The Truth About Trump’s Proposed Cash-for-Kids Savings Scheme

Last week, at a White House meeting with the C.E.O.s of Uber, Goldman Sachs, and Salesforce, Donald Trump touted “a pro-family initiative that will help millions of Americans harness the strength of our economy to lift up the next generation.” He was referring to a provision in the tax-and-spending bill that House Republicans pushed through in May, which would establish tax-deferred investment accounts for every child born in the United States during the next four years, with the federal government contributing a thousand dollars to each. House Speaker Mike Johnson, who was also present at the White House meeting, described the proposal as “bold, transformative.”

It could more accurately be described as an effort to put lipstick on a pig. As everybody surely knows by now, the House bill—formally called the One Big Beautiful Bill Act—is stuffed with tax cuts for corporations and for the rich, and it proposes to slash funding for Medicaid, food assistance, and other programs that target low-income Americans. The proposal for new investment accounts didn’t change the bill’s highly regressive nature. According to a report by the Congressional Budget Office, over all, the bill’s provisions, including the new accounts, would reduce the financial resources of households in the bottom tenth of the income distribution by about sixteen-hundred dollars a year relative to a baseline scenario, and raise the resources of households in the top tenth by an average of about twelve thousand dollars a year. In other words, it’s a reverse-Robin Hood bill.

The new savings vehicles that Republicans are proposing also demand inspection. Johnson and other Republicans are trying to promote them as pro-family and pro-worker, and some media accounts have described them as “baby bonds.” But the proposal bears little resemblance to one of that same name which some progressive economists and elected Democrats have been promoting for years, as a way to tackle gaping wealth disparities in America. Given the way the Republican scheme is structured, it could well end up entrenching existing disparities rather than helping to eliminate them.

Endowing children with some wealth to help give them a proper start in life isn’t a new idea, of course. Rich families have been setting up trust funds, in some form or another, for centuries. But what about children in families that have little or no wealth to hand down? (According to the Federal Reserve, in 2022, the average net worth of households in the bottom ten per cent of the wealth distribution was one dollar. One.)

In 2010, the economists Darrick Hamilton, who is now at the New School, and William Darity, Jr., of Duke, outlined a plan to create interest-bearing government trust accounts for children who were born into families that fell below the median net worth. Under the Hamilton-Darity plan, the average value of these government contributions, which they described as “baby bonds,” would gradually rise to roughly twenty thousand dollars, with children from the poorest families benefitting even more. Adding in the interest that would accumulate in these accounts over the years, Hamilton and Darity calculated that some of these kids could end up with more than fifty thousand dollars by the time they reached adulthood.

Although the baby bonds would be distributed on a race-blind basis, the fact that Black, Indigenous, and Latino families were (and are) disproportionately represented in the lower reaches of the wealth distribution would have meant that the scheme would have worked to the benefit of their children—with a concomitant impact on the racial wealth gap. (In 2022, according to survey figures from the Federal Reserve, the median wealth of Black households was $44,890, compared with $285,000 for white households.) Indeed, Hamilton and Darity claimed that their proposal “could go a long way towards” eliminating the intergenerational transmission of racial advantage and disadvantage.

This proposal was never put into effect. But a version of it lived on in the form of legislation proposed by Cory Booker, the Democratic senator, in 2018, and subsequently reintroduced, in 2023, by Booker and Representative Ayanna Pressley. Under the Booker-Pressley bill, all American children at birth would be given a publicly financed investment account worth a thousand dollars, and the government would make further payments into these accounts annually depending on family income. When the owners of the accounts turned eighteen, they would be allowed to use the money for certain specified expenditures, including buying a home or helping to pay for college. “Baby Bonds are one of the most effective tools we have for closing the racial wealth gap,” Pressley commented when proposing the legislation.

On the Republican side of the aisle, some politicians and policy analysts have long supported tax-advantaged private savings accounts as a way of encouraging thrift and staving off socialistic tendencies. But it was only recently that the Party came around to the idea of seeding these accounts with public money. The Texas senator Ted Cruz promoted it under the label of “Invest America.” In the House bill, it was rebranded as a “MAGAAccount,” with the acronym standing for “Money Account for Growth and Advancement.” Republicans renamed it a “Trump Account” at the last minute. “You can call it anything you like,” Cruz told Semafor. “What is powerful is enabling every child in America to have an investment account and a stake in the American free-enterprise system.”

In political terms, Cruz may be right: duringCOVID, direct federal payments proved popular with voters (and Trump insisted on putting his name on the checks, too). But in socioeconomic terms, the Republican proposal would be much less potent. “It’s upside down,” Darrick Hamilton told me last week. “It amounts to a further subsidy to the affluent, who can already afford to save in the first place.”

The details of the proposal confirm Hamilton’s point. Money in the new Trump accounts would have to be placed in a low-cost stock index fund, and investment gains would be allowed to accumulate tax free until the funds were used. Parents and others would be allowed to supplement the original government endowments of a thousand dollars with contributions of up to five thousand dollars a year. But poor families obviously wouldn’t have the means to provide top-ups. “That means poorer families with no savings will get $1,000 compounding over 18 years while rich families will be able to invest up to $90,000,” Stephen Nuñez, an analyst at the Roosevelt Institute, wrote in a piece about the G.O.P. plan. “That will widen the wealth gap.”

There are other issues, too. It’s far from that clear that banks or brokerages will be willing to administer the new accounts without charging hefty fees that would deplete them. Some financial experts say that most households would earn better returns by contributing to existing 529 college-savings plans. (The limits for contributions to 529 plans are higher, and in many states they aren’t subject to state taxes.) Conceivably, some of these concerns could be resolved by pooling the money in the accounts, by fiddling with the tax code, and by encouraging employers of the account holders’ parents to make additional contributions to them. (At the White House meeting last week, Michael Dell, the C.E.O. of Dell, said the company would be willing to match the government contributions.) But these are only suggestions, and it’s hard to avoid the conclusion that the entire project is largely an effort to divert attention from the true nature of the Republican economic agenda.

“You certainly would want to question the timing of the proposal,’ Hamilton said to me. However, he added, that, “with regard to the Trump Accounts, the idea of a stakeholder society is not bad. That part is valuable, if you ask me.” He said that when he was growing up, in the Bedford-Stuyvesant neighborhood of New York, and attending an élite private school, the role that inherited wealth played in determining people’s life prospects was “vivid” to him. Where Trump and the Republicans have gone wrong in promoting the stakeholder concept, he went on, is “one, by relying on saving, and, two, in the regressive structure of the program.”

To be sure, Hamilton’s “baby bonds” initiative would involve considerable costs, and that is one reason why it has never got off the ground politically. In our conversation, Hamilton cited a figure of a hundred billion dollars a year. That sounds like a large number, he conceded, but he also pointed out that it would amount to less than two per cent of over-all federal spending, and he said that it would be considerably smaller than the sums currently devoted to subsidizing private wealth accumulation by people who already have some wealth, through things like the mortgage-interest deduction and the low tax rate on capital gains.

Hamilton didn’t mention it, but according to the Congressional Budget Office an extension of the soon-to-expire 2017 G.O.P. tax cuts, which is the primary purpose of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, would cost nearly five hundred billion dollars next year—five times the estimated cost of his baby-bonds proposal. Given the Republicans’ dominance in Washington and the gaping budget deficit, there’s obviously no immediate prospect of the U.S. government reorienting its priorities to tackle rampant wealth inequality, in the way that Hamilton and his colleagues recommend or in some similar manner. But that doesn’t mean it wouldn’t be possible. If the commitment to levelling out wealth were broadly shared, the possibilities would be many. ♦

Is the Anti-Trump Opposition Getting Its #Resistance Back?

For this week’s Fault Lines column, Jon Allsop is filling in for Jay Caspian Kang.

Earlier this year, Gavin Newsom, the governor of California, launched a podcast that promised direct conversations with people he disagrees with. In reality, it featured him sucking up to figures from theMAGAExtended Universe. Inthe début episode,the guest was Charlie Kirk, an influential young right-wing activist and commentator; Newsom suggested that his thirteen-year-old son was so excited to meet Kirk that he wanted to skip school to attend the taping. (Newsom didn’t let him. “C’mon,” Kirk objected. “You cancelled school for like two years!” Newsom seemed to find this funny.) The following week, Steve Bannon came on the show and said that the 2020 election was stolen; Newsom let this slide. Recently, in the wake of the protests against immigration raids in Los Angeles, Kirk and Bannon have returned Newsom’s hospitality by, respectively, calling him “the fakest person I’ve ever met” and comparing him to John C. Calhoun. Newsom, for his part, has pushed back strongly against the Trump Administration’s militarized response to the protests, challenging Tom Homan, President Trump’s border czar, to arrest him (“Come and get me, tough guy”) and tweaking Trump himself in TikTok memes inspired by “Hamilton” andTaylor Swift. With enemies like these, who needs friends?

Jay Caspian Kang pointed outin this column, in March, that Newsom’s podcast always seemed doomed to fail—not to mention “embarrassing”—because his conciliatory approach was out of step with polling that indicated liberals want to see Democrats fight Trump’s Republican Party, not get along with it. Ina different column, Kang similarly took issue with a school of thought, advanced most explicitly by the veteran strategist James Carville, holding that Democrats should “roll over and play dead,” allowing Trump to burn himself out. As Kang put it, this strategy never seemed viable, either, and several recent developments signal that playing dead is, well, dead. Newsom’s newfound combativeness is one example. Another came last week, also in relation to the L.A. protests, when Alex Padilla, the normally mild-mannered California senator, confronted Kristi Noem, the Homeland Security Secretary, at a press conference, and was forced to the floor and handcuffed by federal agents. This week, there were similar scenes in New York City, where agents arrested Brad Lander, the comptroller and a candidate for mayor, while he was accompanying a migrant in immigration court. In between, millions of anti-Trump demonstrators protested across the country under the banner “No Kings.”

It’s possible to see all this as the dormant resistance to Trump finally awakening. But that isn’t really correct. AsI wrote in the first days of the new Administration, Trump’s opponents may not have marshalled anything like the enormous Women’s March of January, 2017, but civil-society groups had started to organize their supporters, and many of Trump’s early moves were quickly challenged in court. Since then, therehavebeen a lot of protests—even more, by one count, than in the equivalent stretch of Trump’s first term—though the media, as Kang noted, hasn’t always covered them to the same extent. Newsom may only just have found his voice, but other leading Democrats—the Illinois governor,J. B. Pritzker, for example—never lost theirs. Earlier this year, I felt sure that this sort of activity would spread and intensify, as it now has, if only because Trump’s political project ultimatelyrequiresresistance—which generates conflict—in order to thrive, and he will keep pushing until inevitably provoking his opponents. Newsom is a case in point. His grovelling may have been of some use to the likes of Kirk and Bannon, but he’s much more useful as a foil, an avatar of a woke élite that’s imperilling America. Being a foil may be useful to Newsom, too. One ally told NBC that if Newsomwereto be arrested for supposedly obstructing Trump’s immigration raids, it would be his “Nelson Mandela moment”—a comparison that has surely not been made before, and hopefully won’t be again.

We are, unfortunately, at the point in this column where I must capitalize the word “Resistance,” and maybe add a hashtag for good measure. As I’ve previouslynoted, with these accoutrements, the word comes to signify something more than merely fighting back, becoming freighted with the cultural signifiers of the liberal opposition to Trump’s first term. (Think “Notorious R.B.G.” tote bags, Jimmy Kimmel proposing that Trump become a ceremonial king in exchange for going away as President, the cast of “Hamilton” confronting then Vice-President Mike Pence.) As Trump returned to office, this #Resistancedidappear to be dead. Now Newsom is posting “Hamilton” memes, and Jimmy Kimmel has shown up at a “No Kings” protest. I do still think we’re in a different moment. (The old Twitter is gone, for starters.) But the basic animating spirit of the #Resistance has clearly survived.

Still, it remains an open question what a new Resistance might look like, how it might cohere or be channelled. In February, Kang posed precisely that question in this column. He toyed with historical precedents—Goldwater Republicanism, the Tea Party—but found them imprecise and largely unhelpful. He described the contours of a “nü-Resistance”—which he characterized as “angry, oppositional, and ideologically chaotic,” and severed from various pillars of the Democratic establishment—but wasn’t yet sure where that energy might go.

Nearly half a year later, we have some new data points. The framework of a Democratic Tea Party remains unhelpful—butsomethingis going on inside (and, now, outside) the Democratic National Committee, which has recently been riven by threats to primary complacent incumbents (and, now, Democrats who support going to war with Iran). These tensions have been whipped up, most notably, by David Hogg, the Parkland shooting survivor turned activist turned short-serving D.N.C. vice-chair. (After other D.N.C. leaders clashed with Hogg, his election was invalidated on procedural grounds, and he ultimately declined to run again for the post.) And Newsom, Padilla, and the “No Kings” protests appear to have harnessed some of the loose energy recently.

But other reported efforts to counter Trump’s appeal—throwing money at influencers in the hope of finding the “next Joe Rogan,” a project to study “the syntax, language and content” that appeal to young men—demonstrate the limits of top-down attempts to cultivate political energy, as well as the persistent staleness of the institutional Democratic brand. At this stage, it seems to me that “young men,” never as homogeneous a voting bloc as imagined by post-election pundits, are vastly more likely to get bored ofMAGAthan to be seduced by the political equivalent of Steve Buscemi with a skateboard asking them, “How do you vote, fellow-kids?” More substantively, the ideological contours of the new Resistance still feel unsettled. Uncompromising opposition to Trump’s most brazen maneuversdoesincreasingly look like a unifying approach. But, even there, consensus is not yet total. Some Democrats have fretted that Trump’s L.A. crackdown is bait to distract them from kitchen-table issues. Gretchen Whitmer—the governor of Michigan and, like Newsom, a leading candidate to be the Democrats’ next standard-bearer—has pursued a strategy of working with the Administration. If Newsom’s podcast supplied the most humiliating audio of the new Trump era, the most humiliating image was surelya photo of Whitmerphysically hiding in the Oval Office as Trump signed orders to investigate a pair of first-term officials who went on to criticize him. This hasn’t seemed to hurt her standing—at least in Michigan—and she has been able to tout some policy victories, most notably obtaining new fighter jets for a local base.

As with Newsom, I suspect that Trump will at some point drive Whitmer past breaking point. (Already, he has suggested that he might pardon the men convicted of trying to kidnap her, in 2020; what happens if he attempts to send the Marines to Detroit?) Then again, the notion that Newsom started his podcast with the pure intention of reaching out toMAGA, only to be met with actions that he couldn’t possibly accept, may underplay his political cunning. It’s not hard to imagine Newsom embarking on the podcast—which, as Kang noted, immediately went down horribly with the Democratic base—knowing full well that he would soon be back in Resistance-leader mode, but seeing it, in the interim, as a useful way to distance himself from progressive totems that he perceives as toxic (for instance, trans athletes competing in girls’ sports, which he disavowed to Kirk), or something to point to and say, “Look, I really did try reasoning with these people!”

And this is assuming that Newsom actuallyhaspivoted away from the podcast-conciliation strategy, which isn’t clear, even if he certainly has movedtowardResistance leadership. As recently as June 4th, he posted another cloyingly folksy conversation, this time with Dr. Phil, who described himself as “the least political person I know” before extolling family values and weighing in on “pro-Hamas” protests on college campuses; two days later, the L.A. raids began. (Dr. Phil was on the scene, having been granted special access, for some reason, to document immigration-enforcement actions.) Last week,Newsomwas interviewed on “The Daily,” the New YorkTimes’ flagship podcast, and without any prompting stressed that he has “no problem meeting with people and talking to people I disagree with,” as “some of your viewers and listeners may know.” Asked about his podcast, he indicated that he still sees it as “incredibly important” to show “a little humility” toward his adversaries, and to listen.

Back in February, Kang concluded that, when it came to the emerging opposition to Trump, “what we are seeing is not a shift in policy preferences but, rather, the dissolution of traditional political logic in this country.” I’m not sure I’d go quite this far. It’s perfectly logical, in light of how Trump is behaving, that the opposition is intensifying; it is also not surprising—or necessarily concerning—that Democrats haven’t yet articulated a coherent new policy platform less than a year on from a priors-shattering defeat. But Newsom and many of his fellow-Democrats do seem to be trying to have it both ways—to prove that you can joke around with Steve Bannonandpost “Hamilton” memes about Trump without disappearing down the gaping chasm between those acts. WhenI last wrote about Trump resistance in this column, it was to argue that it will have to coalesce, if it does at all, within a fragmented media ecosystem; Newsom, perhaps, is trying to game the choose-your-own-adventure quality of this ecosystem by putting out different content that might seep into, and resonate within, very different filter bubbles. I think this is doomed to fail because it (and he) is palpably inauthentic, and authenticity—or, rather, the perception thereof—is king in this media environment. But someone else might manage to do it. If the new Resistance remains hard to define, that’s partly because it’s still early. There’s no inevitability of neat coherence down the line. One thing is for sure: the mass protests will continue. ♦

Why Ehud Olmert Thinks His Country Is Committing War Crimes

Last week, Ehud Olmert, a former Prime Minister of Israel, publicly denounced his successor, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the war Netanyahu has been waging in Gaza. In apieceforHaaretz, titled “Enough Is Enough. Israel Is Committing War Crimes,” Olmert referred to the current government as a “criminal gang” led by Netanyahu. He wrote, “What we are doing in Gaza now is a war of devastation: indiscriminate, limitless, cruel and criminal killing of civilians. We’re not doing this due to loss of control in any specific sector, not due to some disproportionate outburst by some soldiers in some unit. Rather, it’s the result of government policy—knowingly, evilly, maliciously, irresponsibly dictated. Yes, Israel is committing war crimes.” Olmert’s comments follow Israel’s decision to finally allow humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip, after a near-total blockade for more than two months led the United Nations and even the Trump Administration to issue warnings that the population was facing starvation. But Israel has tried to distribute the aid under a new scheme that humanitarian organizations and the United Nations have warned is insufficient and dangerous, in part because it requires many Gazans to travel long distances to receive aid. In the last several days,scoresof Gazans have been killedby Israeli forceswhile trying to get food and other necessities at the few locations where they are on offer.

Olmert, who served as Prime Minister between 2006 and 2009, was once a member of Netanyahu’s Likud Party, before joining and then leading the more centrist Kadima Party. As Prime Minister, he took steps to reach a peace accord with Palestinians, but failed to do so; allegations of corruption cut short his political career. (Olmert eventuallyservedmore than a year in prison, starting in 2016.) I recently spoke by phone with Olmert about his criticisms of the war. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we also discussed his understanding of Netanyahu’s motivations, whether the Israeli government has a plan for Palestinians in Gaza, and why the crisis in Israel is about more than Netanyahu’s ability to stay in power.

In your recentHaaretzpiece, you write, “I took every available opportunity to distinguish between the crimes we have been accused of, which I refused to admit, and the carelessness and indifference regarding Gazan victims and the unbearable human cost we’ve been levying there. The first accusation I rejected, the second I admitted to. In recent weeks I’ve been no longer able to do so.” What did you mean, and what changed?

Look, no government, not even Bibi’s government, which as you know I don’t support, and certainly not the high command of the Army, gave explicit orders to kill indiscriminately, to shoot indiscriminately wherever, whatever, doesn’t matter. That’s not the case. For a long period of time, the war was perceived as legitimate, and I defended the government on that ground. The Israeli counteroffensive was recognized as just considering the brutal attack of Hamas on the 7th of October. There was a need to find Hamas leaders wherever they were hidden, sometimes underground, and in public facilities. And, even when there was a relatively high number of victims among the people living in Gaza, the understanding was that you can’t, on the one hand, recognize Israel’s right to find the leaders and the fighters of Hamas and, on the other hand, deny that they are embedded in the most densely populated areas, where there are many, many civilians. And you can’t find them without causing collateral damage, which was not liked, but which was not a purpose of the military effort. And therefore, regardless of the high number of victims, it was accepted by the international community.

What has happened lately is that it is obvious to everyone that there is no purpose that can justify the expansion of these military activities. There is not any goal that can justify continuing the military operation at the risk of losing the hostages, at the risk of losing the lives of Israeli soldiers, and the risk of losing the lives of many of the non-involved people in Gaza. There is not any purpose. The perception in Israel is that this is a personal war or illegitimate war that is being conducted exclusively because of the political interests of the Prime Minister. This is a crime. This is not something that can be defended. And the fact that there are so many victims can’t be justified. It’s as simple as that.

At the beginning, the war had more international legitimacy, but pretty early on, in, say, December of 2023, President Biden, who was a supporter of the war and was in fact arming Israel, called Israel’s bombing “indiscriminate.” Israel at various times cut off aid and caused a real humanitarian crisis, too.

Cutting aid is a different aspect. You didn’t ask me directly about Biden, but I have an enormous positive emotional attitude to President Biden. Personally, I like him. I know him. We’ve been kind of friends for many years. I think that there couldn’t be a better friend, a more dedicated Zionist in the White House than Biden was, and the criticism against him is outright arrogance and something that can’t be accepted, and can’t be tolerated.

O.K., well, we don’t need to debate President Biden.

O.K., I don’t want to debate, but I want to be on record saying it about him.

I just want to be clear that the concerns about Israel’s conduct in the war did not arise recently.

No, no, it’s true that criticism about the conduct of the war didn’t arise recently. But between criticism and an outright accusation of war crimes, there is still a certain distinction, and I think that even those who criticized Israel from overseas were careful. I’m not talking about N.G.O.s, pro-Palestinian organizations. I’m talking about governments that were friendly to Israel, like the U.S. government, like the British government, like the French government. Macron criticized Israel for a considerable time. He didn’t speak half a year ago the way he speaks now. The difference is a result of what is perceived to be a non-legitimate expansion of the military operation, and the understanding that Netanyahu doesn’t want to reach an agreement with Hamas for the release of the hostages.

Right, but people have been saying that Netanyahu wants to drag the war on for political reasons for well over a year.

I’ve been saying it. I called to end the war more than a year ago.

You also write, “I do not share the opinion of former Chief of Staff Moshe Yaalon, who said that Israel is carrying out ethnic cleansing. But we are nearing the point when it will be undeniable that such is the unavoidable result of what the government, the military and our brave soldiers have been doing in practice.” Can you expand on that, and why you don’t share Yaalon’s opinion?

I think that the present policy of the government is not yet an active effort to deport the people of Gaza from where they live. However, when you hear [the right-wing ministers] Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich—they’re not bystanders, they’re not outsiders. They are the key members of this government. They are the key spokesmen of this government. When they say that all of Gaza is Hamas and therefore there is no one that deserves to be given food and that they all have to be deported, this is what it is. [Smotrich and Ben-Gvir proposed denying aid to Gazans and expelling them from the Strip in the first months of the war.] It can be interpreted as ethnic cleansing. It’s not that we are really forcing hundreds of thousands of people across the border. But when you hear these things, you can’t remain indifferent, you can’t overlook it. You can’t just hear it and say, “O.K., let’s move on.” No, no. This is something that is totally intolerable. Anyone that has any position that doesn’t draw the inevitable conclusion is potentially a partner to a crime of a very, very serious manner.

This makes me think of something that comes up later in your piece. You write, “Yes, we’ve been denying Gazans food, medicine and basic living needs as part of an explicit policy. Netanyahu, typically, is trying to blur the type of orders he’s been giving, in order to evade legal and criminal responsibility in due course. But some of his lackeys are saying so outright, in public, even with pride: Yes, we will starve out Gaza.” So, you believe the starvation is intentional, but cleansing Gaza—even if it may happen in practice, and ministers in Netanyahu’s government want it—is not? It seems like you’re making a distinction between Israel’s intent in terms of starvation and the intent in terms of ethnic cleansing. Is that accurate?

Let’s put it this way. First of all, for a period of time, starvation was the practical policy of the Israeli government. Humanitarian supplies were denied. Denied. Actively denied and stopped and held. There was not yet, at any period of time, an active policy of deporting people. [Ethnic cleansing is not by itself a crime in international law, but usually refers to the intentional forcible displacement of an ethnic population from a certain area regardless of whether it includes crossing a border.] But on both the humanitarian needs and the deportation or cleansing of Gaza of its residents, Ben-Gvir and Smotrich are on record advocating for them, pushing for them, supporting them, calling for them, and also threatening the government that they will break it down if it does not accomplish them.

Netanyahu is trying to avoid direct contact. But this is his government; he’s the Prime Minister. In my government, no one would’ve been able to say such a thing and remain a member of the Cabinet for another minute. And he’s making every possible effort to keep them. He’s actively a partner to these statements and to the possible ramifications of these statements.

Early in our interview, and in your piece, you said that this was a war “without purpose, without goals.” It seems like what you’re saying is that, essentially, on humanitarian aid and starvation, there was an intentional policy in place, but that there wasn’t one on ethnic cleansing. Are the goals of this military operation, at this point, simply to keep Netanyahu in power or do you think of it as having some larger political objective?

If you ask Netanyahu, he will argue heatedly that he wants to eliminate Hamas completely, and in order to reach a total victory, you have to carry on. You can’t have a deal that may save the remaining hostages at the cost of ending the war. However, there is not one single person that has any experience or understanding or knowledge of what’s going on that agrees that there is any serious chance of eliminating completely every single person that holds a gun or an R.P.G. or a hand grenade in Gaza.

It’s ridiculous. A year ago, he said we are almost on the verge of total victory. Now he says we have to expand the war with five ground divisions. And we know that Ben-Gvir and Smotrich said in the most explicit manner that if there is another deal for a ceasefire, they will resign and they will bring down the government. There is no way that you can avoid the inevitable conclusion that what bothers Netanyahu is his personal survivability and the political stability of this Cabinet over anything else.

So the upshot of what you’re saying is that if the political incentives demand that Netanyahu ethnically cleanse Gaza, then that may happen. If the political incentives demand something else, then we may go there. It’s all just driven by those incentives.

That’s right. And, at some point, even when it’s not an explicit policy of his government to ethnically cleanse and kill indiscriminately, it is inevitable. Even if it is not his stated policy, at some point the events on the ground can’t be interpreted in any other way.

In an earlieressay, you wrote about the settler community: “Many of them justify the continuation of the fighting in Gaza and call to expand the fighting in the north, so they can continue the work of destruction and obliteration in the West Bank.” It seemed like you were trying to say that, in the minds of people like Smotrich and Ben-Gvir, there may be a connection between the war in Gaza and the situation in the West Bank. What did you mean?

You must have a good sense of humor. I’m not suggesting that there “may be” a certain connection. These are the same people, and they advocate what is happening in the West Bank explicitly, publicly, continually, all the time, in the most obvious manner. I mean, there is no question about it. A settlement leader, when eulogizing a woman who was murdered when she was about togive birtha few weeks ago, asked why a nearby Palestinian village was still standing. This is also what they want to do in Gaza.

In your piece, you say, “The military, charged with and duty-bound to execute government orders, acted in many cases rashly, incautiously, over-aggressively. However, it did so without any order or instruction or directive from military top brass to hit civilians indiscriminately. Therefore, as I understood it at the time, no war crimes had been committed.” I just want to clarify this, because you were once the Prime Minister and oversaw military actions. It is possible to commit war crimes without an order from top military brass to commit those crimes, yes?

Yes. But as I said, when I spoke to international media earlier in the war, everywhere in America, in Europe, everywhere, I kept saying there is not a policy of genocide or of war crimes. Why? Because there was not such a policy in any meeting or command session between the political leadership and the military leadership. There was never an order that, even by gross exaggeration, could be interpreted as permission to kill indiscriminately.

However, we all served in the Army, we all were in wars, and this is a very tight and demanding and challenging and sometimes scary situation for many. And sometimes the soldiers can do things which are totally unacceptable and can be called crimes. But it was not a policy. There was not a decision. No one told them to do it. In the heat of the battle, in the exchange of firing and shooting, there was sometimes a reckless reaction, disproportionate, which may have caused unnecessary victims, but not killing for the sake of killing. That doesn’t mean that there were not many victims, a disproportionate number of victims that regrettably should have been prevented, maybe by a better or more effective military operation. But this is not a war crime or genocide or anything close to it.

Well, those can be war crimes. It wouldn’t be genocide necessarily.

It could be a crime. There could be a defense explaining it and somehow providing the proper framework for understanding it. Not to justify it.

You say in your piece that war crimes are in fact going on now, while still claiming there is not a “policy” of war crimes. So what war crimes do you acknowledge are happening?

Look at the West Bank. The daily attacks against Palestinians in their homes and olive groves and properties amount to war crimes, particularly when the police fail to arrest the attackers, and arrest the Palestinian victims instead.

When everyone says that there is not any basis for continuing the war and it’s only the political considerations of Netanyahu, and that means the loss of Israeli soldiers and hostages and Palestinians, it’s a crime.

But you have been arguing for a very long time that he has been continuing the war for political reasons.

Yes, but now it doesn’t have the legitimacy of a military operation.

Haaretzreported that, according to a recent poll, eighty-two per cent of Israeli Jews “support ‘the transfer (expulsion) of residents of the Gaza Strip to other countries.’ ” The report went on, “When asked directly whether they agreed with the position that the IDF, ‘when conquering an enemy city, should act in a manner similar to the way the Israelites acted when they conquered Jericho under the leadership of Joshua, namely, to kill all its inhabitants?’ nearly half, 47 percent, agreed.” Do you find these numbers credible, and does it feel like that describes the bleak situation politically in Israel that any non-Netanyahu leader would face?

I just don’t know. However, I do want to say one thing. There is a man in the Knesset who is close to Ben-Gvir and Smotrich named Zvi Sukkot who says “nobody cares” that Palestinians were killed. So there is this attitude of revenge that does exist among a considerable number of people in Israel, and this is something that has to be fought against with all the power that is needed, because this is very dangerous. I’m fighting for the soul of Israel. The fact that there are Israelis that can say this stuff publicly—“nobody cares”? No. I care.

It seems like what you’re saying then is that this isn’t just about dislodging Netanyahu from power, if you’re talking about the soul of Israel. Even if Netanyahu were to be dislodged from power, the problem is much deeper.

Yeah, but the change has to start somewhere. Israel was not like this. Israel was not like this. Definitely the shock of the 7th of October had an enormous impact on the attitudes and emotions of many Israelis. And of course everything comes along with the memories and the fears, the historic fears and the expressions of antisemitism spreading across the world. But before this Israel was a much safer, more self-confident society. What Netanyahu did in the last few years, starting before October 7th, was to create an environment of hysteria. We can’t talk with the Palestinian Authority. We have to fight all of them. Iran is about to destroy the state of Israel. Hezbollah is about to destroy the state of Israel. A certain spirit of desperation was cultivated in a very calculated manner by the Prime Minister, because the only way to possibly unite Israeli society against all enemies is by creating a sense of lack of confidence in the very existence of the state of Israel, which is, in non-polite language, bullshit.

One has to understand something. We had to react to the 7th of October. But there was not one second that the existence of Israel was in danger, not even on the 7th of October. And to say that the empire of the state of Israel, with all the power that we possess, was in danger or is now in danger, and that that justifies expanding the military operations, is nonsense. It is a policy that has been developed and elaborated by the Prime Minister in order to justify the attitude that there is not any chance to have peace. So we continue forever. ♦

An Inside Look at Gaza’s Chaotic New Aid System

Following the collapse, in early March, of the temporaryceasefirebetween Israel and Hamas, Israel essentially shut down all aid entering the Gaza Strip. The territory had already been facing ahumanitarian crisisfor nearly eighteen months. During that time, Israel allowed in a fluctuating, almost always insufficient number of aid trucks. The food and medicine that arrived on those trucks was then distributed by local groups across the Strip. In May, when the full blockade was partially lifted—after European leaders, and even the Trump Administration, warned of starvation—the old system of aid delivery, which was operated in part by the United Nations, was largely phased out in favor of a new organization called the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, which was set up in coördination with Israeli authorities to deliver supplies to Gazans at just four locations.

Before the G.H.F. began its operations, the United Nations and a number of humanitarian organizations warned that the new system would lead to chaos, with people being forced to travel long distances to receive aid, potentially leading to dangerous crowds and violence. And indeed, during the last several weeks, Israeli forces have killed scores of Gazans at these sites, and injured hundreds more, as the death toll among those seeking aid from the G.H.F. has surpassed a hundred and twenty people. (Israel has acknowledged firing warning shots, as well as firing further shots at people who ignored the warnings.) The G.H.F., whose decision-making structure is opaque, has already changed its leadership and temporarily shut down operations to reëvaluate its procedures. At one point last weekend, G.H.F. said that it could no longer continue its work because of threats to its staff from Hamas. (Hamas has denied the accusation, and G.H.F. resumed operations the next day.)

I recently spoke by phone with Salma Altaweel, who lives in Gaza and works for the Norwegian Refugee Council, a humanitarian N.G.O. I wanted to get a sense of how her organization was dealing with the new aid system, and exactly what had changed on the ground since it was put in place. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we also discussed how she talks to her daughter about the current situation, her concerns about the G.H.F., and what Gaza needs besides food and medicine.

Can you tell me what your job consists of right now and what your day is like?

Yes. I’m working as the field-office manager in the northern part of Gaza City. [Someone begins talking to her in the background.] Excuse me, it’s my daughter. Sorry. And now, since the ceasefire collapsed, we are working in hibernation mode. It’s very hard to move in Gaza City. But we are still providing support to people. We are providing drinking water to much of the population in the central part of the city. And we are providing clothes, through e-vouchers, to hundreds of families. There is not enough cash for people to buy merchandise, so we have been giving out vouchers to families in need. We make arrangements with certain venders, and then beneficiaries will receive a code that they can use to redeem clothes. We also have some learning spaces that provide informal education to kids. Also, we have a legal section that is providing some legal support and offering consultations.

How is drinking water accessed?

There are still some plants here in Gaza City that are working to provide drinking water. Trucks are moving around, travelling to shelters and providing water to people inside, and outside, too. We are covering a good number of people. And there are some other N.G.O.s doing this. All of them are collaborating with each other to try to cover most of Gaza.

I know that even before the blockade began in early March, there was never enough aid reaching the people of Gaza. But there was some aid. Can you talk about how aid reached Gazans under that system?

Before the collapse of the ceasefire, U.N. agencies and international N.G.O.s were working to try to coördinate aid. Not all items were allowed to enter Gaza, but as you mentioned there were some items that were entering. Trucks would cross the border, and the aid would enter the warehouses of the U.N. agencies and the N.G.O.s. After that, each local organization had its identification criteria to provide aid to people. The people were receiving text messages so they could come and collect it from the warehouse of the U.N. agency or the N.G.O. with dignity, and without a crowd. Also, aid would arrive to different neighborhoods, and people were not forced to move long distances or go to an insecure place to collect food, or shelter items, or hygiene kits, or whatever they were allowed to take. The quantities were not enough to cover people all the time, but at least there was some food that was entering. The bakeries were also functioning at some points—not all the time, but sometimes there was bread.

Then, in March, Israel announced that there would be a total cutoff in aid. How quickly did things change?

Many of the bakeries remained functioning for one month after March, but they closed by early April, and starting at that time most of the stock from the markets was empty. So by May we faced real starvation. People were not eating for days because there were not any items entering. They have resumed allowing some items, but not enough.

After this new aid system started, the one with the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, what did your organization do? And what’s been happening more broadly? The stories we read in the United States are that people have to travel to this small number of sites to get food, and it’s obviously been very chaotic. The Israeli military has shot people. How is your organization trying to operate within this new system, and how do you feel the new system is or isn’t working?

Let me just say that, for the last few weeks, relocation orders have been issued and are covering most of Gaza. The N.R.C. specializes in providing shelter, and people are being forced to relocate to other places without taking their shelter items with them. In most cases, people are forced to flee only with what they can carry. Often, people are only given a few minutes’s notice to leave. So they are in high need of items such as tents, bedding sets, and clothes. They are moving without any of those items because they aren’t able to. And they are finding themselves out in the street without anything. We are trying to provide them support, but unfortunately shelter items are not coming through—until now, Israel was only allowing some specific items, like food and medicine. The U.N. is trying to push to get approval for shelter items, but we are not able to provide support to people who are in the streets sleeping without shelters.

So, just to be clear, the people relocating are relocating because the Israeli military is giving them orders to relocate, not because they are relocating to get food?

Yes, they are getting relocation orders because of military operations.

What are you and your organization telling people in terms of getting aid, and getting food? Are you providing them directions to get to the nearest facility where they are handing out food?

No, we are not giving them any directions like this. We are trying to do our best to support them, but we cannot give them direction to go to these areas. They are so risky. They’re killing people on a daily basis in those areas. There is no humanity in these areas. Humanitarian principles are not being applied. So we are not guiding anyone to go there.

So, for obvious reasons, because of the way the aid is being handed out and because people are getting killed at these distribution sites, you’re not telling people to try and approach the sites in any way?

So what advice are you giving people? I’m sure you must get asked by Gazans, “What should we do?”

Yes. We cannot give people advice to go to these sites. I can tell you that most people are not going. Many of the people who go are looters who are accessing those very risky areas to get items and sell them in the market at very high prices. This is what I can see on the ground.

And I assume there’s been no coördination between the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation and groups on the ground like yours?

A few weeks ago, we were hearing very serious warnings about starvation. Has any of the aid that’s come in during the past few weeks been circulating on the ground and at least made the situation a little bit better? Or is it the same situation in terms of lack of food and medicine that we were seeing a few weeks ago?

I think a very limited quantity entered through U.N. agencies. And some of that was looted. [On Saturday, Israeli authorities said that about fifty aid trucks per day had entered the territory during the prior week. According to an Israeli official who spoke toThe New Yorker,that includes aid delivered to the four G.H.F. facilities and aid brought in by other humanitarian organizations, who say that at least five hundred trucks per day are needed.] Because of all the starvation, the situation is not stable. Some people end up looting the aid. It was difficult to open enough bakeries when flour was looted. So, not enough of the aid is distributed. Some of the trucks have brought things that are not aid. This is on the commercial side. They are not essential items. They are like chocolate, cigarettes. Not flour.

Israel has allowed trucks with cigarettes to come into Gaza?

Is there a stated reason for this?

I don’t know. [When asked about chocolate and cigarettes entering Gaza, the Israeli official said, “I don’t know what you mean.” He later called back and said, “Commercial trucks have not entered the Gaza Strip.”]

So I guess your hope is that Israel starts allowing more trucks of humanitarian aid in, because the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation method seems to be failing?

Yes. We are hoping that they open things up, like they did under the previous system, and not only for food. Yes, we are in need of food, but also shelter items. They are not letting fuel enter. The hospitals are in need of fuel. So we have a real need to go back to the previous method.

If you feel comfortable, can you talk to me a little bit about how you personally are dealing with this? Your daughter said something a few minutes ago.

Yes, we are now facing a challenging time. For me personally, I try to push the mealtime as late as I can, so at least they are not sleeping while they are hungry. [Altaweel has three other children.] So I try to push the mealtime. You can only prepare one meal per day. A meal for a family can cost a hundred dollars. So most families are not able to prepare more than one per day. And people are not having meals every day—maybe for some it is every two to three days. They are not eating anything. There is no flour in the market. We are depending on other seeds like lentils and rice, and they all have very high prices. It’s very hard. My daughter, she is always telling me, “I want sweets. I want something sweet to eat.” But there’s no sugar. I can’t prepare much.

What do you tell a seven-year-old about this? How do you explain the situation? How do you talk to her about it?

Sometimes she asks questions that I cannot answer. Sometimes she’s asking me, mostly when there are air strikes around us, “Why are they doing that with us, why they are killing us?” It’s very hard to answer the questions, and mostly I try to say, “Be patient,Inshallah, hopefully the situation will be better soon.” We are praying to God that food will enter. But she asks: why they bombed our house, what we did to them, why I lost all of my toys and all my clothes. Sometimes she’s crying, and sometimes she cries while she sleeps, because she has lost everything. But it’s hard to answer these questions for her.

What does your daughter do while you’re working? What do other kids do while their parents are working?

There are no schools. They’re spending their day at home, doing nothing. Maybe they’re playing with their peers in the same building, but that’s it. But they are feeling very bad, because there is nothing from their previous life that they can do.

When you think back to the way that aid was being delivered in the previous system, was the major problem that there wasn’t enough getting through? Or was the major problem that it couldn’t be distributed as you wanted it to because it was a war zone?

If we return to the previous system, it’ll be better in terms of food. But the problem is that all of the Gaza Strip is destroyed and it needs to be rebuilt and reconstructed, and if it isn’t things won’t be better. They were only allowing food and some lifesaving items to enter, but they were not allowing any other items for the reconstruction or rebuilding of our schools. There weren’t school items, or teaching items. So if we return to the old system, it’ll not be enough for us, because we are aiming to rebuild Gaza, and to live on streets without rubble. They also were not allowing heavy machines in to remove the rubble.

And yet, as you said a few minutes ago, the old system would be a huge improvement on what’s happening now.

It would be an improvement, but it would not be enough. ♦

Why Netanyahu Decided to Strike Iran Now

Early on Friday, Israel launched a major attack on Iranian nuclear sites and weapons facilities, and targeted many of its top military officials. In retaliation, Iran launched dozens of ballistic missiles at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem late Friday. Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s Prime Minister, said that the strikes would “continue for as many days as it takes to remove this threat.” In response, President Trump, who had recently said that he wanted to renegotiate a nuclear deal with Iran—during his first term, he pulled out of the original nuclear deal signed during the Obama Administration —expressed strong support for the Israeli attack, saying, “I think it’s been excellent. We gave [the Iranians] a chance and they didn’t take it. They got hit hard, very hard. . . . And there’s more to come.”

On Friday, I spoke by phone with Aluf Benn, the editor-in-chief ofHaaretz. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed Netanyahu’s motives for ordering a strike, how the Prime Minister uses his understanding of Trump to pursue his own agenda, and what this attack means for the future of the region.

Why do you think this is happening right now, in June of 2025, rather than earlier or in the future?

First of all, Israel has been at war with the Iranian “axis of resistance” for almost two years now. Second, Israel, for more than twenty years, has been designing and preparing a plan to attack Iran under successive leaders. For most of that time, it was Netanyahu in charge, but military leaders have long been thinking of dismantling Iran’s nuclear facilities in the same way that Israel bombed a nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981 and then in Syria in 2007. In both cases, those nuclear programs were seen as existential threats to Israel, and the goal was to preëmpt, delay, or destroy the main nuclear facilities.

So the idea of bombing Iran has been around for two decades. It peaked around 2012, under Netanyahu and then Defense Minister Ehud Barak, but they were stopped by the Obama Administration, which eventually signed a deal with Iran to limit its nuclear program. At that point, some of the Israeli security and intelligence chiefs were thinking that Israel should not go it alone and never attack Iran without American consent and prior knowledge. In 1981, Menachem Begin, the Prime Minister, bombed the nuclear reactor near Baghdad without telling the Americans. And that created tension between the two governments for a while. But, in 2007, Ehud Olmert told George W. Bush about a reactor that was being built in the Syrian desert at the time. It was a secret facility. We shared the intelligence with Bush, and Bush was thinking for a while of attacking with American forces. But then the Americans decided not to, and they just let Israel destroy the facility. Israel did not take responsibility for the strike for almost a decade in order not to embarrass Bashar al-Assad and force him into retaliation.

Discretion is not the case today. This attack is very visible and follows two exchanges of fire between Iran and Israel last year, in which Iran retaliated in April for the assassination of one of its generals in Damascus. They fired all kinds of drones in response. But their attack failed because Israel was protected by a coalition that includedCENTCOM[the U.S. Central Command]. And then in October, once again, there were missile attacks by Iran and an Israeli attack that was successful in dismantling Iranian air defenses. This was followed by the collapse of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Assad regime in Syria, the two main allies of Iran in our vicinity. And that paved the way and opened the corridor for an eventual attack on the nuclear facilities. But they waited for Trump to give the green light.

There had been concern among some more hawkish Israelis that Trump would not give a green light to this strike, because he wanted a deal with Iran. But what you seem to be saying is that one crucial thing that’s changed is, in fact, the timing and Trump being in office.

First of all, the operational opportunity to have an open corridor because of the suppression of Iranian air defenses in October mattered, and the Russians did not replenish Iranian stockpiles and systems afterward. And then there was the subsequent defeat of Hezbollah by the I.D.F., the decapitation of its leadership, the destruction of most of its strong ballistic-missile force, and then Assad falling. So now you can deploy a very large force to destroy targets within Iran. And it was reported recently that Israel had finished its preparations and Netanyahu was pushing for an attack on Iran. There were some different signs, like public opposition by Trump, even as recently as this week, but clearly Netanyahu told him about it in advance.

And today Trump has been very supportive.

Underneath that Presidential support, we have one thing that is crucial, and that was one of the last decisions of Trump’s first term, which was to include Israel inCENTCOM. That enabled Israel to be part of the U.S. regional air-defense and missile-defense system. So Israel is now relying not on American bombers and American soldiers on the ground but you have coördination, coöperation, intelligence sharing, et cetera.

It seems that Netanyahu has a pretty good understanding of Trump in terms of both Iran and Gaza. Trump will say he wants to make a deal with Iran. He’ll say he wants a ceasefire in Gaza, but whether it’s his attention span or his lack of actually caring about it, he is not really going to put pressure on Israel to keep it from doing what it wants to do.

In Gaza, there’s been a lot of criticism of what Israel has done. But over all, historically, America has given Israel quite a free hand vis-à-vis the Palestinians. It was always different on regional matters, where America always had the final word, even when it followed what Israel wanted. Like Trump’s decision to leave the nuclear deal in 2018—it always had the final word. And, in this case, too, Trump wanted a deal. If the Iranians had agreed to the American terms to stop uranium enrichment, they could have had a deal. Trump gave them time, and then they didn’t respond, so Israel attacked. In a similar way, Israel begged for a ceasefire with Hezbollah in the north and the now deceased leader of Hezbollah at the time was saying, “No, we are going to support our brothers in Gaza, and we’re going to keep firing at Israel and keep that second front open.” They could have been saved.

You could say that Israel could have stopped the war in Gaza, and that could have helped things regionally, too.

Definitely. But Netanyahu is still committed to the final occupation of Gaza and destruction of the Palestinians . . . of Hamas, and to eventually drive out the Palestinians from there, and follow what he calls the Trump plan: just giving the land to resorts and to Israeli settlements. This is still the official Israeli policy in Gaza.

Would Israel now suffice with the attack on Iran to let go of Gaza or, on the contrary, use the defeat of the axis of resistance to conclude the occupation of Gaza and the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians? That remains to be seen.

Reading your newspaper, it’s very clear to me that many people believe that Netanyahu is extending the war in Gaza for his own political reasons and that you can’t separate the war from Netanyahu’s personal desires. Is that the case here?

Well, first of all, with attacking Iran, there’s very strong support within Israel, at least within the Jewish society—I would say a virtual consensus. We wrote an editorial saying, “Don’t go to war,” but it’s a minority position, and it’s going to be an even smaller minority if Israel succeeds in wiping out the Iranian nuclear program and forcing Iran to capitulate in some way, or if there is an Iranian regime change. But, besides that, one of Netanyahu’s abilities throughout the war, even when he and his leadership are unpopular and still lagging behind in public-opinion surveys, has been to pursue popular policies. The policy of destruction and even partial occupation of Gaza has been very popular, to punish Hamas for what it did on October 7th. The policy of attacking Iran is extremely popular, and there’s no real opposition to that in Israel. The opposition was only the fear of alienating the United States, or the fear that such an operation is too risky to be successful.

What did your editorial say? Why did you counsel against this?

Because we thought, and we still think, that eventually the surest way to prevent Iran from going nuclear was a deal, in the same way that the Obama deal, for the three years that it was in place, was quite successful in slowing it down.

So what are Netanyahu’s coalitional politics in terms of this?

Look, Netanyahu has had a shtick for many, many years that, whenever he does anything that is less popular with parts of his base, he would always pretend to surrender to some stronger force. So, when he does unpopular stuff like extending the Gaza war, not freeing the hostages with the deal, he can imply to the public that he can’t do that because he is afraid of the far right bringing down his coalition. Meanwhile, if and when he did agree to a deal with Hamas, and if and when he eventually agreed to a ceasefire in Gaza without driving out the Palestinians and without allowing the land for Israeli settlements, he would say, “I had to surrender to Trump. We needed Trump on Iran. We need Trump’s diplomatic cover, whatever. So I have to surrender to Trump.” And now, after the attack on Iran, the far right won’t want to leave the coalition because there will be others who could possibly join the coalition. That gives Netanyahu a much wider room to maneuver politically. On the night before the attack, the coalition was under threat, not of collapsing but of beginning to go downhill, because of the rebellion of some of the ultra-Orthodox partners who opposed the drafting of their kids into the Army. Currently, they have an exemption. So Netanyahu played it masterfully. He was able to prevent any damage and to keep his coalition together.

You talked about popular opinion in Israel being very much united behind this. Is that true at the élite level of security chiefs and former security chiefs, many of whom have had criticisms of Netanyahu and even his defense policies?

Well, their criticisms were twofold. One was about the need to coördinate with the United States, and I think he did that. The other would be if the attack failed, and that still remains to be seen. It’s not over yet. If Israel is destroyed by Iranian missiles, it’s going to be a difficult sell. But I think more to the point is that there are a bunch of security, former security chiefs, andHaaretzcommentators and others who don’t trust his decisions, because of his involvement in political scandals and corruption and, moreover, his authoritarian aspirations, as embedded in his judicial overhaul and the effort to weaken checks and balances on his rule. These things raise suspicions about his motives. But clearly this is not something that Netanyahu or any other leader could do alone. You have a very sophisticated war machine and intelligence machine at play here. It’s not just about the far right fighting the Iranians.

What do you mean by a sophisticated war machine?

The active security chiefs were definitely in on this, and their predecessors as well. It’s something that has been in preparation for years. Many of these critics were deeply involved in whatever we see today in Tehran.

So we’ve talked for a while now, and one thing you haven’t said is that the reason for this attack is that the situation with Iran and nuclear weapons has changed, and that the danger is much greater now. Has it?

This is very important, and I forgot to mention it. On December 5th, six months ago, Iran started doubling down by fuelling its uranium-enrichment facilities so that the product would be one step below the nuclear-weapons threshold. This was reported by the International Atomic Energy Agency. So they edged much closer to the bomb. And, if you look at the timetable—I’m not familiar with the Iranian decision-making process, obviously—but, if you look at the timetable, they did this during the American transition period, which is always a good time to do stuff, when the outgoing Administration is not looking closely and the new one is not in power yet. So they thought that they would enter the negotiations with the United States from a stronger position and maybe show that they are a few weeks away from enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.

That’s clearly part of the Israeli timetable, as well. We have a combination here of Iranian recklessness and a bold decision to go full speed or almost full speed ahead with uranium enrichment. You have the operational opportunity because of the October attack last year. And you had Trump, who was willing, for the first time in twenty years and after several American Presidents, to listen to the Israeli plan and give it some sort of green light and coördinate and then applaud it afterward, rather than saying, “We had no idea. We were not there. We just watched it on television.”♦

Donald Trump’s No-Strategy Strategy on Iran

Last week, Israel began an extensive bombing campaign on Iran, in what the Israeli Prime Minister,Benjamin Netanyahu, has claimed is an attempt to wipe out the country’s nuclear program. Iran has fired back missiles in response, but Israel’s military superiority has been clear: it has damaged nuclear sites and energy facilities across the country, and has assassinated key figures in Iran’s military leadership. PresidentDonald Trump, who has for months been saying that he would like to sign a nuclear deal with Iran—and who, in 2018, pulled out of the agreement that Barack Obama’s Administration had negotiated—has nevertheless offered significant military and rhetorical support to Israel’s current campaign. Despite what seemed like some initial reluctance to support an Israeli attack, he has now repeatedly threatened Iran, and its Supreme Leader, and called for an evacuation of Tehran. He has indicated that the United States may formally enter the conflict, perhaps in an effort to destroy Iran’s Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, which is considered reachable only with American weaponry.

To weigh this possibility, and to reflect on the United States’ role in the conflict, I recently spoke by phone with Aaron David Miller, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He previously worked at the State Department, and played a role in Middle East peace negotiations for decades, most notably at the end of the Clinton Administration. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed why Trump decided to support Israel’s war against Iran, what the Iran conflict reveals about the U.S.-Israeli relationship, and why people continue to misunderstand Trump’s approach to foreign policy.

What is your understanding, as of now, of how the Trump Administration became embroiled in the conflict between Israel and Iran?

I think it reflects a President who basically does not want a major conflict, and who didn’t want to involve the United States in a major conflict, but has not tried or figured out a way to get out of the conflict or to make American intervention less likely. That is his dilemma. We’ve got F-35s out there. We’ve got Aegis missile systems. We’ve got Patriots. He’s given the Israelis a tremendous political margin for support. He’s beaten back many of theMAGAenthusiasts who think that supporting Israel is throwing good money after bad. And he has now even provided rhetorical support.

So, if he didn’t want to get the United States involved, why is he doing these things?

To Donald Trump, it’s always a question of, How do I look? Am I being played? Am I being perceived as weak? Did I overcommit or overpromise the possibility of a deal with Iran? I think he’s trying to make a virtue out of necessity. But, whenever Trump was briefed that the Israelis were about to strike, he had the capacity and the personality and the power to tell Netanyahu to wait and, at a minimum, to get time.

TheTimesreported, on Tuesday, that the Administration felt boxed in, essentially, and that Netanyahu was going to conduct a military assault on Iran regardless. And so, to some degree, they had to go along because they couldn’t stop it. You seem to be saying that, in fact, they did have a certain amount of power.

Let me tell you why I think that. It’s not a popular view, and it’s not a view that many people hold. Donald Trump, in the last six weeks, has done things in and around and to Israel that no Republican President and no Democratic President I ever worked for, from Jimmy Carter to George W. Bush, has ever done. He has blown through two of the three basic political laws of gravity that have governed the U.S.-Israeli relationship. One is no daylight. In March, he, without Israel’s permission, authorized his hostage negotiator to open a dialogue with Hamas, a group that had already killed American citizens and had been responsible for the deaths of Israeli-American dual nationals. He cut a deal with the Houthis without the knowledge of the Israeli Prime Minister, which implicitly said that, as long as you don’t attack our naval assets, we have a ceasefire. He didn’t say anything about drones and ballistic missiles against Israel. Then, over the objections of Netanyahu, he removed sanctions on the new President of Syria. And he summoned Netanyahu to Washington from Budapest in April. Presumably, the Prime Minister thought he was coming to negotiate down tariffs. And then Trump announces, with the Prime Minister of Israel standing next to him, that he’s now opened direct negotiations with Iran. No other American President would have done something in this way. So that’s the no-daylight policy being discarded.

Second is the imperviousness to political costs or consequences. Had a Democratic President done the things that I just identified, somebody would have called for their impeachment. Trump’s margin for dealing more independently and more critically with the current Prime Minister of Israel is much larger than any American President has ever had. And this posture dates back to the first Trump term, when he believed that Netanyahu was using him. He doesn’t have the same emotional commitment to the idea of Israel, the people of Israel, the security of Israel that Joe Biden had. Israel to him is a means to an end.

The third political law of gravity that’s governed the relationship is aversion to serious and sustained pressure. Despite violating the first two, he wouldn’t or couldn’t get to No. 3. On an issue of extreme importance to Israel, which involved American equities and interests and potentially American lives, he couldn’t bring himself to say, “Look, you know, I know you have got to do what you have got to do, but I can’t be there for you. I need more time.” He may not have said “Attaboy” and green-lighted this thing, but he clearly didn’t say no.

When I read theTimespiece, I thought, O.K., this is something that we’ve seen before: an American Administration leaking that they were backed into a corner by the Israelis, that they had no choice. And what you seem to be saying is that Trump and his Administration actually had the political leeway that other American Administrations felt like they did not have, and he just didn’t take it. So we’ve ended up in the same situation that we’ve ended up in before, even though this could have been avoided without the same political cost.

Yeah, I’m suggesting to you a counterfactual. And others may say, “Oh, don’t be ridiculous, Aaron. Trump understood that Iran is a bad actor. There was no doubt in his mind.” I don’t buy that because I don’t think he’s committed to Netanyahu. Certainly he doesn’t care about the humanitarian situation for Iranians or Palestinians.

Let me put it this way. Trump is now managing three U.S.-mediated conflicts: Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Hamas, Israel-Iran. He has no effective strategy for how to deploy or to even try to deploy U.S. influence or leverage on any of them. He is situational. He is transactional. In the end, he has no strategy. Netanyahu came to him with a plan, and he may have had doubts but he didn’t say no. And once the plan was executed he responded with no broader concerns or worries about what the day after is going to look like. I think he’s moved away from being a guy who had serious doubts, worried that he was backed into a corner, and now he is, I think, reluctantly committed to, well—

He doesn’t seem reluctant in his public comments.

Right, the reluctance is gone, because what’s happened is, I think, he respects success and power. The Israelis have demonstrated success and power against a very bad actor. So, having passed up the opportunity to basically say, “No, give me more time,” he’s now contemplating the use of American military force in conjunction with the Israelis. Not to simply add on to what the Israelis are doing but to bring American power to bear, to do the one thing the Israelis cannot do that Americans can: long-range refuelling and massive-ordnance penetrators delivered by B-2 bombers that can be used to go after Iran’s Fordow reactor. And I would bet in his mind he’s not giving up the idea that getting involved could actually somehow translate itself into leverage.

He could go to Netanyahu and say, “Look, you see what I just did? We have to think about the day after and you have to stop.” But this is where I think it breaks down. I think the Iranians are going to respond. They have thousands of short-range ballistic missiles. Geography is destiny. They’ve already demonstrated in September, 2019, that they could orchestrate an attack on Saudi oil facilities with cruise missiles and drones. I’m not sure what the Iranians will do given the asymmetry of power, but there’s a very real possibility that they will strike U.S. assets in Iraq, in Syria, and in the Gulf. So that’s the day after.

And I should add that, unless Trump is prepared to move toward regime change, the Americans and Israelis cannot destroy the Iranian nuclear program. There are three models for regime change in the region. No. 1 is Egypt, or Tunisia—millions of Egyptians and Tunisians out in the streets, and security forces refuse to fire. No 2.: You have an organized, cohesive military force that has credibility—in the Syrian case, it was an Al Qaeda affiliate backed by the Turks. They didn’t even know how quickly they could get to Damascus. The hollowness of the regime facilitated this. The third option is Iraq and Afghanistan. None of these regime-change scenarios are appropriate or relevant to the situation that exists in Iran. So the question becomes: even if they destroy Fordow, can they permanently destroy an Iranian nuclear program? What is to stop reconstitution?

Do you think Israel’s goal is really to wipe out the nuclear program or is it broader?

I think Netanyahu has a problem. Can they really cease and desist knowing that they didn’t hit the main nuclear site? If you don’t hit Fordow, you can’t even make a credible claim that you demolished the program or constrained it for more than six months, maybe. No, Netanyahu needs Trump, and Trump may figure he needs to do this in order to get the Israelis to stand down. But he would have to show resolve.

In that case, it is not going to work because Trump does not have the resolve to see something complex through.

Right, so then it’s a military campaign, and what is the end result? What’s the day after an American strike going to look like? What happens? The Americans can maybe set the nuclear program back a year or two. Is the plan to do more strikes every three months? I don’t think that’s sustainable.

In terms of the broader relationships here, the U.S. always claims to have been put into a box by the Israelis. You and I talked about this during the Biden Administration. What does it say about our relationship to Israel that we keep finding ourselves in this place, or at least claiming to?

We are infantilizing the American Presidency. Look, I understand Biden and I am sympathetic to him.

You are the last person in America.

From the moment I saw his speech, after October 7th, about a black hole of loss, there was no way Biden could borrow from the three baskets that were available to him: restrict U.S. military assistance or make it conditional, introduce U.N. Security Council resolutions or vote for someone else’s, or unilaterally recognize Palestinian statehood and basically go on a campaign to question the value and the integrity of his Israeli partner.

Trump boxed himself in. He boxed himself in, in my judgment, by setting unrealistic deadlines for negotiations. He boxed himself in because he didn’t focus at all on the looming possibility that this Israeli government was seriously thinking of striking Iran. I also don’t think he drew the lesson from watching Netanyahu for six months in Gaza. Netanyahu wanted “total victory,” not negotiation. Had Trump not proposed these incremental hostage releases, there would have been no negotiation. There would have been no humanitarian assistance into Gaza. He also misread the Iranians in negotiations. And he misread the Israelis in terms of Netanyahu’s capacity to be flexible and to default to the military option. He refused to acknowledge that Netanyahu is no longer the risk-averse Prime Minister he was when I worked on this issue. He is now risk-ready and willing to go beyond his predecessors. Trump boxed himself in, because he’s not paying attention. He’s not focussed. He made the same mistake with Volodymyr Zelensky and Vladimir Putin. The conventional narrative that this is all a result of a crafty, clever Israeli Prime Minister who played Donald Trump? I’m sorry, no. He wasn’t willing to stand up and say no.

I agree with you about this infantilizing narrative that the Israelis play the Americans—there’s something silly about it. I would just say, though, that there’s also something tragic about the fact that, even if Trump is willing to go against the Israelis or to irritate Netanyahu in a way previous American Presidents were not, it still seems like Netanyahu’s managed to get to a place where, on the two issues that he probably cares about most, Iran and the Palestinians, he’s going to get what he wants, even from Trump. And so Trump may butt heads with him or have annoying news conferences with him, but fundamentally he’s going to get close to what he wants from Trump on both those issues.

I think that’s right. And Netanyahu has another ally, which is Hamas, the bad actor. And he’s got the mullahs. And the fact that those two actors helped plead his case—I think that also factors into Trump’s thinking. In terms of Netanyahu, I could argue one con man understands another. But Trump also understands that Netanyahu is dealing with bad actors and, by implication, so is Trump. As bad as Netanyahu may be, Hamas and Iran are worse.

It’s getting tougher to say that as the war in Gaza drags on.

Was the Obama nuclear deal working and did Netanyahu want a new one from Trump, one that I imagine would have looked relatively similar to the first?

The answer to the first question is that the nuclear deal was flawed but functional, because there are no good deals with Iran. There are only transactions. There are no transformations.

And Netanyahu does not believe in negotiations with Iran. He has certain principles. And, more importantly, Netanyahu’s aspiration, ultimately, is the end of this regime. He thinks that, if you want an end to the Iranian nuclear program, you have to change the regime. You don’t moderate their behavior. You change them. He knows that. And that means any negotiation, however credible, however long it delays things—he is not interested. He will only accept it if he has to. ♦

The Minnesota Shootings and the Dangerous Trend of Impersonating Law Enforcement

Around 2A.M.on Saturday morning, operators manning emergency lines in the Minneapolis suburb of Champlin, according to a police report, got a call from someone who said that a masked man had come to their home “and then shot their parents.” When police and medics arrived, they discovered that the victims were a Democratic state senator named John Hoffman, and his wife, Yvette, who were alive but badly injured. A “very intuitive” sergeant from the nearby city of Brooklyn Park, who had helped respond to the call, asked officers from his jurisdiction to check on the home of the Democratic state legislator Melissa Hortman, who was until recently the state House speaker. According to the Brooklyn Park police chief, Mark Bruley, when the officers arrived, at about 3:35A.M., they saw something unexpected: a “vehicle that looked exactly like an S.U.V. squad car” in the driveway with its emergency lights on. The front door was open, and the officers saw a man dressed like a cop firing into it; he killed Hortman and her husband, Mark. The officers fired at the shooter—since identified as Vance Boelter, a fifty-seven-year-old evangelical Christian (a website of his said that he is an ordained minister) with a scattered work history, who had recently been employed by local funeral-service companies—who ran back into the house and, for a time, escaped. He was arrested on Sunday evening and has been charged with federal murder, which carries the possibility of the death penalty.

The LedeReporting and commentary on what you need to know today.

The assassination of one elected official, and the attempted assassination of another, confirm the arrival of a new political era, in which the expectation and the fear of political violence are endemic. But who Boelter is, and the exact nature of his objectives and perceived grievances, may ultimately be less salient than whom he pretended to be. (Boelter’s motives aren’t yet clear, though he possessed what police have suggested may have been a target list of about seventy individuals, many of whom are Democratic politicians.) A state legislator summoned to his or her door well after midnight may be wary about opening it, but somewhat less reluctant if the person on the step is uniformed and there’s a cop car parked on the street. As it turns out, Boelter was driving an S.U.V. that he had presumably outfitted for a security business that hadn’t taken off. But he made the deliberate decision to leave the emergency lights on.

It was very smart of the real Brooklyn Park police officers to suspect what was happening, and their quick reaction might well have saved lives. (At a news conference on Monday, authorities in Minnesota revealed that Boelter had visited at least two other homes between Hoffman’s and Hortman’s, though no one was home at one, and he seemed to have been scared away at the other.) Their job could not have been helped by the fact that the past decade has seen the rise of an unstable environment around politics and law enforcement—one that arguably worsened around January 6th, when Donald Trump celebrated the vigilanteswho stormed the Capitoland attacked its police force as “warriors,” and later when he pardoned them for their decision to take the law into their own hands.

The politicization of law enforcement has acquired a new dimension during the ongoingimmigration crackdowns, when the Administration has sometimes seemed to allow its agents to disguise their identities or affiliations so that it is often unclear to detainees whose custody they are in, or under what authority. (If the vigilantes have been encouraged to act as cops, the actual cops have also been encouraged to act a bit more like vigilantes.) In Boston, in March, when federal agents arrested Rümeysa Öztürk, a Tufts University graduate student who had co-written a pro-Palestine op-ed in a campus newspaper, they were in plain clothes and masked. Sometimes the mission has been fuzzy or concealed: not long after the White Housedeployed seven hundred marinesto Los Angeles, purportedly to help quell the protests against immigration raids, photos spread of them detaining a protester. Catherine Rampell, of the WashingtonPost, reported last week on an immigration raid targeting a landscaper working outside a boutique home-design business in Great Barrington, Massachusetts, in which agents showed up “in masks and tactical gear and refused to show IDs, warrants or even the names of any criminals they were supposedly hunting.” In the piece, Rampell spoke to the business’s co-owner, Linda Shafiroff, who said, “It could have been like a band of the Proud Boys or something.”

In each of these circumstances, the federal government is asking ordinary people to trust that those wearing uniforms are acting on behalf of the public, while also allowing them to shroud their identity and their mission, and pushing the boundaries of what law enforcement can do. It is hard to imagine a scenario more perfectly engineered for exploitation. In February, a man wearing anICEjacket at the Conservative Political Action Conference, outside Washington, D.C., admitted to a podcaster that he had no affiliation with the agency, but said of his jacket, “It’s $29.99 on Amazon. I would recommend buying a small, if you’re my size.” In Philadelphia, police sought a man who had entered a car-repair shop wearing fake security apparel; yelled “Immigration!,” which caused some employees to scatter; and then proceeded to tie up a worker and rob the business. By the end of March, the fake-ICEsituation had grown sufficiently common in Southern California that the Los AngelesTimesran a feature titled “ICE impersonators and other scammers are on the rise: How to protect yourself.”

Some of these impersonators are scamming for money. But others, especially those harassing migrants, may be expressing some solidarity with the President’s political aims. The leaky membrane that Trump has established between law enforcement and his own agenda does a disservice to the officers, many of whom are simply trying to do their jobs. It may also make their work more dangerous. The more lawless the government is, the easier it is for lawless individuals to impersonate officers, and the more likely it is that citizens will doubt that the real officers actually represent a legal authority.

Which is a recipe for generalized mistrust. For citizens to know who an armed federal agent really is, and what authority he is operating under, should be part of even the most basic commitment to transparency. At a minimum, courts and politicians should pressure government agents to disclose their identities during raids and detentions, and to clarify where their authority begins and ends. If they don’t, or can’t, a more dystopian path beckons, of endemic suspicion of authority. (In California’s Central Valley, as immigration raids peaked, school attendance reportedly dropped by twenty-two per cent.) On Saturday, at an anti-Trump No Kings protest in Salt Lake City, Utah, a man reportedly appeared to be crouching behind a wall, while carrying what looked like an AR-15-style rifle. (Open carry is mostly legal in Utah, and it isn’t yet clear whether he supported or opposed the protests.) Several armed people whom the police referred to as “peacekeepers” providing security for the protest—though whether this role was official or self-assigned was under investigation—pulled their own weapons and yelled. One fired at the man, managing to disarm him but killing a bystander.

In Minnesota, authorities said that they were looking into Boelter’s motives, and whether he belonged to a wider network. In the meantime, jitteriness prevailed across the political class. TheTimessuggested that political violence is “becoming almost routine”; Greg Landsman, a Democratic congressman from Ohio, told the paper that for months he has envisioned an assassination attempt each time he speaks in public. “It’s still in my head. I don’t think it will go away,” he said. “It’s just me on the ground.” These are the kinds of pressures that can dispel public service, and disrupt a democracy. Amid all the general calls to cool the heated rhetoric of partisan politics, a specific measure might prove helpful: more clarity about who represents what area of law enforcement, and where the limits of their mission lie. Otherwise, this risks becoming the summer when everyone—all the way up to the politicians—began to feel unsafe.♦

The Trump Crackdown on Elected Officials

Last Thursday afternoon, the House Speaker, Mike Johnson, stood smiling in a hallway of the Capitol as he deflected reporters’ questions about the week’s most recent outrage. A few hours earlier, in Los Angeles, Alex Padilla, the senior Democratic senator from California, had interrupted a press conference held by Kristi Noem, the Secretary of Homeland Security, then was thrown to the ground and handcuffed by federal agents. In a video of the incident, Padilla, in dark slacks and a windbreaker, identifies himself before asking Noem about the Administration’s deployment of the National Guard and federal troops to police protests in L.A. “I saw the same video, a very brief video that I think many people did,” Johnson said. “Everybody can draw their own conclusions.” He went on to say that he would support a motion to censure Padilla, who, he added with a smirk, had acted “inappropriately.”

Shortly after the video went viral, the Trump Administration responded with its usual mendacity. Noem blamed Padilla for not identifying himself, even though the footage refuted her claims. In a subsequent interview, Padilla, who had arrived at the federal building in L.A. that day for a different meeting, said, “From the moment I entered the building, I’m being escorted by a member of the National Guard and an F.B.I. agent. I asked, ‘Well, since we’re waiting, can we go listen in to the press conference?’ They opened the door for me.” The Department of Homeland Security went on to post a statement on X in which it claimed, falsely, that Padilla had “lunged toward Secretary Noem” and “did not comply with officers’ repeated commands,” adding that the Secret Service “thought he was an attacker and officers acted appropriately.”

At the time, the arrest of a U.S. senator in Los Angeles was the latest incident in a pattern of increasingly aggressive actions that the Administration has taken against elected Democrats and their allies. Each instance has been tied to Trump’s immigration crackdown. In late April, the F.B.I. arrested and charged a Wisconsin county judge, Hannah Dugan, for allegedly aiding an undocumented immigrant in evading Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers at a local courthouse. (She has pleaded not guilty.) On May 9th,ICEagents arrested the mayor of Newark,Ras Baraka, and LaMonica McIver, a U.S. congresswoman, outside an immigration jail in New Jersey. Baraka, who was accused of trespassing on private property, was held for five hours before being released; the charges were dropped, and, a few weeks later, Baraka filed a defamation lawsuit against Alina Habba, Trump’s former personal lawyer and the interim U.S. Attorney for New Jersey. (The suit cites a stream of misleading claims that Habba had posted on social media about Baraka’s actions, saying, among other things, that “he has willingly chosen to disregard the law.”) McIver was charged with assaulting a federal officer in the chaos surrounding Baraka’s arrest, and indicted on June 10th. “The charges against me are purely political,” McIver hassaid. “They mischaracterize and distort my actions.” If convicted, she faces up to eight years in prison. On May 28th, D.H.S. agents barged into the New York City office of the veteran Democratic U.S. congressman Jerrold Nadler in pursuit of alleged rioters who had protested whileICEofficers arrested immigrants outside a courtroom. Moments after the agents reached the door, they handcuffed a staffer, claiming that, when they had demanded entry without a warrant, she had physically impeded them. On June 17th, less than a week after Padilla’s arrest,ICEagents tackled and handcuffedBrad Lander, the New York City comptroller and a candidate for mayor, as he accompanied a person outside an immigration court. “You’re obstructing,” an agent told him, according to a recording. Lander, as he was being cuffed near an elevator, replied, “I’m not obstructing. I’m standing right here in the hallway.” D.H.S. later charged him with “assaulting law enforcement and impeding a federal officer.”

The incidents involving lawmakers all have something in common: in each case, video evidence directly contradicted or undermined the Administration’s account of what happened. The charges against Representative McIver are without question the most serious. Yet she and two other representatives—Rob Menendez and Bonnie Watson Coleman, both New Jersey Democrats—travelled to the facility on May 9th to exercise an uncontroversial prerogative: members of Congress are allowed to visit and inspect immigration-detention facilities, unannounced, as part of their oversight role. The practice has become fairly common in recent years. The facility in Newark, called Delaney Hall, opened the first week of May, a few months after D.H.S. signed a $1.2-billion contract with the private-prison company GEO to operate it. Baraka, who at the time was running for governor, had objected to the contract and raised questions about aspects of the building permit. When he had tried to visit the facility in the past, GEO employees turned him away.

The three members of Congress arrived on May 9th around noon. To enter the facility, visitors pass through an outer gate and into an interior parking lot that leads to the main compound. They had been waiting for about an hour when Menendez noticed a number of armedICEagents exiting the building into the parking lot. “I’ve never really seen a handful of armed officers at a detention center,” he told me. “These guys were showing up clearly, like, the way you’d expect them to if they were about to go out into the field.” He remembered thinking, “What’s about to go down?”

It was then that Menendez realized Baraka had shown up, but that hardly explained why there would be so many agents. “I honestly thought that there literally was going to be a major, major raid, because I’ve never seen this many armed agents,” he said. According to Baraka’s lawsuit, Representative McIver had invited him to meet with the congressional delegation outside the facility after their tour. But, at 1:50P.M., a guard stationed at the outer gate invited Baraka inside, claiming that it would “calm the crowd” that had gathered outside to protest. About forty-five minutes later, a senior D.H.S. agent approached Baraka and ordered him to leave. He lingered, but only briefly. By then, the Congress members had seen Baraka inside the gate, and walked over to confer with him. The agent returned and threatened to arrest Baraka, who exited the premises onto public property outside.

What happened next is less clear. Menendez says he overheard part of a phone conversation in which a D.H.S. agent, apparently speaking to a superior, said something about a decision to arrest Baraka. A large group of agents then left the facility. “We were ready to go do the tour,” Menendez told me. “The mayor walked out. The situation was over.” Yet, he continued, “that’s when they decide to open the gate where they knew there were all these people who were on public property protesting.” It was inevitable that the situation would escalate: armed federal agents were converging on a crowd outside the grounds of the facility. The representatives went to join Baraka. Videos show them getting jostled and pushed in the scrum. There’s little question that McIver made physical contact with a federal agent. But the footage hardly demonstrates what she’s been accused of—she appears to be getting shoved herself. “You can’t talk to a congresswoman like that,” McIver can be heard saying at one point. A D.H.S. spokesperson later claimed, without evidence, that the members of Congress were part of a “mob” and were “assaulting ourICEenforcement officers, including body slamming a femaleICEofficer.”

Robert Gottheim, Nadler’s chief of staff, was stunned by the government’s inflated descriptions of its confrontations with public officials. “You exercise your rights. They do what they want. Then you figure it out after the fact,” he said. The immigration court in Manhattan is on the fifth floor of the federal building at 201 Varick Street; Nadler’s office is on the sixth floor. On the afternoon of May 28th,ICEofficers had shown up on the fifth floor with photos of immigrants who were scheduled to appear in court. As the Administration has intensified its arrest operations at courthouses and at routine check-in appointments atICEoffices, demonstrators and clergy have shown up to document the activity. Two members of Nadler’s staff had gone downstairs to observe and, when tensions flared, invited the activists upstairs to defuse the situation. Officers from the Federal Protective Service, a D.H.S. agency that guards government property and personnel, followed them to Nadler’s office.

The initial video of the encounter, shot on a witness’s phone and obtained byGothamist, opens with the sounds of Nadler’s staffer sobbing as an officer cuffs her hands behind her back. “She pushed him back,” another officer says. Someone off camera says, “No, she did not. That is not what happened.” Nadler’s office later releasedadditional security footagethat shows more of the exchange. Two officers enter the outer vestibule of Nadler’s office, while a third, with a dog, stands by the door. There’s no sound on the video, but Nadler’s staffer appears to have a conversation with the two officers before walking over to an interior door leading into the office that requires a code to open. As soon as she punches it in, one of the officers grabs her.

The government initially threatened to charge the staffer with assaulting a federal officer. Gottheim was in Italy with his family at the time. He received a call from a ranking officer at the Federal Protective Service, who told him that a staffer had committed an assault. Gottheim said, “Where? In our office?” According to Gottheim, the officer then said that he could charge her with disorderly conduct instead. “I said, ‘You’re going to give her disorderly conduct while she was in our own office? I need to get the congressman on the phone.” The staffer, who has not been identified, was eventually released without charges. Publicly, D.H.S. claimed to have been investigating rioters on the premises. There was no mention of the alleged assault. “In the beginning, we were not sure what they were going to do,” Gottheim said. “Then they released the statement. It really angered us. It was a total fabrication.” Nadler later said of the Administration, “They’re behaving like fascists.”

The Administration’s political calculus seems aimed at punishing and intimidating Democrats who challenge the President’s agenda. Earlier this week, following a day of nationwide “No Kings” protests, Trump orderedICEto increase arrests and deportations in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. “ICE Officers are herewith ordered, by notice of this TRUTH, to do all in their power to achieve this very important goal of delivering the single largest Mass Deportation Program in History,” he wrote on Truth Social. That D.H.S. personnel are unencumbered in targeting members of Congress marks a further—and unprecedented—escalation. It also capitalizes on the fact that many protections against such retaliation are grounded in norms rather than laws; pushing the boundaries of acceptable political conduct is easier when those lines are inherently blurry. A senior congressional aide told me, “Members themselves have some limited or arguable protections under the Speech and Debate Clause. But a lot of those protections, mostly due to case law over the years, don’t extend to staff and don’t apply when staff or offices are doing immigration casework.” Such outreach generally falls under the category of constituent services, the aide said, “but we have no immunity in any of those situations.” (In a statement, a White House spokesperson said, “It’s alarming Democrats think they can obstruct federal law enforcement, assault ICE agents, or physically push law enforcement officers while charging a cabinet secretary, without consequence – it’s even more alarming that the New Yorker is encouraging this lawless behavior.”)

There are increasingly urgent reasons for congressional oversight of immigration jails, which have always been notorious for their abysmal conditions. Now, with the Administration expanding its enforcement operations in radical new ways, there are fifty-one thousand people inICEcustody nationwide. On Friday, four detainees escaped from Delaney Hall, in the midst of rolling protests inside the facility among immigrants who described a persistent lack of food and sweltering heat. “People were desperate, breaking doors, banging on walls,” the wife of one of the escaped detainees told theTimes. (A GEO representative said, “There has been no widespread unrest at the facility.”) Last week, as thousands of people marched in the streets of Los Angeles and New York, in response to immigration raids, five members of Congress, in California and New York, were barred from touring detention facilities housing those who had been arrested in the enforcement sweeps. “It’s a direct violation of federal law,” a House aide told me. Since 2019, annual appropriations bills have included a provision explicitly making funding for immigration jails contingent on the ability of congressional appropriators to check on their investment.

There are three months left in the current fiscal year, and, by some estimates,ICEis already a billion dollars over budget. Last week, members of the House Appropriations Committee issued a report detailing its concerns. “ICE began spending more than its appropriated level shortly after the fiscal year commenced and operations now far exceed available resources,” the report says. The Trump Administration’s One Big Beautiful Bill, which passed in the House on May 22nd, would increaseICE’s funding for enforcement by seventy-five billion dollars. The actions ofICEand its partner agencies thus far have been extreme, but this would almost certainly supercharge their operations in the year ahead. One of the more surreal aspects of the Administration’s unapologetic aggression toward members of Congress is that Trump is also demanding their support to expand the very power that’s being used against them.“They’re targeting senators at the same time that these senators are being asked to triple the Administration’s enforcement budget,” Andrea Flores, the vice-president of immigration policy at the nonprofit FWD.us, and a former aide to Democrats in both the White House and the Senate, said. “They’re trying to criminalize legally protected congressional activity. It’s terrifying for any legislator trying to do their job right now.” The White House has called for the bill’s passage by July 4th. ♦

How My Reporting on the Columbia Protests Led to My Deportation

As an Australian who wrote about the demonstrations while on campus, I gave my phone a superficial clean before flying to the U.S. I underestimated what I was up against.

Many people are detained at U.S. airports for reasons they find arbitrary and mysterious. I got lucky—when I was stopped by Customs and Border Protection last week, after flying to Los Angeles from Melbourne, a border agent told me, explicitly and proudly, why I’d been pulled out of the customs line. “Look, we both know why you are here,” the agent told me. He identified himself to me as Adam, though his colleagues referred to him as Officer Martinez. When I said that I didn’t, he looked surprised. “It’s because of what you wrote online about the protests at Columbia University,” he said.

They were waiting for me when I got off the plane. Officer Martinez intercepted me before I entered primary processing and took me immediately into an interrogation room in the back, where he took my phone and demanded my passcode. When I refused, I was told I would be immediately sent back home if I did not comply. I should have taken that deal and opted for the quick deportation. But in that moment, dazed from my fourteen-hour flight, I believed C.B.P. would let me into the U.S. once they realized they were dealing with a middling writer from regional Australia. So I complied.

Then began the first “interview.” The questions focussed almost entirely on my reporting about the Columbia student protests. From 2022 to 2024, I attended Columbia for an M.F.A. program, on a student visa, and when the encampment began in April of last year I began publishing daily missives to mySubstack, a blog that virtually no one (except, apparently, the U.S. government) seemed to read. To Officer Martinez, the pieces were highly concerning. He asked me what I thought about “it all,” meaning the conflict on campus, as well as the conflict between Israel and Hamas. He asked my opinion of Israel, of Hamas, of the student protesters. He asked if I was friends with any Jews. He asked for my views on a one- versus a two-state solution. He asked who was at fault: Israel or Palestine. He asked what Israel should do differently. (The Department of Homeland Security, which governs the C.B.P., claims that any allegations that I’d been arrested for political beliefs are false.)

Then he asked me to name students involved in the protests. He asked which WhatsApp groups, of student protesters, I was a member of. He asked who fed me “the information” about the protests. He asked me to give up the identities of people I “worked with.”

Unfortunately for Officer Martinez, I didn’t work with anyone. I participated in the protests as an independent student journalist who one day stumbled upon tents on the lawn. My writing, all of which is now publicly available, was certainly sympathetic to the protesters and their demands, but it comprised an accurate and honest documentation of the events at Columbia. That, of course, was the problem.

This past February, I booked a trip from Melbourne to New York, with a layover in Los Angeles, so that I could visit some friends for a couple of weeks. In that time, stories of tourists being detained in and denied entry from the U.S. had begun to regularly appear in Australian media. I began to think about what precautions I should take when crossing the U.S. border. I opted against taking a burner phone—a move that some legal experts had advised, in the press—believing it would provoke suspicion, and simply decided to give my phone and social media a superficial clean.

I designed my strategy around the understanding I had developed, after living in the United States for five years and travelling between the States and Australia time and time again, that C.B.P. was fundamentally unsophisticated and ad hoc in its methods, and that I would have to get extremely unlucky to be searched at all. I understood that, if I encountered any difficulty, it would be because the primary-processing officer at the end of that long line at LAX would notice that I had been a Columbia student, and ask to see my phone. If he searched through it, he would encounter the messy and personal digital life of a worryingly single thirty-three-year-old man. But he would not find photographs from protests, Signal conversations, or my Substack posts, which I took down in the week leading up to my flight.

But C.B.P. had prepared for me well before my arrival. They did not need to identify me at LAX as someone worthy of investigation: they had evidently decided that weeks before. MyESTAapplication—the system by which many tourists become eligible to visit the U.S. under the visa waiver program—must have triggered something on their end. Perhaps C.B.P. now has the technological dexterity to check the web history of everyESTAapplicant. Or, perhaps, I was named ina list—provided by the far-right pro-Israel organization Betar US, to representatives of the Trump Administration—of visa holders whom it hoped to see deported. In either case, a U.S. government officer must have read my work and decided that I was not fit to enter the country. Because Officer Martinez had apparently read all of my material so long ago, he didn’t even know that I had taken all this materialdown.What this means is that, by the time a foreigner cleans his social media in preparation for a trip to the U.S., as much of our news media has been urging us to do, it may already be too late.

For me, this mistake was a disaster. Because I’d designed my strategy around passing the standard passport line, I was totally ill-equipped for what happened in the interrogation room. Though I did not know it then, I was participating in an interview that I was never going to pass. It didn’t matter that my views on Israel-Palestine seemed to disappoint Officer Martinez in their lack of divisiveness—I told him it is a conflict in which everyone has blood on their hands, but which can and should be brought to an immediate end by the dominant power. He asked if other Australians feel the same, and I told him that yes, most do. This seemed only to perturb him. When he ran out of questions about Israel, he disappeared into the back room to begin downloading the contents of my phone.

He was gone for a long time. I imagined him, in his office, using some new software to surface all the grimy details of my life. Though I’d deleted a lot of material related to the protests from my device, I’d kept plenty of personal content. Presumably Martinez was skimming through all of this—the embarrassing, the shameful, the sexual.

That fear was confirmed. Martinez came out and said that I needed to unlock the Hidden folder in my photo album. I told him it would be better for him if I did not. He insisted. I felt I had no choice. I did have a choice, of course: the choice of noncompliance and deportation. But by then my bravery had left me. I was afraid of this man and of the power that he represented. So instead I unlocked the folder and watched as he scrolled through all of my most personal content in front of me. We looked at a photo of my penis together.

When he was done, he disappeared again into the other room. I sat there, trying to understand why, despite my hard-won comfort with myself, and with sexuality in general, I felt so violated. I am proud of my life, of who I am. That didn’t seem to help. I realized then I had no privacy left for them to invade.

This time, Martinez was gone for even longer. After fifteen or twenty minutes, the person who had been left in the room to guard me, a lumbersome, goateed man without a name badge, turned to me and said, “God, dude, what do you have on your phone? This normally takes five minutes.”

This is when I truly knew I was fucked—not because the guard was telling the truth but because I sensed he was not. My feeling then was that he was playing his own part, a part designed to mount pressure, to intimidate.

When Martinez finally came out, he was bouncing toward me excitedly, like a kid with a lollipop. He said that they had found evidence of drug use on my phone. Did I realize that I had failed to acknowledge a history of drug use on myESTA?

I moved, in seconds, from a desire to be amiable to a desire not to be found lying. In the gray zone between the arrival gate and passport control you are beyond the reach of the U.S. Constitution. You have fewer protections than a criminal metres away, inside the border. People with legal standing are much harder, it turns out, to abuse. In the C.B.P. interrogation room, I had not quite fallen to the level of statelessness, but I had fallen below the criminal.

Were I not fatigued from a long flight and from a long interrogation, and were I not stressed and scared, I would have recalled that my phone doesnothave clear evidence of drug use. A better version of me, the version I like to think I am, would have called bullshit on this bluff. But at that moment I could not account for every single one of the four thousand-odd photos on my phone. I imagined photographs that do not exist, messages that do not exist, proving that I was some sort of drug kingpin. So I admitted that I had done drugs in the past—in other countries as well as in the U.S., where I had bought THC gummies at a dispensary in New York.

Marijuana is legal in New York, but it is not legal federally, and so it seems that, in the eyes of C.B.P., I had broken federal law for purchasing legal weed in New York, and then perhaps again by failing to declare it on myESTA. Martinez, who seemed now to be bubbling over with excitement, went back to his supervisor to, in his words, “pitch this.” When he came back, he told me I would be put on the next flight back to Australia.

Martinez and another officer took me in the back, pushed me against the wall and patted me down. Martinez made sure that I carried no weaponry between my penis and my scrotum. They took the shoelaces out of my shoes and the string out of my elastic pants, presumably so that I would not be able to hang myself. This struck me as overly cautious, but as I entered the detention room I changed my mind. We were so deep in the building, and so clearly underground, that the very notion of a window started to feel like something from a half-remembered dream. Three months ago, a Canadian woman was disappeared into the system for nearly two weeks. I did not know then whether I would be out in one hour, one day, or one month. When I was brought into the room, I encountered a young woman, in tears, begging the guard for information. He told her he had no information to give her and that none would be forthcoming. “Thatwoman,” he said, pointing to a bundle of blankets in the corner, “has been here for four days.”

After that I started to spiral. We detainees were banned from talking to one another. There wasn’t anyone I could communicate with, anyway—a barrier in the room separated the men from the women, and I was the only man. There was food—cup noodles mostly—and a vending machine with M&M’s and Coca-Cola that we could use “if we had brought cash,” one of the guards told me. The room was so cold that all of us were wrapped in C.B.P. blankets.

The bulbs buzzed and the air-conditioning hummed throughout the day, or the night, or whenever it now was. I learned then that the detention room is a place where time itself is detained, that the clock behind the guard, who himself sits behind plexiglass, existed mostly to taunt us. We worked hard not to look at that clock, because, though the hands would move, we had no concept of what they were moving toward. The horror of the thing was that no one knew where we were, and we had no way of telling them. We were isolated from one another and also from the world.

It was then, some hours after first being detained, that I realized C.B.P. must be governed bysomeinternal procedure regarding the distribution of information, and I approached the guard to ask if there was any way I was allowed to get word of my detainment to the outside world.

“You can call your consulate,” he said.

I exercised that right immediately. He dialled the number, and I stood there at his desk, talking loudly so that the others, who I doubted had been informed about their right, could hear me. The woman at the other end of the phone told me that in all likelihood I would be on a plane that evening, about six hours from then, and that, if I knew the number of any of my contacts by heart, she would notify them for me. That’s how my mother found out.

About three hours later, after I passed out on a cot in the detention pen, an officer shouted and woke me up. I was taken to another room and subjected to a second interview, one I did not know was coming, in which all the same questions of the first interview were repeated. I lost my patience with this new guy, Officer Woo. “If you are already going to deport me,” I asked him, “why should I answer any of your questions?”

He seemed shocked at that. “We haven’t decided if we are going to deport you yet,” he said. Then he paused. “But looking at your file . . . I can see why the other officer told you you were going home.”

This second interview had a “Groundhog Day” quality to it, except I was glad for the repetition. We encountered errors in Martinez’s notes. At one point, when I told Woo that the demonstrations at Columbia were “pro-peace” protests, he looked at me with real surprise. “I thought they were pro-Hamas protests?” he asked, quite genuinely. I was stunned by the innocence he brought to a question I found violently absurd. He couldn’t seem to bear the look I gave him then, a look somewhere between horror, exasperation, and fury, and, in embarrassment, he started to laugh.

I was put on a plane, eventually. It was indeed the next Qantas flight out, QF94 at 9:50P.M.on June 12th, roughly twenty-seven hours since I’d first left Melbourne and twelve hours since I’d arrived at LAX. Two heavily armed C.B.P. guards led me out of the detention room and marched me through the bowels of the airport, and then, suddenly, into the bright lights of the duty-free shops, and then finally toward the gate, where, as I stood with guards at the head of the queue, I watched my compatriots board one by one. This gate at LAX is famous to the many Australians who have passed through it on their way home. The armed-guard act from C.B.P. was, I think, supposed to be a kind of shaming, but I felt such a surge of love and respect for my own people that I began to smile and joke with passengers as they passed. The guards did not like this.

When the plane was loaded, I was finally allowed on. The lead guard, Officer Liu, handed an envelope with my passport and phone to the head flight attendant, who, seeing at once what was happening, began to treat me with conspicuous warmth, and the guards, uncomfortable in their contrast, quietly disappeared.

Qantas itself no longer reflects the warmth of its staff—presumably at the request of C.B.P., the airline withheld my phone and passport from me until we landed in Melbourne. In this respect the airline is, in my view, carrying water for the Trump Administration. (Qantas did not respond to a request for comment.) Because I did not have my phone, no one—not me nor the consulate—had informed anyone in Australia that I was on that plane, and I landed back in my home country believing that I would have to make my own way to my house in the bush, nearly two hours from Melbourne.

Every year scores of Australians and thousands of others are denied entry to the United States. C.B.P. has full discretion, after all. There is nothing new about the U.S. ferociously, arbitrarily, and cruelly deploying that discretion in order to keep out people the government does not like. Whatisnew is the politically motivated deployment of that power to exclude speech that the government does not want to hear.

WhenMahmoud Khalilwas detained, I wrote on my blog that the U.S. had pivoted to a new tactic, one I called“the deportation of dissent.” Then it happened to me. C.B.P. ostensibly marked me for denial of entry before I arrived. Its officers told me explicitly why I had been marked. Then it used the powers at its disposal to make sure I did not enter the country.

I do not yet know if I will be allowed back, or if I have been banned, as can happen to travellers accused of misrepresenting their experience with drugs. But I fear that writing about this, and speaking to the media, as I have done, will trigger further reprisals from the U.S. government. I’m afraid that I will be banned for good, if I haven’t been already, or that the information on my phone, which I handed over to them, will be used against me. But I was targeted for writing honestly about what was in front of me—the same thing I’m doing now. That is worth its price. ♦

Was a Right to Gender-Affirming Care for Minors Possible?

The Supreme Court was unlikely to strike down a state ban on some pediatric medical treatments, but the Biden Justice Department’s strategy made it even more improbable.

Preventing harm to children is a goal with which most people would agree. But the widening gulf between red and blue states has meant that, in a range of areas, there is no consensus—indeed, there’s extreme polarity—on what “harm” even means. On the issue of gender-affirming medical treatments for trans children and adolescents, both sides have claimed life-or-death stakes. More than half the states have laws that limit doctors from giving such treatments to minors; the remaining states allow this kind of care. On Wednesday, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Skrmetti, held that a Tennessee state ban on the use of puberty blockers and hormones to treat minors’ gender dysphoria does not violate the equal-protection clause of the Constitution. The decision will allow other states to leave in place dozens of similarly restrictive laws.

The LedeReporting and commentary on what you need to know today.

The bid to get the Supreme Court to strike down those bans, as it once did with abortion bans, was a pipe dream. But it’s difficult to imagine a version of legislation more likely to run afoul of the Court’s equal-protection doctrine than what the Tennessee legislature enacted. The statute, SB1, prohibits medical providers from using puberty blockers, hormones, or surgery to enable a minor to identify with a “purported identity inconsistent with the minor’s sex”—but allows the same medical treatments to be used for other purposes, including to support the “normal development” of a “minor’s sex.” One of the law’s explicitly stated purposes is “encouraging minors to appreciate their sex” and not “to become disdainful of their sex.” SB1 seemed like an obvious, textbook example of a law that “classifies” based on sex, and therefore is supposed to be subject to “heightened” or “intermediate” scrutiny, in which a court asks whether the sex classification is substantially related to the achievement of an important government objective. If the answer is no, the law is unconstitutional. As Justice Sonia Sotomayor pointed out in a dissent, which was joined by the two other liberal Justices, “Sex determines access to the covered medication.” The state permits the use of puberty blockers and hormones “to help a male child, but not a female child, look more like a boy; and to help a female child, but not a male child, look more like a girl,” Sotomayor wrote. If that is not a sex classification, what in the world is?

Like the dissenters, many students of equal-protection doctrine would immediately have perceived a sex classification here and moved to analyze it under intermediate scrutiny. But Chief Justice John Roberts’s majority opinion, which was joined by the other five conservative Justices, was a master class in reframing the issues to see something entirely different. In his eyes, SB1 was hardly about sex at all and “clearly does not classify on the basis of sex.” Instead, he saw in the law only classifications based on age and “medical use.” That is, when “a transgender boy (whose biological sex is female) takes puberty blockers to treat his gender incongruence, he receives a different medical treatment than a boy whose biological sex is male who takes puberty blockers to treat his precocious puberty.” So, according to the Court, access to the medicine turns not on whether the patient is a boy or a girl, but rather on what medical condition the drug is prescribed for. Banning the medicine to treat gender dysphoria prohibits it equally for both boys and girls, and allowing the same medicine to treat precocious puberty permits it equally for both as well. Ergo, no sex classification, Roberts concluded. These gymnastics make one wonder whether any classification based on sex could, presto chango, turn out not to be.

The Court similarly swatted away an argument that SB1 discriminates against trans people, reasoning that both transgender and cisgender minors are equally unable to receive the medicine to treat gender dysphoria. (To me, this logic is as faulty as that of the case the conservative Justices relied on at length, Geduldig v. Aiello, which, in 1974, found that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is not sex discrimination because some women don’t get pregnant.) Because Roberts did not see the law as classifying based on transgender status, he did not find the need to address the question of whether transgender status is a suspect or quasi-suspect class—like race, national origin, or sex—in which case the law also would have received a higher level of judicial scrutiny. (The Court has not declared a new suspect class in five decades, since it found that sex was quasi-suspect.) JusticesAmy Coney BarrettandSamuel Alito, in separate concurring opinions, went the extra mile to underscore that they do not believe transgender people are a suspect class, asserting, among other things, that being trans is not, like race, “an immutable characteristic.” Barrett added that a suspect class must be a group with a history of discrimination embedded in the law—not just a history of being discriminated against in general—and found that transgender people do not fit that criterion.

Underneath the Chief Justice’s clipped conclusions, the beating heart of Skrmetti was the Court’s subdued but palpable horror at the state of scientific evidence on the efficacy and safety of pediatric gender-affirming treatments. In its 2023 petition to the Court, Biden’s Justice Department came in with overblown claims of scientific consensus—that “overwhelming evidence” supports the use of puberty blockers and hormones for pediatric gender dysphoria, and that it is “the overwhelming consensus of the medical community”—just as the public was starting to learn how much uncertainty lies beneath common practices and recommendations in pediatric gender-affirming medicine. Several Justices’ concurring opinions foregrounded the dearth of reliable studies and conclusive findings about long-term outcomes of the use of puberty blockers and hormones for transgender minors, and cited several European countries’ acknowledgments in the past several years about the insufficient evidence. England’s National Health Service report on the subject, published in April of 2024 and known as the Cass Review, concluded that there is “no good evidence on the long-term outcomes of interventions to manage gender-related distress” in trans minors, and that “results of studies are exaggerated or misrepresented by people on all sides of the debate to support their viewpoint.” (Justice Clarence Thomas’s concurring opinion seemed to get sidetracked in something of a screed against “the expert class” and “elite sentiment” operating “under the guise of scientific judgment,” even citing a favorite medical bugbear, eugenics.)

It was always tough to picture the current Court telling states that they cannot limit pediatric gender-affirming medical treatments. But there had been a chance that Justice Neil Gorsuch, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, would take a surprising stand, as he did inBostock v. Clayton County, in 2020, to form a majority; in that case, the Court concluded that employment discrimination against gay or transgender employees violates Title VII’s ban on discrimination “because of” an individual’s “sex,” reasoning that it is “impossible to discriminate against a person for being homosexual or transgender without discriminating against that individual based on sex.”

Persuading two conservative Justices to extend this highly formalistic reasoning into a constitutional equal-protection case about pediatric gender-affirming medicine required delicacy. But the failure to sufficiently acknowledge medical uncertainty made even knockdown legal arguments to the Court seem untrustworthy. Believing that the petitioner’s legal arguments were more correct than Tennessee’s in light of the sum total of past constitutional sex-equality cases and the gravitational force of Bostock, I had wondered if the loss of credibility regarding medical evidence would push away the possible swing votes. Modesty about the state of the scientific evidence would have been perfectly consistent with a constitutional objection to a sex classification that deprives doctors of the ability to exercise medical judgment and determine what is appropriate for particular patients.

In any event, a Gorsuch-led majority reprising the reasoning of Bostock did not materialize. The Court found SB1 constitutional because it concluded that the state had legitimate concerns about the possible risks of physical and psychological harm to minors, including irreversible sterility and regret. In the face of medical uncertainty, the Court was unwilling to “second-guess” a legislature’s decision. Justice Gorsuch remained notably silent and merely signed onto the Chief Justice’s opinion.

The Skrmetti decision is unlikely to change much in terms of pediatric gender-affirming medicine: red states will continue limiting access to the treatments, and blue states will likely continue to allow them. But a Supreme Court decision declaring that there is no equal-protection right in this context is a significant setback for transgender rights more broadly. State and federal governments may take it as a signal that it is permissible to restrict the freedom and opportunities of transgender people, as the Trump Administration hasaggressively been doing, particularly in the military. No states currently prohibit gender-affirming medical treatment for adults (though some prohibit Medicaid from covering it), but Skrmetti opens the door to the argument that legislatures’ concerns about medical uncertainty may allow them to restrict the care for all ages. Then again, the Justices’ unease about whether children and adolescents can genuinely consent to life-altering treatments would be lacking in the case of adults.

Skrmetti did not adjudicate trans people’s rights to access bathrooms, tocompete in sports, to be addressed by their chosen names and pronouns, and to obtain passports in accordance with their gender identities. Nevertheless, Justice Barrett’s concurrence left little doubt that even laws that are found to classify based on trangender status will not be subject to heightened scrutiny. She seemed to be saying loud and clear that the Supreme Court will not be a good venue for vindicating transgender rights in the foreseeable future. Bringing Skrmetti to the Justices may have been a strategic misstep for trans rights, but it will be hard to know whether doing so caused more harm than not having brought it. ♦