Chief.

During the past several decades, O.L.C. has produced opinion after opinion that has been staggeringly expansive with respect to that power. Each armed conflict that a President undertook without congressional authorization became a precedent that further enlarged what the executive branch considered constitutionally permissible. That is how we got to a situation in which a President can reasonably claim that it is lawful, without congressional approval or even consultation, to drop bunker-busting bombs on a country that has not attacked the U.S. One might assume that Trump wouldn’t care a whit about precedent, but the telltale way he described the operation in a letter to Congress days after the strikes suggested that he was closely informed by past executive practice. He alluded to key formulations from previous O.L.C. opinions, stating that his strikes “discretely targeted” Iran’s nuclear facilities, were “limited in scope and purpose,” and did not involve ground forces—meaning that the operation fit the criteria of what O.L.C. has said falls short of war, such that congressional authorization was unnecessary.

Trump’s justifications also reflected O.L.C. precedents maintaining that a President can unilaterally use military force abroad to pursue “national interests” and “collective self-defense.” The office has construed “national interests” very broadly, to include “ensuring the safe delivery of food and medicine in Somalia,” under the first President Bush; “assisting an ally or strategic partner,” Iraq, under President Obama; and deterring “the use and proliferation of chemical weapons,” in Syria, during Trump’s first term. And “collective self-defense” can mean not only repelling an imminent attack but also warding off future attacks and defending allies.

Jack Goldsmith, a foremost expert on war powers and a professor at Harvard Law School, wrote, in October, 2023, that, under the body of O.L.C. opinions, “just about any conceivable circumstance” in which a President “would think it prudent to use force in the Middle East” can be justified. Slowing down Iran’s ability to create nuclear weapons would satisfy the “national interests” test as well as the “collective self-defense of our ally, Israel,” as Trump put it. More recently, Goldsmith rued the troubling reality that “there is no constitutional rule that would answer the question” of whether the Iran strikes were unlawful. But some lawmakers may believe that it is time for Congress to rethink the acceptance of past executive-branch practice as a justification for future unilateral military actions. Not least because a leaked preliminary Defense Intelligence Agency report suggesting, to Trump’s ire, that his attack had not “completely and totally obliterated” Iran’s nuclear capabilities, if proved correct, may lead him to feel that it is in the “national interest” to try again. (The Administration said that it might now limit the intelligence it shares with Congress.)

The courts largely stay out of war-powers debates because those debates are often deemed to entail policy questions rather than legal ones. So if Congress persists in not checking the President’s use of the military, or even believes that such checks are unconstitutional, his unilateral power will remain nearly unlimited. Before the Iran strikes, concerns about Trump and the military were focussed on his federalization of the California National Guard, which the Administration justified on the theory that violent incidents among those protestingICEin Los Angeles had turned into a “rebellion” against the U.S. The Ninth Circuit found that Trump’s actions were likely consistent with a statute stipulating that the President may take such steps when “unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States.”

We are learning that, at home and abroad, the ability to curb the most dangerously consequential uses of Presidential power relies mostly on the self-restraint of the Commander-in-Chief. Law gets us only so far, or, sometimes, nowhere. ♦

The Grim State of Trans Health Care

With the “Big Beautiful Bill” in flux, and federal funds for gender-affirming care hanging in the balance, protections for trans children and adults continue to be dismantled at the state level.

This weekend, as raucous parties and strident Pride marches take place across New York City, many in the L.G.B.T.Q. community are in a less than celebratory mood. At best, the vibe is ambivalent, withlocal political victoriesovershadowed by ominous national news. Trans people, in particular, are grappling with the painful political disappointments of the past year. The Supreme Court, in its recent ruling in United States v. Skrmetti,upheld a Tennessee state lawbanning puberty blockers and hormone therapy for minors, and the Trump Administration is attempting to ban all pediatric gender-related care. Older trans individuals, too, are under threat, as the Administration now seeks to block federal funds from supporting trans health care. There are roughly two hundred and seventy-six thousand trans adults currently enrolled in Medicaid; their access to gender-affirming care may soon be stripped away, should Trump’s “Big Beautiful Bill” pass in the Senate. Hormones and surgery costs could soar beyond most trans people’s means, forcing some to resort to alternative methods, like using underground D.I.Y. networks, or seeking care abroad. Although the Administration, with its proposed changes to programs like Medicaid, may claim that its guiding principle is fiscal conservatism, its true goal is control.

In May, more than a month before the Supreme Court’s ruling in U.S. v. Skrmetti, the Department of Health and Human Services released a four-hundred-and-nine-page document casting doubt on the safety of gender-affirming care for children. The report attempts to undermine the idea that it is safe for trans children to receive hormone-replacement therapy and puberty blockers, the treatment course established by the World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH), and which is currently endorsed by all major medical associations in the U.S. (Despite conservative fearmongering about young trans people undergoing radical medical procedures, theWPATHguidelines generally recommend that only those above the age of eighteen should receive genital reconstructive surgery.)

According to the H.H.S. report, for the vast majority of people, gender dysphoria is simply a temporary discomfort. Perhaps, with proper care, such as counselling, they would come to terms with the “reality” of their biological gender. The report begins with explanations of various medical maxims: one isPrimum non nocere—“First, do no harm.” But counselling can sometimes be a thinly veiled disguise for conversion therapy, and conversion therapy is harm at the highest level—I know this from experience. The report technically calls for “gender exploratory therapy,” noting that “being labeled a ‘conversion therapist’ ” is a “damaging accusation given the profession’s mistreatment of gay people.” But such a claim fails to acknowledge the possibility that gender-exploratory therapists may be perpetuating the same kind of mistreatment.

The H.H.S. report contradicts a previous assertion from the U.S. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, a subset of H.H.S., which has written that no research has displayed convincing evidence that therapy can alter a patient’s gender or sexual identity. It also contradicts guidance from medical authorities such as the American Medical Association and the American Academy of Pediatrics, the latter of which hascalledthe H.H.S. report “inaccurate.” These authorities stand by the recommended treatment protocols established byWPATH, an organization of physicians, surgeons, and mental-health professionals that emerged from an attempt to standardize care in 1979. Trump has deridedWPATHfor conducting “junk science,” and the organization has been accused of selectively publishing research regarding the effectiveness of pediatric trans care on mental health. But the H.H.S. report, which Trump ordered as a corrective, does not represent a good-faith effort to engage on the question of when and how young people suffering from gender dysphoria should be treated. Rather, in its reliance “on select perspectives and a narrow set of data,” in the words of the American Academy of Pediatrics, it engages in the same kind of cherry-picking thatWPATHhas been accused of. After enacting a ban on pediatric trans care, in 2023, Utah lawmakers commissioned an assessment of the safety of puberty blockers and H.R.T. The study recently found that these treatments are both safe and effective. But, as Chase Strangio, a trans lawyer at the A.C.L.U.,pointed outin an Instagram video, the report got little mainstream-news coverage. The H.H.S., and the political right at large, have instead focussed on detransitioners. If trans people comprise a small community—an estimated 0.6 per cent of the population—then the detrans community is even smaller. Yet the right loves to platform their stories; the H.H.S. report describes these individuals as “brave whistleblowers.”

For trans children caught in these political crosswinds, the stakes are high. “Being called your correct name and pronouns, being on HRT, that can be the difference between life and death,” Zelda, a seventeen-year-old trans boy from Louisiana, recentlytoldtheCut. More than forty per cent of trans adults have attempted suicide, according to the Williams Institute at U.C.L.A. While the H.H.S. report does raise the alarm on trans suicide, at times it suggests the blame is on hormones, more so than a culture rife with violent transphobia. This is despite the fact that numerousreportshave found that those who undergo conversion therapy are far more likely to die by suicide than their peers. In states where anti-trans legislation passed, suicide attempts by trans teens subsequently went up by seventy-two per cent, according to the Trevor Project, a nonprofit organization focussed on crisis prevention for L.G.B.T.Q. youth. Some have argued that the studies have yet to directly link access to trans health care with lower youth-suicide rates, but medical care is not the only factor influencing mental health—discrimination, job security, stigma, and harassment also play key roles. Still, as Strangio, who represented the plaintiffs in the Skrmetti case, told the Supreme Court during oral arguments, “There are multiple studies, long-term, longitudinal studies that do show that there is a reduction in suicidality, which I think is a positive outcome to this treatment.”

Children are often caught at the center of the moral panic around transness. They are the testing ground for the erosion of trans rights, which conservatives often frame as a defense of parents’ rights. This thinking, too, is reflected in the way that the media often spotlights the voices of parents of trans kids rather than the children themselves. Right-wing stories that aim to whip up panic about an alleged “trans boom” tend to interview parents, infantilizing the kids as unreliable narrators. Even on the left, the voices of parents are often prioritized, ranging from spokesperson or advocate to the central narrator of their trans child’s story, in a way that goes beyond the standard journalistic practice of protecting minors, given that these trans kids are often in their teens. (A rare exception is “Just Kids”—a recent documentary directed by Gianna Toboni about the great lengths that trans kids must go to in order to receive care—which interviews a number of trans children and allows them to speak for themselves about the criminalization of their care.)

It is easy to deprive children of trans rights because our society generally functions as if children don’t have any rights at all. We struggle to believe that these little humans are capable of making their own decisions, much less of telling us who they are. But, although conservatives might focus their public messaging around trans children, it’s naïve to think that trans adults will be any safer from the Administration’s ire. The age at which someone should be “allowed” to transition keeps moving: Trump recently said nineteen; other conservative critics have suggested waiting until people are in their twenties. (Of course, this would mean that no one is allowed access to puberty blockers.) But the White House’s goal isn’t just no new trans kids; it’s no trans people, period. This is the clear takeaway from Trump’sexecutive order“Defending Women from Gender Ideology Extremism and Restoring Biological Truth to the Federal Government,” which declares that sex is immutable, and withdraws all federal recognition for trans people.

Trans kids are often used as a Trojan horse. An early version of the House Republicans’ “Big Beautiful Bill” proposed eliminating Medicaid funding for gender-affirming care solely for minors; a later version of the bill struck the phrase “for minors.” Curtailing care for trans adults was always part of the larger conservative plan. In addition to stripping away coverage for trans health care, the bill also sets stricter work requirements for Medicaid—another dangerous prospect for trans people, who face significantly higher unemployment rates. When I started transitioning, I was unemployed and reliant on Medicaid coverage. Many trans people have expressed outrage at the proposed bill: “Being covered by Medicaid has given me medical support I never thought possible,” the comedian Marley Gotterer told me. “ ‘Lifesaving’ doesn’t even come close to describing it.” Health care, she continued, “shouldn’t be about luck.”

In her recent book “Aggregated Discontent,” Harron Walker writes about Amida Care, a Medicaid health plan in New York specifically designed to help low-income trans people. “They paid for my hormones during two significant periods of my life when I couldn’t get insurance through work, because no employers with those kinds of jobs would hire me,” Walker told me over the phone. “It’s why so many of us don’t have to stress about paying for hormones every month, much less other bills, and why we’re able to focus on our art, our work, whatever else makes up our life—because we’re not funnelling all of our attention and resources into figuring out how to get health care.”

The Trump Administration is “using every mechanism at their disposal to try to decrease access,” Strangio, the A.C.L.U. lawyer, has said. He has suggested that, in order to build a “trans liberatory project,” the left must embrace a “politics of solidarity.” This is more than just a catchy slogan; the idea is a coalition focussed on securing material rights for the various groups struggling to safeguard bodily autonomy in our current moment—immigrants, women seeking abortions, disabled people. (As part of the “Big Beautiful Bill,” Republicans have also been seeking to deny Medicaid coverage for abortion and forDACArecipients.) Thesame executive ordermeant to strip government protections from trans people has recently been applied by the Department of Veterans Affairs in a way that affects a broad swath of cisgender individuals as well, owing to the removal of language that explicitly prohibits doctors from discriminating against patients for their marital status or political beliefs. “Under Trump’s new rules, veterans can be blocked from getting care, and doctors can be barred from working at V.A. hospitals for the sole reason that they may be unmarried, belong to a union, are registered Democrats, or identify as gay or trans,” Senator Patty Murray, the former chair of the Senate Veterans’ Affairs Committee, wrote in a statement.

“I want people to fight for others and others will fight for us,” Strangio said. Still, it is easy to feel pessimistic. While there are occasional victories—a federal district judge recently ruled against the Trump’s Administration’s anti-trans passport policies—it is hard to know whether the White House will comply, even when it loses in court. The “Big Beautiful Bill” may still be in flux, with federally funded trans health care hanging in the balance, but protections continue to be dismantled at the state level; there are two bills in Texas, for instance, that seek to prohibit trans health care and insurance protections, and which are already under way. Democrats, meanwhile, seem all too willing to compromise, having turned their attention to less “controversial” battles. Zohran Mamdani and Tim Walz are some of the rare politicians who have continued to champion gender-affirming care, whereas many other prominent members of their party, such as Gavin Newsom and Kamala Harris, have backed down on their previous support of trans issues. Trans participation in sports is often a particular point of contention on the left. Last year, Massachusetts representative Seth Moulton told theTimes: “I have two little girls. I don’t want them getting run over on a playing field by a male or formerly male athlete.” By shifting the conversation to sports, Democrats obscure larger issues like the assault on trans health care. Trans people are not just a cultural war issue. They deserve material rights.

I tried to talk myself out of transitioning. For years, I sat in an armchair across from a Christian counsellor to discuss “my situation.” It took a long time to undo the psychic damage, to learn how to inhabit my body, to not dissociate long enough to realize I wanted to change my sex. If we enforce the idea that changing gender is unthinkable, it soon begins to seem impossible. But we have the capacity to think such audacity into being. All change is dangerous, but to remain impermeable to new identities, and to new bodies, is a brittle way to live. We don’t need freedom from change, but freedomtochange.

Last September, I “got” a vaginoplasty. Though it was before Trump was reëlected, I was not the only one to joke that perhaps my procedure was among the last that this country would offer. What’s perhaps more noteworthy is how few of these surgeries occur, even in an environment that’s not openly hostile to trans people. In 2020, just over nine hundred vaginoplasties were performed in the U.S.,accordingto theJournal of the American Medical Association. The worldwide figure is around three thousand annually. (Phalloplasties are even rarer; only about three per cent of trans men have received such a surgery.) For the past few years, right-wing politicians and pundits have written about trans surgeries as if they are offered for free at drive-ins. The numbers tell a different story.

A larger number of trans people utilize hormones, which are life-altering but not as drastic as surgical intervention. When I go to get my hormone-replacement-therapy (H.R.T.) prescription, I sit in a waiting room next to post-menopausal women seeking the same medication. Many cis women also take spironolactone, the foul-smelling little pills that I once took as a part of H.R.T., in order to get rid of their acne. Trans people, often forced to do their own research, are more likely to understand the risks, side effects, and joys of estrogen and testosterone. Cis people, on the other hand, usually trust their doctors implicitly in regard to these medications because they’ve typically been able to.

The regret rate for kids who transition is far lower than Republican lawmakers would like us to believe, not even rising above one per cent, according to a 2021 collection of studies published in Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery Global Open. Kristina Olson, the lead author of a 2024 JAMA Pediatrics study, told NPR that only four per cent of participants expressed regret with some aspect of their care: “Often the regrets they were expressing had to do with [wishing] they hadn’t done blockers and they’d gone straight to hormones, or they maybe had a negative side effect related to the blockers,” such as an implant getting irritated. Regret is a phantom frequently leveraged against trans people, especially children.

Republicans claim they are protecting children, in particular, from making choices that the kids will later wish they could undo, the kind that will scar them and limit their ability to have fulfilling, reproductively healthy lives. It’s a modern twist on an age-old fear. In his book “Kids These Days” (2017), Malcolm Harris chronicles parents’ growing intolerance for risk, often because they see their children as an economic investment. Harris cites an article in theAmerican Journal of Playby Peter Gray, about adolescents’ declining ability to self-direct their leisure time:

Even casual observations of children playing outdoors confirm that these youngsters, like other young mammals, deliberately put themselves into moderately fear-inducing conditions in play. . . . If too little fear is induced, the activity is boring; if too much is induced, it becomes no longer play but terror. Nobody but the child himself or herself knows the right dose, which is why all such play must be self-directed and self-controlled.

The task, for all of us, is to become autonomous, capable of managing our own lives—understanding work and play, danger and reward, fantasy and reality. Trans people are all too aware of such dichotomies. Happiness is never far from risk. But some things are perhaps worth doing even if they do not come with a guarantee. ♦

Your Hip Surgery, My Headache, by David Sedaris

The year my sister Amy was invited to play Mrs. Claus in the Macy’s Thanksgiving Day Parade was the same year Hugh had his hip replaced.

“It somehow makes sense that these two things are happening within a week of each other,” I said.

“Except I’m not doing it,” Amy told me.

It was nearly midnight, and we were in my apartment in New York, gathered in the living room. The view from the window looked like the backdrop of a talk show—a jumble of tall buildings with thousands of lit windows, some of them winking. “How can younotplay Mrs. Claus?” I asked.

Amy ticked the reasons off on her fingers. “One: they want me there at 3a.m.Two: it’s supposed to rain. And three: they’re not paying me anything.”

“Macy’s doesn’t pay Mrs. Claus?” I asked, surprised in the same way I’d be if I’d learned that she—Mrs. Claus—had been married before, maybe to another woman, like, “What? That can’t be true!”

With us in the living room were two Frenchmen whom Hugh and I know from Normandy: Olivier, who owns a donkey and had been teaching himself English with Duolingo, and David, who also has a donkey but spoke no English whatsoever. Still, he could understand by my tone that something outrageous was happening.

“Qu’est-ce qui se passe?” he asked.

“The department store that calls itself the House of Macy will not give money to the bride of Father Christmas,” I said in French. “For us, this is unacceptable!”

Olivier and David had arrived a week earlier and were staying with us until the Saturday after Thanksgiving. It was their first trip to New York, and they were overwhelmed by how loud and crowded the city was. My sister Gretchen, who lives in North Carolina, was also staying with us, and while I was happy to see her and our French friends, I’d just returned from a long tour and had not had any time alone—or alone with just Hugh—since mid-September. We have a good deal of room in our New York apartment. It’s not like anyone was sleeping on a sofa or hanging wet towels off the doorknobs. I just resented having to adjust my schedule. House guests meant less time at my desk, both in the morning and in the evening, when, mainly because of Gretchen, we had to eat dinner earlier than usual. I can put up with a lot, but when my work schedule is interrupted I get antsy. It didn’t help that just four days after Gretchen was due to leave, Hugh would be checking into the hospital for hip surgery. “And don’t think I’m not going to need you,” he said over Thanksgiving dinner.

A whiz in the kitchen, Hugh makes all our meals, and when I suggested that he could probably still manage—“I’m sure other people have. Can’t you cook, like, from a wheelchair or something?”—he said, “No,you’regoing to do it. Three times a day and for as long as I need you to.” He poured himself a glass of wine. “I could be out of commission for months!”

“Yes, but you don’t know that for a fact,” I reminded him. “I’m sure there are people who recover from a hip replacement in a matter of days. You just don’t hear about them.”

David asked what we were talking about, and I said, in French, “After the hospital, he wants to make a strike!”

However difficult Hugh’s operation would be, I doubted that it could be worse than the year and a half leading up to it. There was no one day he started complaining about his pain—he’s always done that to some degree. Rather, it shifted from his back or his sciatica to his hip, then stayed there and intensified.

“Ow!” he’d cry, wincing as he sat down at the lunch or dinner table, as he bent before the oven or even looked at a stepladder. Hugh never says anything so simple as “I have a headache,” or “My finger hurts.” Instead, he describes his pain in detail, the way he might to a doctor who’d just said, “Tell me everything, and I want you to be as specific as possible.”

I know when Hugh is on the phone with his mother because all his talk will be about his sore wrist, his swollen joint, the cut on his foot. When I offer to get him an ice pack, an ibuprofen, a Band-Aid, he’ll say in a voice that is weak but also bitter, “That’s O.K. I’ll get it myself later if I need to.”

“They don’t hand out medals for needless suffering,” I’ll remind him.

“You don’t know what it’s like,” he’ll tell me.

I know all about kidney stones and gum surgery. I know about broken ribs and urinary-tract infections. When it came to hip pain, though, he had me.

His groaning would sometimes wake me in the middle of the night.

“Listen,” I’d tell him, “if I could take your pain and suffer it myself, I would, if only to get a decent night’s sleep.”

This went on day after day, until I could no longer remember its absence.

Hugh became a non-stop grouse. Ghosts in movies moaned less than he did. Still, it took a lot to get him to see a specialist. “The doctor said it’s bone on bone,” he reported after returning from his appointment. “Do you have the slightest idea of what that feels like?”

Two months after Thanksgiving, Hugh would turn sixty-five and be eligible for Medicare, but even that was too long to wait. Luckily, we have health insurance, and it appeared that our plan would cover the brunt of the cost. And so, in what seemed like very little time, he was scheduled for surgery at one of the hospitals within a short walking distance of our apartment. There are a number of them, so many that when our friend Tracy was looking for a place on the Upper East Side, and we suggested our part of it, she instead chose to get something thirty blocks north. “All the Google Street Views I looked at in your neighborhood showed people who were crying,” she told us.

It’s something I hadn’t noticed until she said it. Then I thought,She’s right!If our sidewalks are clean, it’s likely due to a steady downpour of tears, mostly in the vicinity of Memorial Sloan Kettering.

The place Hugh went to was called the Hospital for Special Surgery. “It’s the best,” his doctor said, as did many of the retired residents in our building who’d had their hips and knees and shoulders replaced there. “If you need a walker or a wheelchair, just ask,” any one of them would tell us. “I’ve got one in the basement!”

A neighbor said that she still had some painkillers left. Another offered to loan us her comfort-height toilet seat. Hugh passed, but wound up buying his own. “The doctor says I’ll need it,” he told me.

The sight of the puffy, foot-tall toilet seat in our home was too much for me, a spectre of death no less chilling than the Grim Reaper himself. I said, “Next, bring in a coffin, why don’t you.”

The day before his surgery, Hugh talked to his older brother John in Washington State, then limped into my office to recap their conversation. “He said he really wished he was here to help take care of me.”

I looked up from my laptop. “Call him back.”

“I don’t know that he reallymeantit,” Hugh said.

I handed him my phone. “Sure he did, call him. Do it now.”

“John can’t afford a last-minute ticket across the country,” Hugh told me. “And I know for a fact that he won’t want to drive three hours from his house to the Seattle airport.”

“He won’t have to,” I said. “Call him.”

That was at 3p.m.New York time. By five, a hired car was heading to Port Angeles to collect Hugh’s brother, and by midnight John was in a first-class seat to J.F.K., where another car would be waiting to deliver him to our apartment.

I said to Amy, “It’s worth every penny.”

I like all of Hugh’s siblings. Each is creative in his or her own way. John, for instance, can make a sculpture out of anything. Hand him an empty sardine tin, three chopsticks, and a broken calculator, and he’ll turn them into something remarkable. He’s a wonderful writer as well, and a huge reader. John is warm and inquisitive. He’s bighearted and energetic, and I’d always looked forward to his visits, especially now. “He can cook, right?” I asked.

“Well, sure,” Hugh said, “but it’s just regular stuff he makes for his grandkids. Pork chops, macaroni and cheese, that kind of thing.”

“That’ll do,” I told him. “At least until you can stand on your feet long enough to pan-fry scallops.”

John hadn’t yet arrived when I collected Hugh’s overnight bag and accompanied him to the hospital for his operation. For years, I’d heard horror stories about American health care, but this place was first-rate. After checking in, we were led to a small, spotless room with curtains for walls. There was an examining table set up, and, once Hugh had changed into a medical gown, we were visited by six staff members, starting with a nurse who inserted an I.V. into the back of his hand and cleaned out his nose with iodine. An aide shaved and then washed the hip that needed replacing. Then came another nurse, who took a vial of Hugh’s blood and asked a series of questions, including “When did you last have a bowel movement?”

I put my fingers in my ears and made the noise of a hundred thousand bees.

“Are you O.K.?” the young woman asked.

“We don’t do things like that,” I told her, rocking back and forth, my fingers still in my ears.

“We don’t have bowel movements,” I explained. “The bathrooms at our house are for soaking in the tub and brushing our teeth—that’s it. Nothing else has ever happened there.”

I know couples who sit on the toilet with the door open, who merrily pass gas in front of each other and discuss their evacuations in graphic detail. But Hugh and I are not those people. Hearing his answer to the nurse’s question could have possibly destroyed me, and so I kept my fingers in my ears until she left and the anesthesiologist arrived. Then came another nurse and, finally, the surgeon—Dr. Reif—who, we learned, had just amputated a leg.

Sitting in the curtained-off room, listening as patients to the left and right of us were asked about their bowel movements, too, I realized that I had never seen Hugh frightened before. “You’ll be fine,” I told him, patting his hand and noticing for the first time that it had age spots on it.

At 11a.m., right on schedule, a gurney pulled up. Hugh was outfitted with a bonnet, and, after he was wheeled away, I went home to meet John, who has visited us in France and England but, like Olivier and David, had never before been to New York. All the Hamrick brothers are handsome, though in slightly different ways, like dogs born in different litters to the same purebred parents. John’s jaw is squarer than Hugh’s and Sam’s, and his thick hair, even as he turns seventy, has hardly any gray in it. His gait is looser, and he’s more affectionate, always ready to lay a hand on your shoulder, and perhaps surprise you with a kiss on the cheek.

“Ick,” I said, when we greeted each other. “Get off me!”

Walking from my apartment to the Morgan Library, where we would have lunch, took three times as long as it normally would because John kept stopping in the middle of the sidewalk to look up: “Wow. Did you see the detail on that building?”

A woman slammed into his back, the way I myself have done a thousand times when a tourist, oblivious to the people around him, quits moving in order to gawk and point.

“You could at least apologize!” John shouted after her once she’d skittered around him, muttering.

We were eating when the surgeon called to say that he had finished, and that there had been no complications.

It hadn’t occurred to me that anything might have gone wrong, though I suppose it easily could have. Eight years earlier, John’s wife—a woman he’d been with since he was fourteen, the mother of his child—died of a blood clot after breaking her leg. Totally unexpected, and his entire life was derailed. I’m still not sure how he makes it from one day to the next, and in such good humor. Time helps, I imagine, as do all the philosophy books he reads. For a while, he saw a therapist. Now he dates a woman who lives down the street from him and makes her own greeting cards.

It’s amazing how quickly doctors can get hip-replacement patients back on their feet. The morning after the operation, John and I entered the hospital and found Hugh shuffling down a hallway. He had a physical therapist by his side and was using a walker—but still!

Getting him home a short time later involved a thick cushion and a car with plenty of legroom. “Ow!” he said whenever I tried to help. “You’re making everything worse!”

In the apartment, he steered his walker toward the bed. “I’m going to need you to take my shoes off,” he said to me, adding, as I began to do so, “Slowly! Now put my slippers on—not like that!! Get me my shoehorn!”

He needed a blanket, his phone, a glass of water. “Notthat muchwater!” he complained when I handed it to him. There were prescriptions to be picked up, and sickroom equipment—for instance, an adjustable stool he’d need when getting in and out of bed. I went to four different places looking for one. At CVS, I came upon a well-dressed white-haired woman who had in her shopping cart a pack of wet wipes and eight quart-size cartons of half-and-half.

“God, that’s a lot of half-and-half,” I said to her. “Who on earth needs that much?”

“I’m having guests,” she snapped, and I scurried away.

That evening, I went with Amy to our friend Mike’s for dinner.

“I can’t believe you’re abandoning me,” Hugh said as I dressed to leave.

I reminded him that it had been on the calendar for months. “And I’m notabandoningyou—John is here.”

It was nice to get away, if only for a few hours. To have someone bringmebowls of nuts and glasses of water. At the table, I mentioned the lady who’d growled at me at CVS. Then Mike told us about a woman who’d spotted Ted Koppel carrying a basketful of avocados at a farm stand in Maryland.

“None of your goddam business,” he reportedly answered.

I recapped the evening for Hugh the following morning, saying that there were plenty more parties coming up. “Hopefully, you can come with me to Antonio’s Christmas lunch in two weeks. We had so much fun last year, remember?”

“Two weeks!” Hugh gestured toward his outstretched leg. “Look at me! Are you out of your mind?”

John, who had gone that morning to buy a juicer, set a glass of something that poured like wet cement in front of his brother and raised his voice, which was unlike him. “My God, David. He’s just had major surgery!”

I raised my voice in return. “Well, excuse me! I thought that eventually hemight get better!”

By outsourcing Hugh’s care, I had shut myself out of his recovery. Now I wanted back in, but it was too late. After saying, “Whatever you do, don’t give him a bell,” Amy brought Hugh an empty can she’d put a few quarters in.

Clang,clang,clang, I’d hear while sitting at my desk.Clang, clang.

“How can I help?” I’d ask, racing into the bedroom.

“John is downstairs,” Hugh would say. “Go get him and tell him I need to put my socks on.”

I’d roll up my sleeves. “I can do that for you.”

The two were inseparable, and would convene each morning to dissect their dreams. “So I’m back in Port Angeles under a pitch-black sky, frying—get this—pennies in a skillet,” I caught John saying a week after his arrival, as he sat on the edge of the bed, massaging oil into Hugh’s feet. “I might be wrong, but I’m interpreting this to mean I could use more copper and iron in my diet.”

At meals, the brothers would reflect on their childhoods in Africa. “Remember that C.I.A. agent who had a crush on Mom in Djibouti?” “What was the name of that Belgian nun in Ethiopia who we gave our monkey to?”

It made it hard to join the conversation. This as opposed to when Amy would visit. Shortly after Hugh’s operation, she had her elderly rabbit, Tina, put to sleep. A few days later, nose stuffed up and with puffy eyes, she came to dinner.

“Actually,” Amy said, “I think I’m allergic to Tina’s ghost.”

Hugh has a sister named Ann, and one morning I walked into the dining room and found him talking with her on speakerphone. “Do you have comfortable enough chairs?” she asked.

The answer would normally be yes, but, on account of his hip, he had to be raised up while sitting. “There are a few that are O.K. if I put a cushion on them,” Hugh told her, gesturing for me to refill his coffee cup. “At my doctor’s office yesterday, I saw one that would be perfect, but there’s no way David would allow it into the apartment. It’s too ugly.”

“Well, screw him,” I heard Ann say. “We’re talking about your health here!”

The next morning, she sent a text that read “Is David any help to you?”

Before Hugh could answer, I picked up his phone and typed, “None at all,” adding an emoji—my first time ever—of a skunk.

I expected her to respond with “You’re kidding,” or “I don’t believe that for one second.”

Instead, she wrote, “That sort of angers me. But then, he’s so self-involved.”

Rather than texting her back, I returned to my office and resumed writing in my diary.Self-involved,indeed, I thought. Hugh hadn’t shown me the chair he was talking to Ann about, but, if it was truly that ugly, I’m sure he wouldn’t have wanted it, either. Why was I the villain here?

Hugh went off his painkillers after the third day. After the eighth, he cast aside his walker and was able to get around using a cane. He made it to the lobby, slowly, then all the way to the corner. Now that he didn’t need quite as much attention, I started taking John to see a bit of the city. One afternoon, on the C train, we came upon a man who had peed on himself—and had likely been doing so for quite a while. The stench of old urine was so intense that it had emptied half the subway car. Neither awake nor asleep, he sat slumped beside a dribbling vodka bottle, muttering.

Check, I thought, since that’s something every visitor to New York needs to see. After looking at this man for a moment or two, John remarked not on the smell or on the ridiculous Santa hat the man wore but on his hands. “Did you notice how beautiful they are?” he asked.

I took him to lunch at a deli in Carnegie Hill. Just as our orders arrived, I heard someone ask, “Can we get a picture?”

Must I? I thought, looking to my right and realizing that the person was talking not to me but to Kevin Spacey.

“Hasn’t he been cancelled?” John asked much more loudly than he needed to.

“It still counts as a star sighting,” I told him, thinking,Check!

We went to the Met andMoMA, then to the most garish of souvenir shops so that John could buy sweatshirts for his grandsons. In Times Square, he stood stock still and took photos of billboards as people who work in that neighborhood cursed the pair of us. I said to Hugh when we got home, “I even took him to see the tree at Rockefeller Center.”

That was huge, as no one in their right mind goes anywhere near Rockefeller Center from Thanksgiving to mid-January or so.

“What do you want, a medal?” Hugh asked.

I tried to remember that he was still in pain, and that, trapped inside for all but thirty minutes a day, he was going a little stir-crazy. It was hard for both of us, but became surprisingly easier when, shortly before Christmas, John returned to Washington State. On that morning, I accompanied Hugh to his surgeon’s office for a follow-up appointment.

“Any questions?” Dr. Reif asked after removing Hugh’s bandage to examine the wound.

“Yes,” I said. “Do you see any reason why he can’t cook Christmas dinner? We have nine guests coming, and he’s threatening to have it catered.”

The doctor replaced the bandage. “Oh, I think he’s up to it. That said, you might want to take a few shortcuts, use Stove Top stuffing rather than homemade, that sort of thing.”

“Stuffingfrom a box?” I said when we were back on the street. “Stuffing,period? As if we’d have turkey on Christmas Day! That man didnotknow who he was talking to, did he?”

“No, he did not,” Hugh sniffed, raising his cane to hail a cab. And, with that, he was back. Christmas nearly killed him, but no shortcuts were taken. He made a second entrée for the vegetarians and two desserts. Given a few more days, he might have even churned his own butter.

I left New York in early January to go back on tour, and when I saw Hugh again, six weeks later, he was fully recovered. Walking, swimming, going up and down stairs. “It’s a miracle!” he said.

I once met a young man who’d discovered by accident that one of his kidneys was dead inside him. Doctors removed it, and when I asked what happened to the cavity he said that his other organs had shifted slightly to occupy it. That’s what happened to the space Hugh had filled with his pain. It’s not like we now devote it exclusively to politics or art appreciation, though both subjects grew larger, as did talk of our families, and our friends. As he became his old self again, the pleasantness of our life together just sort of swelled, crowding out everything but half a bottle of OxyContin and a really tall toilet seat now gathering cobwebs beside an aluminum walker in our building’s dank, uninviting basement. ♦

Heir Ball: How the Cost of Youth Sports Is Changing the N.B.A.

American sports come with implied narratives. The story of baseball is fundamentally nostalgic, connecting us to childhood and to the country’s pastoral beginnings. Football tells a story of manly grit, with echoes of the battlefield. Basketball is the city game, as the sportswriter Pete Axthelm called it half a century ago, and its chief narrative, for decades, was about escaping the ghetto. Religious metaphors run hotter in basketball than in other sports: when Spike Lee set out to make an ode to New York City hoops, he named his protagonist Jesus Shuttlesworth, for the N.B.A. Hall of Famer Earl (Jesus) Monroe; LeBron James appeared on the cover ofSports Illustratedat the age of seventeen as “The Chosen One.” Every tall and prodigiously skilled teen-ager feels like an act of God. And no sport, perhaps other than soccer, with itspibesandcraques—the impoverished dribbling and juggling machines who hope to become the next Maradona or Pelé—so deeply mythologizes the search for talent. The savior of your N.B.A. franchise might be getting left off his high-school team in Wilmington, North Carolina, or he might be selling sunglasses on the streets of Athens, Greece, to help his Nigerian immigrant parents make ends meet, or he might be living with his mother in a one-bedroom apartment in Akron, Ohio. You just have to find him.

At least, that was the story. On a recent episode of “Mind the Game,” the podcast that LeBron James hosts with the coach and former point guard Steve Nash, James spoke with the young N.B.A. superstar Luka Dončić about how different James’s hoops upbringing had been from that of kids today. On the playgrounds of Akron, James said, he would play 21, in which the person with the ball tries to score against everyone else. Such games taught him how to improvise, how to get around multiple defenders and create scoring opportunities out of nothing. James is a father of two sons, who mostly learned how to play basketball “indoors,” in a “programmed” environment, he said. They were taught the game by a fleet of coaches and other professionals. “I didn’t have a basketball trainer until second, third, maybe fourth year in the N.B.A.,” James went on. “My basketball training was just being on the court.” Last year, Dončić founded a nonprofit that focusses on youth basketball; in December, the organization published a report arguing that, as youth sports have professionalized, they have become more exclusive, sucking the “joy” out of the game.

A video clip of the podcast was posted on TikTok, and the top comment beneath it reads, “Lebron will be one of the last superstars that’s from the ghetto, basketballs like golf now it’s a tutelage sport.” That might not be entirely true; if a seven-foot-two teen-age Kareem Abdul-Jabbar were walking around any neighborhood in New York today, he wouldn’t get far without a wannabe agent stopping him in the street. But, putting aside such once-in-a-generation talents, the landscape of the league has subtly changed. James and his older son, LeBron (Bronny) James, Jr., made N.B.A. history last year by suiting up as teammates, for the Los Angeles Lakers. And, while that was a first, being a second-generation N.B.A. player is becoming almost unremarkable. In 2009, ten players in the league had fathers who’d played for N.B.A. teams; this past season, there were thirty-five. The future promises even more hoop legacies. The likely No. 2 pick in the upcoming draft is Dylan Harper, whose father, Ron, played with Michael Jordan on the Chicago Bulls. Lists of top high-school recruits include the names Anthony, as in Carmelo, and Arenas, as in Gilbert. James’s younger son, Bryce, has committed to play for the University of Arizona and could also reach the N.B.A. soon.

Genetics is the most obvious explanation: if your dad is six feet eight and your mom is six feet two, you stand a better chance of guarding Kevin Durant—or Durant’s kids—than my children will ever have. But the N.B.A. has been around for almost eighty years, and the number of roster spots in the league has barely changed since the mid-nineties. If all that mattered were good genes, the influx of second-generation players would have shown up thirty years ago. Why the spike now?

To answer that question, one N.B.A. executive told me, you probably have to look at the economy of basketball development. The children of pros are generally wealthy and well connected; they have access to “better training, coaching, and the right people who can put them on the right lists,” the executive said. “Those early edges accumulate.” Increasingly, players are made as much as they are born, and making those players costs money. A star prospect requires a set of physical gifts that might as well be divine in origin. But, to compete now, he will also likely need the kinds of resources that you have to buy, and a small industry has arisen to sell them.

“It’s getting too expensive for some kids to even play, and the pressure to be perfect takes away the love for the game,” Dončić told me. “I think about my daughter and wonder what sports will feel like for her one day.” Jay Williams, a basketball analyst at ESPN who was the second pick in the 2002 N.B.A. draft, said to me, “When I came into the league in the early two-thousands, player development was mostly raw talent, repetition, and survival.” Now, he said, “development starts younger, it’s more specialized, and it’s driven by business.” Jermaine O’Neal, a six-time N.B.A. All-Star who recently founded a basketball-centered prep school, told me, “The cost of everything has changed.” O’Neal, like James, grew up with a single mother in a working-class area of a small city. Sports in general, O’Neal said, are “pricing out a percentage of athletes raised in communities like mine.”

The professionalization of youth sports has changed not only who reaches the N.B.A. but how the game is played when they get there. Watching the post-season this year, I found the level of play to be possibly higher than ever. But I felt little emotional connection to the game. Like many fans, I complain about the number of three-point shots that teams are taking, which turns so many games into an almost cynical exercise in playing the odds. Today’s style is also more rehearsed, more optimized. This, I believe, can be traced to the way that the players are learning the game from an early age—to the difference between a childhood spent outdoors with your friends, competing against grown men, and one spent as a customer, with a cadre of coaches who push you only in the ways that you or, in most cases, your parents approve of.

“What used to be driven by someone’s hunger to improve, to figure it out and work to get better, becomes a job for a lot of these kids so early,” Steve Nash told me. This, he added, meant “essentially trading their enjoyment and motivation for a calculated approach that may be more suitable to young adults than young kids.”

Does this shift also help explain why the N.B.A. has struggled to find its next superstars, successors to James, Steph Curry, and others of their generation? Perhaps. It’s true that a number of today’s best players—Dončić, Nikola Jokić, Giannis Antetokounmpo—are from other countries, and many Americans crave homegrown heroes. But the leading players in this year’s finals, Shai Gilgeous-Alexander, of the Oklahoma City Thunder, and Tyrese Haliburton, of the Indiana Pacers, are North American. (Gilgeous-Alexander is from Canada.) The former plays a throwback game that involves a lot of slithering through tight spaces; the latter makes surprising, lightning-quick passes and fires his jump shots with an awkward motion that resembles an old man pushing his grandchild on a swing. Yet neither player has caught the public imagination in the manner of a James or a Curry or a Durant. When fans argue about the next face of the league, they usually bring up Anthony Edwards, the charismatic guard on the Minnesota Timberwolves, or Ja Morant, of the Memphis Grizzlies, who floats through the air like his bones are hollow before exploding into some of the most violent dunks the league has ever seen. They are the basketball equivalents of James Brown: undeniably virtuosic, always on point, but with so much confidence and brio that they feel unpredictable and capable of anything. The new N.B.A. archetype, in contrast, feels more like an “American Idol” singing machine—technically flawless and with unlimited range, but ultimately forgettable for everyone except the vocal coaches on YouTube.

What happened? Once, a serious basketball prospect might simply play on his local high-school team and then head off to college. Nowadays, he will likely attend multiple schools, seeking exposure, playing time, and competition. The trend began slowly, in the nineteen-eighties, when secondary schools with big-time basketball programs—notably, Oak Hill Academy, in rural Virginia, the alma mater of Rod Strickland, Anthony, and Durant—began recruiting the country’s best players. Soon, explicitly sports-centered schools emerged. The talent agency IMG purchased the Nick Bollettieri Tennis Academy, in Florida, and expanded it to include other sports, adding basketball in 2001. Five years later, Cliff Findlay, a Las Vegas businessman who had made his money in car dealerships, opened Findlay Prep, which was, arguably, just a basketball team—a dozen or so boys from all over the world who played games around the country and took classes at a private school a few minutes away from the gym where they practiced. Findlay Prep won three national high-school titles in four years and produced eighteen N.B.A. players. It closed down, in 2019, when the nearby private school ended the partnership. Suddenly, Findlay’s students had nowhere to go to class.

This spring, I flew to Dallas to visit Dynamic Prep, the school that Jermaine O’Neal founded in 2022. It has eleven students, all of them Division I basketball prospects. Monday through Friday, the students gather at a twenty-four-thousand-square-foot training facility just north of the city. In the morning, they sit in a classroom and take an N.C.A.A.-approved curriculum of online courses. Then they head to the gym for strength training and conditioning, before basketball practice in the afternoon.

When I arrived, Dynamic’s student body was on the court. The team had recently been ranked tenth in the country by ESPN, helping it qualify as a late addition to the Chipotle Nationals, an annual tournament that unofficially crowns the country’s high-school champions. But Dynamic would face long odds against more established programs, including IMG Academy and Montverde Academy, another Florida school that consistently produces N.B.A. draft picks. And practice wasn’t going well. O’Neal, who is the head coach of the team in addition to being the school’s founder, stood on the sidelines, his arms crossed. He is nearly seven feet tall, with a high forehead and a dimpled chin; he still appears to be more or less in playing shape. The team had been running half-court sets for nearly thirty minutes, but nobody was where he was supposed to be—not even Jermaine O’Neal, Jr., the team’s small forward. O’Neal, Sr., had spent the first half of practice quietly simmering; then one player missed a defensive rotation and asked his flummoxed coach what was wrong. “Your demeanor!” O’Neal yelled, before ordering the player off the court. Another kid replaced him, and the ball was passed back to the top of the key. The drill began again.

O’Neal grew up in Columbia, South Carolina, and counts thirty-two siblings among his relatives. His mother taught him almost everything; he didn’t meet his father until he was thirty years old. At seventeen, just a few years after growing about nine inches in three months, he became one of the youngest players ever to reach the N.B.A. when he was drafted in the first round by the Portland Trail Blazers. He was part of a generation who skipped college entirely; the sports media was largely skeptical of kids who turned down college scholarships in favor of N.B.A. dollars, and these teen-agers often found themselves competing for playing time against men more than a decade older. O’Neal rode the bench for four years. But veterans on the team made sure that he understood his place on the roster and how to act like a professional. When he was traded to the Indiana Pacers, after his fourth season, he flourished.

O’Neal credits the playgrounds of his childhood with giving him instincts on the court and helping instill the resilience to endure what felt like an ignoble start to his career. He knows that the kids he coaches aren’t getting that kind of real-world instruction, and so he looks for ways to simulate it. “I’m taking a little bit of the hardship mind-set of how I grew up, and I’m bringing it to this new-school mind-set and mixing it,” he told me. The team’s intense practices and his focus on defense are partly meant to create an experience of adversity. He believes that his job is not only to prepare his players for what comes after Dynamic in college or in the pros but also to protect them from it. “Your coaches won’t love you—you’re just getting them closer to another win,” he yelled at one point during practice. “Once you get on campus, your parents will never be able to help you.”

In O’Neal’s view, a school like Dynamic is more sensitive to the needs of young athletes than traditional options are. Before founding the school, he created Drive Nation, a home for youth basketball and volleyball teams which was headquartered next to the car-rental center at Dallas Fort Worth International Airport. Drive Nation’s teams were affiliated with the Amateur Athletic Union, or A.A.U., an umbrella organization for club teams which, in the past twenty-five years, has become a major part of youth sports. At the time, O’Neal’s daughter, Asjia, was one of the top high-school volleyball players in the country. But, during her junior year, she told her parents that she was burned out: full-time school followed by practice and training—plus the travel and stress that came with playing for a club team and the United States youth program—had been too much. O’Neal began reading about other approaches to youth sports, and he talked to coaches in Europe. He learned about the Continent’s academy system, which plucks promising athletes at an early age and gives them a more specialized path, organizing their lives largely around their sport. Dynamic is his attempt to bring that system to the U.S.

Most of the kids at Dynamic won’t make the N.B.A., but all of them could play for major college programs—and big-time college basketball is a lucrative endeavor in itself. In 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that N.C.A.A. restrictions on the payment of student athletes were a violation of antitrust law; now student athletes can make money by selling their name, image, and likeness. Bronny James reportedly earned nearly six million dollars from such N.I.L. deals—with Nike, Beats by Dre, and other companies—before he left college. And you don’t have to be LeBron James’s son, or even a top N.B.A. prospect, to do well. R. J. Davis, a talented but undersized guard, spent five seasons at the University of North Carolina, becoming the second-highest scorer in the program’s history; he may not get an N.B.A. paycheck anytime soon, but he racked up at least twenty-five N.I.L. deals last year, which paid him more than two and a half million dollars. Players like him are staying in college longer than before, and many of them move around to pursue the best and most profitable opportunities by registering with the N.C.A.A.’s transfer portal, which notifies coaches at other colleges about the players who are newly available for recruiting. The day I visited Dynamic, the transfer portal had just opened up, and O’Neal informed his kids, early in practice, how many players had entered it. This, he was suggesting, is what they were up against: hundreds of young men vying for a limited number of spots that could be worth millions of dollars.

After practice, he gathered the team around him. “What do you all want?” he asked. The players hung their heads. “I’m going to be real with you,” he said. “Today was not good enough.” If the team hoped to succeed at the Chipotle Nationals, they would have to put in more effort. O’Neal pointed out that the number of players in the transfer portal had gone up since that morning. “Seven hundred in the portal now,” he said. “It’s a record. Every year, it’s a fucking record.” Then he repeated his question. “What is it you want?”

It’s an old complaint, but it’s still true: kids who have been given everything may end up lacking motivation. “I wish I’d had the access my kids have—the trainers, the recovery tools, the mental-health support,” Jay Williams told me. “It’s a smarter system now, but what I want to pass down to them is the hunger, the grit.” O’Neal made more than a hundred and sixty-seven million dollars in his playing career, and he has struggled to impart the lessons he learned in his childhood to Jermaine, Jr. “I had this thing where I’d say to him, ‘Man, you don’t understand how good you got it,’ ” he told me. “ ‘The only thing you’re missing is hardship. You fly on private jets. You drive a Range Rover. You’ve had a chef your entire life.’ I have literally missed meals. I’ve literally had one pair of shoes that were my school shoes, my basketball shoes, and, if I went to church, they were my church shoes.”

“I never wanted my kids to live like that, and I didn’t want to live like that,” he went on. “So I would ask Jermaine, Jr., ‘What are you starving for?’ And he couldn’t answer the question.” Eventually, Jermaine, Jr., came up with a response: he needed an emotional break from living in the shadow of both his dad and his coach. O’Neal has been trying to give him one.

Youth basketball is not an outlier in its trend toward professionalization. You can see the same story in countless aspects of American life. Fierce competition breeds cottage industries that promise advantages to the children of parents who can afford them. Those children crowd out their peers, and the path to upward mobility narrows. The kids playing sports at big-time college programs are examples of this trend, but so are many of the straight-A students who attend classes at those same colleges, whose parents may have paid for private tutors and consultants to help secure admission. Children from poorer families have to be extraordinary or they will fall behind.

The most highly touted prospect at Dynamic Prep, according to ESPN, is not Jermaine O’Neal, Jr.—the twenty-second-ranked small forward in the country—but another child of professional athletes. Marcus Spears, Jr., is the son of a retired N.F.L. defensive lineman and a former W.N.B.A. player, Aiysha Spears. June, as his parents call him, is six feet eight, with long arms and the lankiness of a teen-ager who is still growing. He can shoot from outside, defend at the rim, and trigger a fast break after a rebound. If he grows a few more inches, he’ll be the same height as Durant, one of his favorite players; his loping but graceful gait calls to mind a young Antetokounmpo. It may be ludicrous to invoke such superstars when discussing a kid who just turned sixteen, but scouting is an exercise in imagination, one in which the most salient inputs are limitations—if a prospect has T. rex arms or shoots like he’s angry at the ball, his spectrum of possibility shrinks. June was averaging fewer than seven points a game, but he has uncapped potential: you can map his body, skills, and movements onto many of the best players in the N.B.A. He’s currently the third-ranked high-school sophomore in the country, at any position in the game.

He’s also, for now, younger and skinnier than most of his teammates. At practice, I watched him get pushed around while his father paced the sidelines. Marcus Spears, Sr., was a football star at Louisiana State University before playing eight seasons for the Dallas Cowboys and another for the Baltimore Ravens. He’s now one of ESPN’s premier football analysts. On TV, he is self-deprecating and exceedingly likable, but on the sidelines he was like every other anxious basketball dad: muttering to himself when June didn’t rotate fast enough on defense, staring morosely at the floor when June took a spill onto the hardwood. When June declined to shoot an open jumper, he yelled, “Take the shot!”

Later that day, I visited Marcus and Aiysha Spears at their seven-thousand-square-foot house in a gated community near where the Cowboys practice. Aiysha grew up in Detroit—“the city,” she told me, “not the surrounding areas”—and was reared, in her early years, by a mother who wanted her to become a swimmer. Her mother died when Aiysha was thirteen, and she decided to take up basketball, mostly playing for her local school teams, with some A.A.U., too. “I was travelling by myself to tournaments,” she told me. “My mother passed away, my father wasn’t in my life, and my grandparents didn’t know what to do, so they trusted my coaches to handle it and make sure that I was O.K. I would be in Indiana or Chicago, and they definitely couldn’t pay to come watch me play in a tournament. The hundred and fifty dollars or whatever it would cost to see me, that was our electricity bill.”

Marcus, whose extensive array of barbecuing equipment sat on the back patio, grew up in a blue-collar family in Baton Rouge. His mother was a telephone operator for Bell South, and his father worked as an electrician before getting a job at the Georgia-Pacific paper mill. Spears echoed the other former pros I talked to when he described how he learned to play sports: “outside,” mostly in pickup games with older boys. Now he’s trying to teach toughness to his son. “I was super hard on June when he was young,” he told me. “I was looking at it from a prism of knowing what he was going to actually be. Like, ‘Your mom is six foot two, bro, and I’m a pro football player. She’s a pro basketball player. You’re going to be the one per cent of the one per cent of what you’re doing.’ ” He prodded his son to work harder, even cursing at him the way he knew June’s coaches someday would. “But I probably started a little too early with him, at seven or eight years old,” he said. “I still have to check myself at times now and realize he’s still fifteen years old, because when I was fifteen I wasn’t even close to what he is doing now.” Spears wants his son to succeed, and he knows that college sports have changed. “When I got to L.S.U., I was developing as a player,” he said. “Kids can’t sit on the bench and learn how to play anymore. They need to produce immediately or they’re gone.”

Kids who are serious about sports now don’t just spend hours practicing; they also spend hours building their brands. Today, just about every notable college prospect has dozens of tightly edited YouTube highlight reels and tens of thousands of Instagram followers. Top prospects used to meet one another at camps or at the annual McDonald’s All-American Game; they might have scanned one another’s names in the infrequent updates of high-school player rankings. Now those same players meet through social media and the booming youth-sports content business.

This is true across all kinds of activities. If you’re the best twelve-year-old chess player in a big city, you’ve probably competed in hundreds of online games against the other top twelve-year-olds across the world—you might even live-stream your matches and feed some of that content into the algorithms of TikTok and Instagram. Yogi Roth, an analyst at the Big Ten Network, has tracked the development of N.F.L. prospects for the past twenty-five years, and he believes that social media has fundamentally changed the experience of learning to play football. Roth played in college and coached for several years before going into television; in 2009, he became a producer and the host of “Elite 11,” which has been likened to “American Idol,” but for high-school quarterbacks. The show has featured sixteen future Heisman Trophy winners and was once a rare opportunity for players at that level to meet one another and compete. Now those connections are made online. “They find one another early,” Roth said. “And then they all get on the same club team, which draws even more connections.”

There are benefits to this hypervisibility—scholarship offers, attention from skilled trainers and coaches. But it also attracts predatory figures and creates additional pressure. Cautionary tales abound. The canonical basketball example is Julian Newman, whose highlight reels went viral when he was a fifth grader and not yet four and a half feet tall. He was written up in theTimesand featured on “Good Morning America”; an online marketing machine was built around him, much of it orchestrated by his father. But Newman was just five feet seven when he finished high school, and no big-time college program wants a tiny shoot-first point guard who might arrive with a long list of demands. He spent the next five years as a fading YouTube celebrity, challenging other content creators to one-on-one battles.

Marcus Spears, Jr., does not have a large social-media following, nor does he spend much time with influencers—relative to other top prospects, he has little online presence, which is mostly by design. “I’m not going to monetize my fifteen-year-old,” his father told me. “I’m not interested in him having three hundred thousand followers.” But he and Aiysha understand that this is a privilege: parents who need the sponsorship money will understandably want to turn the hype around their talented children into funds, and some may even view it as the best choice for their kids. Spears said that he and his wife can see the downsides of that attention because of their experiences as pro athletes. “Also, if I need to fly to L.A. because the best knee doctor is out there, I can do it,” he added. “But, if I wasn’t in this position, and monetization on Instagram was going to allow my kid to go to the best doctor, then I would do that for them.”

All the former pros I talked to were frustrated by the intensity of youth sports as it exists now, but they still participated in the system because, well, what good parents wouldn’t do the same to insure that their children kept up with other talented kids? If I had a child who could potentially play basketball in college or the pros, I would pay for all the trainers everyone else was paying for—and then, if I could, I would send them to play at Dynamic for Coach O’Neal. Most people probably would. As O’Neal put it to me, “Wherever there’s kids, there’s parents. Wherever parents and kids go, they’re going to spend money.”

Not everyone at Dynamic, or at the programs it competes against, has money. The established schools offer scholarships; Dynamic is in an “incubator” phase, O’Neal told me, and so, for now, is not charging tuition. But the student athletes at these schools have all learned to play ball through careful instruction. In early April, a couple of weeks before the N.B.A. playoffs, the Chipotle Nationals began. The kids in these games had a long way to go, but they already played a facsimile of the pro game. Big guys shot threes, guards drove the lane and kicked the ball out for more threes. Gone are the days of novel high-school offensive sets or, at least on this level, wild invention.

More than a decade ago, I travelled to Oak Hill Academy to watch some practices. Most of the kids I saw went on to play big-time college hoops; the school drew a level of talent similar to Dynamic’s today. But, watching Dynamic practice, I was struck immediately by how fast they moved; I felt almost as if I were watching a different stage of evolution. “The game has become faster, more positionless, and more physically demanding,” Bill Duffy, a former N.B.A. draft pick and one of the top agents in the league, told me. “Players are training at a high level from a much younger age, and that’s changed not only how they move but how they think about the game. The style of play has evolved to match the speed and specialization that comes with early development.”

All that training has also led to a uniformity of play. “I absolutely hate it,” Marcus Spears, Sr., told me. That sameness comes from learning the game in a controlled environment, he said. “I think that’s why so many players from overseas are the top names in the N.B.A. now, because not only do they learn the technical side—they play the game with the old-school principle of playing against people who are older than you.” At the turn of the century, there were thirty-six foreign-born players in the N.B.A. Last year, there were a hundred and twenty-five. The top European teens play in pro leagues, against veterans. “You develop instincts in those situations,” Spears went on. American kids, no longer learning on the playground, were losing theirs, he believed. “You hear N.B.A. players that have been in the league a while say these young players suck. It’s not that they suck—it’s just they can’t do anything if you don’t tell them to. You need to make reads in the game, you need to deviate away from the play because it didn’t work. Now everybody just looks around, like, ‘What do I do now?’ ” One coach told the authors of the report published by Luka Dončić’s foundation, “Players don’t know how to anticipate where the ball will fall because they’re so used to their trainers getting their rebounds.”

Steve Nash told me that his effort “to be creative and imaginative” as a player was driven in large part by what he didn’t know—and that, as much as he envied some of the tools that young prospects now have, constant training likely would have altered that. O’Neal, too, saw this as a problem with the way basketball is now taught. “They are literally training these kids like robots, and the players don’t have any feel anymore,” he said. “That’s why all the players look alike now. Hell, half these kids don’t even watch basketball—they watch YouTube.”

At the Chipotle Nationals, O’Neal’s focus on defense, at least, seemed to pay off. Dynamic’s first game was against the vaunted Montverde, and his squad jumped out to an early 12–2 lead, largely owing to the players’ defensive effort. June, who came off the bench, was conspicuously the tallest person on the floor and also conspicuously among the youngest. He finished the game with respectable numbers—five points, five rebounds, and a block in sixteen minutes—and Dynamic managed an upset. The next day, Dynamic blew out Link Academy, the second-ranked team in the country. (The most recognizable name on Link’s roster is Andre Iguodala, Jr., whose father is a four-time N.B.A. champion.) Dynamic won again in Round Three, reaching the finals against Christopher Columbus High School, a Catholic prep school in Miami. Columbus was led by Cameron and Cayden Boozer, the twin sons of the two-time N.B.A. All-Star Carlos Boozer. In the title game, Cayden scored twenty-seven points, Cameron chipped in eleven with eight rebounds, and Columbus got another twelve rebounds from Jaxon Richardson, whose father, Jason, played fourteen seasons in the N.B.A. Columbus won by eighteen points, ending Dynamic’s unlikely run.

There’s no inherent reason that silver-spoon players have to produce an inferior product on the court. And a certain kind of basketball purist—the sort who hates any talk of narrative and is interested only in what happens between the lines on the floor—would roll his eyes at questions about where the handful of players who make the N.B.A. come from.

Still, let’s indulge in one last metaphor. Basketball is like jazz in so many ways that the analogy has become a cliché. As Wynton Marsalis once wrote, “Both reward improvisation and split-second decision making against the pressure of time.” Both are also Black art forms that require incredible discipline and a lifetime of study but which, when performed at their highest levels, encourage a freedom of expression that can take the audience into an ecstatic state. Every hoops fan can think of at least one such moment. For me, it was watching LeBron try to single-handedly beat the Golden State Warriors in the 2015 N.B.A. Finals after his two most talented teammates went down with injuries. James broke from the established tempo of the game and birthed a moment of ugly genius, walking the ball up the court, ordering his overmatched teammates around like a conductor, and almost breaking the spirit of their opponents, one of the best teams of all time.

Maybe this is nostalgia on my part. Perhaps athletes trained in state-of-the-art gyms can bring as much drama and charisma to the court as those who learned to play by trying to score against older guys on a run-down playground. But I’m not sure that basketball can survive as a major sport if it loses all connection to the narrative that has woven it so deeply into American culture. Basketball’s past may not be as virtuosic or as technically sound as its future, but part of why we watch the game is to witness the come-up—the pain of losing followed by the moment when years of work produce an instant of ingenuity that finally gets the superstar to the top. And, because we are sentimental, we want to know that the journey started on the blacktops of Akron, or in some dusty church gym in Indiana, or on the playgrounds of Coney Island. Every great American story is sentimental in the same way: instincts born out of struggle, the triumph of the schoolyard over the classroom, uncommon creativity driven by necessity. ♦